


^, ^'^. 



■^'/ih 



.r?9 



-.>,,xv 



A "ON 



"^y ,x^^' 



<1> 'ri-. 



' •> ^- ^ .v\ 



-\^ 






.\.- s y..rfV.^.^ 












.\ 



>; ,0 



o 0^ 



* , O- 



•^A *^'- 



.0^^ 






- 1: 



'^^ d*^'- 



0^ ^''^^'"z 



IB-, ■' 



' I) :; ^ ' -O 



* ., o ,0' 



>^^>,v:2J^, 



0> s^ ■/ Ov '^o 









''>.>^W^:.\. 






xX^'^. 






'^. " s ■ vx 



%,<^^^' :*^tC' 



A-^ V^ 






AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 
FROM THE PACIFIC 



BOOKS BY PUTNAM WEALE 

Political 

Manchu and Muscovite. 

The Re-Shaping of the Far East (2 volumes). 

The Truce in the East and Its Aftermath. 

The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia. 

The Conflict of Colour. 

The Fight for the Republic in China. 

The Truth about China and Japan. 

An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific. 

Romantic 

The Forbidden Boundary. 

The Human Cobweb. 

The Unknown God. 

The Romance of a Few Days. 

The Revolt. 

The Eternal Priestess. 

The Altar Fire. 

Wang the Niath. 

Autobiographical 

Indiscreet Letters from Peking. 



AN 

INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

FROM THE PACIFIC 



BY 
PUTNAM WEALE 



Questions are never indiscreet 
Answers sometimes are . . ." 

OSCAK WlUiE 




NEW YORK 

DOBD, MEAD AND COMPANY 

1922 






\1> 



Copyright, 1922, 
Bi DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY, INC. 






0/ 




>CU686806 



PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. BY 

TB6e <Bum n Jc JBotitn Company 

BOOK MANUFACTURERS 
RAHWAY NEW JERSEY 



U^n^72 



NOTE 

Putnam Weale is the pen-name of Bertram Lenox 
Simpson, an Englishman in the political section of 
the office of the President of China. Beginning his 
official career twenty-six years ago, under the late 
Sir Robert Hart, the famous head of the Revenue 
in China, he resigned after the siege of the Legations 
and began writing books of which there are now 
nearly twenty to his credit. Of his former chief he 
says, "He trained me with a rod of iron." His lit- 
erary method discloses this early training. 

After the Revolution of 1911-12 he received offers 
to re-enter the government service. But it was not 
until 1916, and the overthrow and death of Yuan 
Shih-kai, that he resumed official work in the political 
department. Since then he has been sent on many 
missions and is mainly responsible for the Reports 
on foreign affairs. 

This book deals with steps taken to bring about the 
demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty, and 
is in many ways an extraordinary compilation. 

'Xugmt, 1922. 



CONTENTS 

PART PAGE 

I The Problem 1 

II The Instrumentality of Canada ... 32 

III The United States Takes a First Step . 61 

IV The Imperial Conference of 1921 . . 88 
V Canossa 125 

VI Washington in November . . . .152 

VII Climax and Anti-Climax 179 

VIII The Reckoning 215 

Appendix. The Washington Treaties and 

Resolutions 249 



LIST OF MAPS 

PAGE 

I Territory of the Far Eastern Republic . 34 

II Map of the Northern Pacific . . . 56 

III Railway Map of China ... .82 

IV Pacific Possessions of Various Nations 
Concerned in the Problems Discussed 
AT THE Washington Conference . . 128 

V The Far East Showing Iron and Oil De- 
posits 182 

VI Map Illustrating Canalization of Chi- 
nese Warfare by the Railways . . 200 



AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 
FROM THE PACIFIC 



PART I 

THE PROBLEM 



I HAVE lately come to the conclusion that the funda- 
mental policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate (which 
was likewise the initial policy of the defunct Manchu 
dynasty) in forbidding in the Seventeenth Century 
in as absolute a manner as possible intercourse with 
Western countries was scientifically correct. 

The Japanese were more thorough in their policy 
than the Chinese because they were then as now es- 
sentially a maritime people understanding the im- 
portance of the sea, and much given to the pursuit 
of ideas to their logical conclusion without regard 
for the ultimate consequences. They had for hun- 
dreds of years prior to the prohibition wandered in 
their shipping over a goodly part of the Eastern 
arms of the Pacific Ocean, and captured by piratical 
assault coast towns in Northern and Central China, 
harbours in the Philippine archipelago, and prahus 
in the Straits of Malacca. Regulations made in the 
Ming dynasty (Fourteenth to Seventeenth Century) 



2 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

prescribe very minutely the number of persons who 
might accompany Japanese embassies to Nanking, 
the old Southern capital, because it was always 
feared by the Court that bands of swordsmen might 
be concealed in such corteges, who would not hesitate 
to attempt a coup de mam if the odds seemed in 
their favour. It is an interesting historical fact that 
the failure of the Mongol invasions of Japan in the 
Thirteenth Century led to a great outburst of piracy 
and raiding on the part of Japanese. The men of 
five centuries ago had therefore almost precisely the 
same characteristics as to-day; the modifications 
which have taken place are infinitesimal; and it will 
be interesting to watch whether they will in the end 
react to foreign economic pressure much as they 
finally did to foreign cultural and military supe- 
riority in the early Tokugawa period. 

The Chinese were less drastic in their prohibition 
because they were (and still are) not only philo- 
sophic but creatures of a curiously contradictory com- 
pound. A friend from the southern provinces who 
has reflected long on the matter, constantly declares 
to me that their nature is a mixture of the cynic and 
epicurean; they have a contempt for human nature 
and yet at one and the same time are much given to 
sensual enjoyment. This estimate seems to me just 
because on no other basis can their marvellous and 
splendid art be reconciled with the rather sordid 
background of their daily lives. It was not in them 
to reject the West in the manner the Japanese did 



FROM THE PACIFIC 3 

immediately they believed that that gesture was 
requisite to secure their own institutions. That 
seemed too extreme for them, no matter how ugly 
European conquest might be. European historians 
have been much given to describing in glowing terms 
the effects which the Turkish capture of Constanti- 
nople and the loss of the old land-routes to the East 
had on the progress of the Western races. They 
have never ceased proclaiming that the white man, 
victoriously bursting his bonds and sailing round 
Africa, Asia, and the Americas, by his sea-mastery 
conquered the world in the space of half a century, 
and vastly benefited humanity. How the cultured 
Asiatic felt about the assault on his domains is a mat- 
ter which has not attracted much attention, although 
Mr. H. G. Wells in his Outline of History has almost 
for the first time in the cast of any Western writer 
taken more adequate views. 

The Japanese walled themselves in against Eu- 
rope, leaving open only a tiny window at Deshima in 
tihe harbour of Nagasaki to which Dutch traders 
came once a year, because fear had gained them. 
Spanish galleons, wrecked on their shores, had shown 
them as in a glass darkly what the famous infantry 
of Alva might mean to them, and how impossible it 
would be to resist a great expeditionary force if 
Western cupidity were thoroughly aroused. There 
was undoubtedly in the Japanese brain a memory 
of the great Mongol armadas of the Thirteenth 
Century, which had succeeded in effecting a landing 



4 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

on Japanese soil and had only been destroyed, much 
as the Spanish Armada to England was destroyed, 
by great storms. Other points which must have 
influenced policy were the success of the Korean ad- 
mirals in burning the Japanese fleets during the 
Hideyoshi Expedition, and a growing conviction that 
Western firearms (shown them by the Portuguese 
and Spanish) were a handicap which they could not 
surmount. 

But allied to this was another fear, far more 
insidious since it postulated the war of ideas, a fear 
which is again to-day in new forms heavily assault- 
ing them. Christianity, in the person of those im- 
mortals whose accoimts of early Japan, like their ac- 
counts of early China, remain deKghtful prose poems, 
had not only knocked at the doors of the country, 
but achieved astonishing success. Great daimyos 
had listened and believed and had been baptized. 
The wearing of the scapula was beginning to be 
fashionable. The little-known and uncompleted his- 
tory of the Japanese people by Murdoch, a monu- 
mental work, has to be read in order to understand 
the vast commotion in Japanese society. The Japan- 
ese nature, always dramatic and intense, seemed on 
the point of achieving something new and remark- 
able in a manner totally unknown in the East. . . . 

The closing of Japan by the Shogunate was thus 
a double gesture: there was the outward and visible 
slam of the door to keep out aliens, and the inward 
.and secret act which ironed out dissidents. The curl- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 5 

ous Japanese type, created by a racial fusion which 
is by no means yet clear, and which has in it un- 
doubtedly very contradictory elements, had been 
temporarily saved. Japanese culture, obtained from 
China by way of Korea a thousand years previously 
and hammered into the amalgam of race by slow 
processes, became even more stereotyped than be- 
fore. The old order of society, based on monastic 
orders and feudalism and traditional observances, 
was such a nice balance that to hold it in place seclu- 
sion was plainly necessary. Had the Shogunate 
been cancelled by maintaining the open door and per- 
mitting the constant entiy of zealous missionaries, 
not to speak of the traders with their arquebuses,, it 
is almost certain that Japanese history would have 
resembled the history of Asia Minor before Arab and 
Turk destroyed the Norman kingdoms on the Medi- 
terranean. The Christian daimyos, who fought in 
the Korean expedition of 1596 with cries of "Maria" 
under banners adorned with the Cross, might have 
been .the founders of Catholic principalities on the 
shores of the Inland Sea. . . . 



II 

The action of the Chinese, while based on the same 
general principle, was curiously different in its de- 
tail. The Manchus had inherited most of their 
foreign policy from the Ming dynasty, just as the 
Republic of China has inherited most of its foreign 



6 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

policy from the Manchus. The Ming dynasty had 
no very settled ideas on the subject of foreigners 
until Portuguese mariners in the Sixteenth Century 
began to behave atrociously in the coast towns of 
Southern China and sallied forth and provided them- 
selves with virgins whom they spirited away to their 
ships. This led to fierce reprisals and the destruc- 
tion of the early settlements. Eventually Macao — 
a tiny town in the Canton estuary — became the sole 
legal residence; and it is a curious commentary on 
the vagueness and indifference which characterize 
foreign affairs that even to-day the Macao question 
is unsettled in certain particulars. 

Meanwhile the Chinese, being essentially com- 
mercial-minded, evolved at Canton a special machin- 
ery based on the close corporation idea, which stand- 
ardized the exchange of goods at the seasons set by 
the trade winds and allowed fleets of vessels to come 
and go. Their own great junks still sailed down to 
Singapore as they had done in Marco Polo's day, 
trans-shipping their cargo and getting new freight 
without such regard for Western activities; whereas 
the Japanese made the building of sea-going vessels 
a death offence. The Chinese had the same religious 
problem as the Japanese; but they were indifferent 
in the matter until a clear ruling from the Pope made 
the authority of the Church override the authority of 
the emperors. Then it was that by Imperial Edict 
the custom of ancestor-worship destroyed the power 



FROM THE PACIFIC 7 

of Propaganda; and that the religious door was 
slammed to as in Japan. 

With the Nineteenth Century the chances of main- 
taining the scientificially correct policy of exclusion 
diminished to vanishing point (scientifically correct 
because it preserved and fostered the type of culture 
evolved by native genius). The civilization of the 
extreme East was at last to meet its inevitable 
Nemesis in the machine-made civilization of the ex- 
treme West. There has been a good deal of renown 
won by Commodore Perry for his so-called opening 
of Japan: but it is necessary to observe that China 
had been "opened" eleven years previously and that 
the waters of the Pacific and the Yellow Sea were 
being ploughed by countless foreign keels. Sailing 
vessels had been seen passing down the coast of 
Japan in hundreds ; many had been wrecked and their 
crews made captive. The policy of seclusion was 
failing, sapped by the sea-tides, precisely as if it had 
been a castle of sand. . . . 

The motives which prompted the American initi- 
ative in this matter appear to have been mixed. I 
have discovered nothing in any pubhshed account of 
a very convincing nature. No doubt the British 
Treaty of Nanking made with China in 1842 exerted 
a great deal of influence: so did events taking place 
in what are to-day the Pacific Coast States. The 
cession of California and the settlement of Oregon 
certainly seemed to demand a more vigorous policy 
further afield. President Wilson with his doctrine 



8 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

of the freedom of the seas was inventing nothing new ; 
for there is at the back of American consciousness a 
sort of sea instinct, not as strong as the English 
instinct, yet closely resembling it, and tending always 
to give importance to maritime action. For the rea- 
son I am inclined to believe that the advance of 
British traders clear round Asia to the very mouth 
of the Yangtze river — ^which was the gi'eat accom- 
plishment of 1842 — prompted Perry's action more 
than anything else, although the rescue of ship- 
wrecked crews and the needs of the Pacific trade were 
the public reasons. Significally enough, Perry used 
Hongkong as his base, American foreign policy al- 
ways tending to use England as its starting- 
point. . . . 

Presently Korea was "opened" and soon the impact 
had become more or less stereotyped. The Western 
world could now dump its excess production on the 
foreshores of a large number of open ports and re- 
ceive back quantities of raw or semi-raw products. 
The rest was more or less on the knees of the gods. 
What effect this exchange was having on the minds 
of the populations: what shape destiny would give 
their hopes and fears — above all their fears — these 
things were not for officialdom. 

We thus reach the period of the Nineties and the 
war which inevitably came between the two "opened" 
countries, China and Japan, about the third "opened" 
country, Korea. All was inevitable; for the banish- 
ment of seclusion and exclusion brought China and 



FROM THE PACIFIC 9 

Japan back to precisely the same point where they 
had been when they left off quarrelling prior to the 
fall of the Ming dynasty. 

Japan had learnt something about soldiers and 
navies; China considerably less. The result was a 
Japanese victory. 

But there was a much more important circttm- 
stance. With the collapse of China the immense cor- 
ruption of Russian imperiahsm had at last reached 
the Far East in force by the land-route. Russia had 
been nibbling for a generation: now she opened her 
mouth and bit hard. The balance of power was not 
only changed by this event, but history inevitably 
took a new road far away from the sea-lanes which 
had until now monopolized attention. The greatest 
importance must be attached to this dislocation 
which has no parallel in the annals of the East, and 
to which is directly due practically all world disturb- 
ance during the last quarter of a century. 

Of all Powers the United States was the one which 
understood the implications of this vast modification 
the least. Placed in possession of the Philippines by 
chance and in the Hawaiian Islands by deliberate 
act, she still maintained the fiction of the aloofness 
practised by her for a century. Yet of all the 
Powers she was the one that had the oldest Pacific 
relations with Russia. Books written sixty and 
seventy years ago are filled with the activities of 
Americans and bear witness to their old-time success. 
Long before there was any question of the Alaska 



10 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

purchase, Russia and America almost joined hands 
across the Northern Pacific, American whalers and 
schooners being the vanguard of the maritime ad- 
vance. 

But in the interval between the Alaska purchase 
(1867) and the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) a 
great change had come. The sailing-ship days were 
over and in the first age of steamers Americans did 
not excel. The zone of interest had also crept south- 
wards. Hawaii and the Philippines had become the 
symbols of policy — not Alaska and the Aleutians. 
It was a British fleet which occupied the Korean an- 
chorage. Port Hamilton, in 1885 because Russia 
looked hke moving south, although, logically, it 
should have been an American fleet since America 
had opened Korea in the Perry style only three years 
previously and had proclaimed unalterable princi- 
ples. Even in China American policy was purely 
negative, taking the form of altruistic declarations. 
There was a very definite pause as men tried to take 
stock of the vast struggle now going on between the 
century old maritime policy and the new Russian 
policy of land grab. 

The signature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 
1902 was a declaration that sea-power tends natu- 
rally to work along certain lines. It was the most 
important event in China since 1842 because Japan 
was still essentially a sea-power, not yet turned by 
continentalism into something harder to define. The 
challenge which Russia offered was so obvious that it 



FROM THE PACIFIC 11 

was necessary to meet it or else the sea-lanes would 
be closed. 

The Russo-Japanese war put Japan back where 
she had tentatively been in 1895, with the valuable 
addition of railways. It is from this moment that 
the modern history of the Far East commences. All 
the forces which are still working were then set in 
motion, moving with a steadfastness which is a fair 
promise of their permanence. The problem of 
integrating Chinese national life in such a way as to 
be an effective international element had necessarily 
become greatly complicated. It was only men of 
strong minds who could see that in spite of vastly 
increased detail the outline remained essentially the 
same. 

Ill 

In Peking, long before the world-war, we had 
reached the conclusion that there were only two coun- 
tries important to the New China. They were im- 
portant not so much because of what they might 
directly do, but because the future in the Far East 
hinged on whether or not their views were identical 
and their influence directed along the same channels 
towards the same ends. The relationship of Eng- 
land to America — that indeed was the supreme fac- 
tor! No matter how you might look at it there was 
not one of the other Powers that had any true liberty 
of action or that could by any possible combination 
radically influence the march of events. Russia had 



12 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

compromised her whole future by her rashness in the 
post-Boxer period. Germany, separated by ten 
thousand miles from the scene of action, had after an 
initial outburst of disruptive energy in 1898 and 1900 
settled down to a motherly policy which had won 
for her the confidence of the Chinese. France had 
interests so small that they were not seriously to be 
counted. Let us remember that it was these three 
Powers who combined together in 1895 against 
Japan in the Liaotung intervention — Russia, Ger- 
many, and France. 

Remains Japan. 

Japan, in spite of her victories in 1894-95 and 
1904-05, still possessed little that made for perman- 
ent greatness. Her geographical isolation was per- 
haps a factor ; but internationally that had a negative 
as well as a positive side; for it put her out of com- 
munion with the world. The machine-made age had 
indeed touched her and enlisted her in its ranks; yet 
essentially she remained unchanged. Her national 
life was based as in the remote past on primitive 
agriculture and the fisheries and the handicrafts : and 
whenever her factories were idle the men went back 
to the land and the coast and the small shops and 
worked as if the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
had brought no change. Iron and steel and scientific 
accomplishment had increased her armaments; but 
the fa9ade of Westernism was not very tough, and in 
a true conflict of exhaustion the same things would 
come to the surface as in the earlier centuries — fierce 



FROM THE PACIFIC 13 

battle valour, a posture of defence, retirement. . . . 
One circumstance and one only qualified this. 
This was the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance which has played the same part in Japanese 
national life as the Declaration of Independence in ^ 
the life of the American people. So immense has 
been its influence in changing Japan's relationship 
with the world that exaggerated as the sentence 
above may sound it is hardly the whole truth. Japan 
had not possessed independence in the sense that 
Western Powers understood it until the Alliance gave 
it to her. She had been dispossessed of the Liaotung 
by a mere gesture on the part of three Powers and 
she had been intrigued out of Korea by one Power 
alone — ^Russia. She could never have fought this 
Power without the protection of the Alliance. Even 
as it was ruin was so close to her when the war was 
stopped that it was calculated to be exactly five 
months off. The real instrument of peace was not 
the treaty signed at Portsmouth on the 2nd Sep- 
tember, 1905, but the second Anglo-Japanese Alh- 
ance of the 12th August signed in London. The 
whole framework of her Western relationship, being 
purely artificial, was held up and supported not by 
what she could do herself, but what she could get 
others to assist her in doing. This is a pregnant 
sentence which every student should nail to his desk. 
No men understood this better than Japanese states- 
men; this is precisely why Japan's future, like 
China's, hinges on how England and America act. 



14 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Japan's Korean-Manchurian policy, with its curi- 
ous attempts to find sanctions which would meet the 
approval of the resident populations and lead them to 
endorse foreign-style legal agreements entered into 
for international reasons, began badly to frighten the 
Far East long before the world-war: and whilst 
it would be an overstatement to declare that the 
Chinese Revolution of 1911 was directly due to 
Japanese policy that Revolution would have been im- 
possible without the humiliations which had been im- 
posed on China by Japan. 

The British, being like the Chinese essentially a 
commercial-minded people, were troubled by the rise 
of a commercial rival. But policy in England is 
conducted on the plan of the Insurance Office. 
Good risks, when they have been wilhngly written, 
are continued because that is the essence of sound 
business, and because a contrary attitude would seem 
unconservative and rash. Japan had carried out the 
letter of her contract: and since it is not usual for 
statesmen to inquire about things of the spirit, the 
rest was a matter which could only be unofficially 
condemned. 

In 1911 the British had done a remarkable thing — 
signed the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance four years 
before the second instrument had expired, ostensibly 
because, in the language of the preamble, changes 
had occurred necessitating a revision of the text. In 
reality it was another matter which forced action. 
The supreme factor in the Far East had begun 



FROM THE PACIFIC 15 

to loom up in a new way : the relationship of England 
to America was troubling statesmen. The move- 
ment towards arbitration treaties was a symptom of 
a need which was deeply felt in order to eliminate 
risks which had become perilously hazardous. The 
insertion of the arbitration article (Article IV) was 
agreed upon, although not at all popular with the 
Japanese. But that was all. The old insurance 
firm would not yet admit the existence of a world 
in which a complete abandonment of an established 
system was advisable. The proof of this was af- 
forded by the whole action which began in 1914 to 
which very close attention should be re-directed. 



ly 

British policy has historically thought of Asia on 
a strictly mercantilist basis. Asia is a region where 
there are markets, not peoples. This connotes the 
existence of certain common necessities and leads to 
a certain kind of action, but nothing else. The 
markets must be supplied with cloth, iron, machinery 
and what-not; the markets must send back their raw 
and semi-raw products. Nothing must be allowed 
to interfere with this exchange or prejudice it. But 
that ideas should penetrate in company with the 
cloth, iron, machinery and what-not and have a most 
powerful repercussion, leading to aspirations, tempt- 
ations, irritations and aspersions, is if not an irrever- 
ence at least not in accordance with precept. 



16 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

In 1914 there was a document in existence — the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was destined to do for 
China the greatest disservice any foreign agreement 
had performed at any time in her history. 

Germany in the Far East, as I have already 
pointed out, was popular because her policy for a 
number of years had been more liberal and less mer- 
cantilist than the policy of any other Power. Sev- 
eral years before the outbreak of war her action in 
the sphere of Chinese railways had been decisive in 
breaking down a persistent and malevolent attempt 
to alienate control from the Chinese people and place 
it in the hands of foreign syndicates. In business 
and diplomacy she was accommodating and sympa- 
thetic, showing that she understood something of the 
psychological problem which was before the peoples 
of the East from the necessity of scrapping their own 
civilization and substituting alien ideas. Although 
she was a member of the Banking consortiimi she had 
taken little or no part in the politico-financial action 
of the Legations in the previous year — 1913 — ^which 
by means of an international loan had destroyed the 
Parliament of the Republic to which they were ac- 
credited. 

President Yuan Shih-kai was actually engaged in 
conversations having for object the surrender of the 
Kiaochow Lease, as soon as the German cruisers com- 
menced their raiding in the China Seas. But the 
conversations had led nowhere not so much because 
full powers were not possessed by the German rep- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 17 

resentatives, but because of the advice and action of 
the British Minister. Had Britain, in the person of 
the British Minister, made an absolute offer to sup- 
port China if she turned out the Germans by force 
unless Kiaochow was immediately surrendered, there 
would have been instant action, and all history would 
have been different. The same communication should 
have been made to China as to Japan. I have the 
authority of all the secretaries and personnel of the 
late President Yuan Shih-kai for the statement that 
China was dissuaded from either quickly completing 
her negotiations or taking the necessary military 
action because of advice tendered her under the guise 
of friendship. The complete failure to grasp the 
great possibilities which a belligerent China held out 
for a solution of the Far Eastern question in 1914 
was due to the fact that the men of the spot were not 
only inadequate but did not deal fairly and honour- 
ably with a friendly power. 

Yet England was represented in Peking by an ex- 
emplary official with every possible qualification, ex- 
cept imagination and a knowledge of world affairs. 
A member of the China Consular service long before 
he had been made British Minister, Sir John Jordan 
was perfectly acquainted with every aspect of 
Chinese life and highly sympathetic with the Chinese 
people. Liberal-minded and just, he had completed 
in the last years of his service a piece of noble work 
by forcing through in the teeth of bitter opposition 
the total abolition of the Indian opium trade, a traffic 



18 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

which had been a source of disgrace for more than 
a century. Nevertheless, in spite of these qualities, 
he was totally unsuited for the crisis which arose. 
Deeply occupied with routine work, he could not con- 
ceive of a disorderly issue such as war arising sud- 
denly out of the night. What stirred and occupied 
him was contraventions of the commercial Treaties 
which he looked upon as more important than the 
fate of nations. Venerating the Foreign Office, in a 
way which might have even embarrassed the late 
George Downing, he had come to look upon any 
interruption of the time-honoured method of report- 
ing and receiving instructions as a sign of Divine 
displeasure. 

Yet he had the situation in the hollow of his hand. 
Fate had willed that in the days of his youth he had 
-been a contemporary of Yuan Shih-kai's in Seoul, 
living through long and stormy years with him when 
Korea's fate was at stake. His influence with the 
man was very great ; there was nothing that he could 
not get him to do. The establishment of the Repub- 
lic in China had largely come through his advocacy 
of compromise at a moment when decision in another 
sense would have kept the Manchus on the Throne. 
The very next year, without ever suspecting that he 
was guilty of something worse than inconsistency, 
he had assisted the virtual overthrow of the Republic 
and the rise of the open dictatorship of Yuan Shih-kai 
by forcing through a foreign loan against the will of 
Parliament. Like many mild men, a believer in the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 19 

strong man theory because he had heard so many 
people speak approvingly of it, he nevertheless had 
few ideas on the subject, and always hoped for the 
best even when his actions were producing the worst. 

Such was the man on the spot who in the summer 
of 1914 was called upon to play a decisive role in a 
matter as disorderly as a world-war. 

What did he do? He carefully and zealously 
watched other people act and reported the facts by 
telegraph from hour to hour. The one important 
thing was to get a firm grasp of all the undertakings 
between China and Germany; to watch them both; 
and to show London (by telegraph) how the Treaties 
might affect the issue. All his influence with Yuan 
Shih-kai, all his friendship for China, all the immense 
possibilities of the situation were forgotten; he 
merely carried out his duty according to his lights. 

What took place? In Dr. E. J. Dillon's book 
on the Paris Peace negotiations there is an account 
which has been checked with official documents and 
found to be substantially correct, and which shows 
in a sufficiently precise way the information and ad- 
vice which reached London from Peking. 

Dr. Dillon says: 

"The day before Britain declared war against Germany 
the British Ambassador at Tokyo officially Inquired whether 
his Government could count upon the active co-operation of 
the Mikado's forces in the campaign about to begin. On 
August 4th Baron Kato, having in the meanwhile consulted 
his colleagues, answered in the affirmative. Three days later 



20 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

another communication reached Tokyo from London, re- 
questing the immediate co-operation of Japan, and on the 
following day it was promised. The motive for this haste was 
credibly asserted to be Britain's apprehension lest Germany 
should transfer Kiao Chow to China, and reserve to herself, 
* in virtue of Article V of the Convention of 1898, the right of 
securing after the war 'a more suitable territory' in the 
Middle Empire or Republic. Thereupon they began opera- 
tions which were at first restricted to the China Seas, but 
were afterwards extended to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
and finally to the Mediterranean. The only task that fell 
to their lot on land was that of capturing Kiao Chow." 

Here you have in all its nakedness the terrible 
error of August, 1914. Not the fate of civilization, 
not the victory of one group of Powers devoted to 
proclaimed objects, not national security were matters 
of concern in China, but apprehension concerning the 
possibilities contained in Article V of the Sino-Ger- 
man Convention of 1898 ! Never has official stupid- 
ity shown itself so glaringly. China, who could have 
been brought into the war at the very outset with 
England on midnight of the 4th August 1914, and 
contributed (after the occupation of Kiao Chow) a 
powerful army for the Mesopotamian and Near East- 
ern campaigns was rebuffed and deliberately kept 
out, being almost driven into the opposite camp 
through the action of Japan, taken at the request of 
' England, advised to that end by her minister in Pe- 
king. Her troops, who might have won for her excel- 
lent renown abroad, were left to fester in the country 
so that they could gradually destroy all unity. Nor 



FROM THE PACIFIC 21 

was the folly coniined to astounding aberration at 
the beginning of the war; no attempt was made al- 
most until the end to utilize Chinese resources. Al- 
though the dockyards of Hongkong and Shanghai 
almost all belong to British companies, and could 
have turned out annually 200,000 tons of new ship- 
ping, official action in spite of every effort was so 
supine that nothing was done until the effort was of 
no importance. One million tons of new vessels 
were therefore as deliberately thrown away as if the 
Germans had sunk them. Had Germany possessed 
England's position and resources in China it would 
have meant for her the difference between defeat and 
victory. That a heavy responsibility attaches to 
every one who participated in this conspiracy of in- 
action is to-day not disputed. 

Because it had meant for them a secret and un- 
necessary betrayal, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be- 
came enthroned as an object of open hatred in the 
hearts of the Chinese people. After having been in 
existence twelve years, it had directly meddled with 
Chinese affairs in a most disastrous way and had 
directly influenced not only the march of events 
throughout the world but the chances of Chinese 
domestic peace. For with the mandate given to 
Japan over the matter of Shantung, the Japanese 
took every advantage, from the Twenty-one De- 
mands of 1915 down to their uncompromising stand 
of Paris in 1919. The survival of the wholly in- 
correct idea that the Chinese cannot be utilized in 



22 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

world politics, except as hewers of wood and carriers 
of water in Labour Corps, was at the bottom, of a 
mistake which the world will continue to pay for dur- 
ing long and painful years. 



If England was the clumsy sinner, America was 
the really romantic sinner. Her policy in the Far 
East had constantly passed beyond the limits of real 
life because she had no vital interest at stake. She 
dreamed great dreams which ended in commonplace 
diplomatic morasses because she was never prepared 
to do more than throw out ideas which she allowed 
others to stamp out of existence. From the enunci- 
ation of the Hay doctrine of the Open Door in 1899 
to the exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes in 1917 
she accomplished nothing that influenced in any de- 
gree the onward march of the peoples of the East, 
while contributing a great deal to their confusion and 
unrest. 

What was she aiming at? Peace, perfect peace; 
she desired to enthrone peace and make all men love 
one another. But her method was by proclamation 
rather than by action, by abstention rather than by 
participation. The supreme irony lay in the fact 
that her dearest measure was the one most deeply 
resented by the Chinese people: for it is a singular 
and interesting fact that the only way you can trans- 
late the open-door is by the phrase "throw open the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 23 

portals of your house," which is tantamount to a 
"sanction" resembling exploitation. The constant 
reiteration of the open-door policy during two de- 
cades has created unnecessary suspicion and is one 
more proof that it is unwise to think up means to 
save a nation until you have satisfied yourself that 
your language is comprehensible. Even when great 
opportunities lay within her grasp she signally failed 
because her proposals were inevitably unbusinesslike. 
Thus in 1901, during the great international discus- 
sion which settled the Boxer peace, the late William 
Rockhill, American Minister to Peking, proposed 
at the last moment in the name of his government 
that all the Powers should cut their claims in half as 
an act of self-abnegation, and so prevent the camel's 
back from breaking, the plan was promptly rejected. 
Had he laid down the doctrine that the payment in 
specie of the sums demanded from China would up- 
set the markets of the East, debase all values and 
ultimately bring revolution, and then insisted that it 
was equally important for a stabilizer to be set up 
by each Power allocating from its payments a de- 
finite percentage to a Central Bank and Currency 
fund, the plan would certainly have been accepted, 
and by now, after twenty years, a relatively vast mass 
of white metal would be held in reserve in China and 
the outlook entirely different. 

During the Russo-Japanese war there was almost 
the same folly. 'No one now doubts that President 
Roosevelt's intervention in 1905 was dictated by an 



24 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

almost feverish desire to stop a sinister development 
of Japanese power. Yet this could have been ar- 
rested only by precisely the opposite method. It 
would have been far better to have declined to inter- 
vene (and also to have declined to allow others to 
intervene) until the principle of Chinese integrity 
had been definitely established by a pledge of evacu- 
ation of Chinese soil. Had that been done and the 
war fought to its normal conclusion, the after-thought 
of 1909, the scheme for the neutralization of Man- 
churian railways, would have been part of the peace 
settlement, and a very great issue would not be still 
awaiting solution. Nor would it have been necessary 
to acquiesce in the crucifixion of Korea, which re- 
mains a standing indictment of the American- 
Korean Treaty of 1884 and a proof that it was a 
worthless document. 

Policy was always out of its depth directly a con- 
crete problem arose. The retirement in 1913 of the 
American banking group from the Consortium of 
foreign banks, on the direct instruction of President 
Wilson, because the terms of the loan touched very 
nearly the administrative independence of China was 
another proof that elimination is the normal end of 
thase who will not force their participation on others 
at their own price. Great, however, as were the 
errors of policy in the decade following the Ports- 
mouth Treaty, they were to be eclipsed and made as 
nothing compared with the error of the war. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 25 



VI 



It can be said that just as the greatest error in 
seventy years of British policy in China was invok- 
ing the aid of Japan in 1914 to perform a piece of 
work which was legitimately China's, so in 1917 was 
there committed the greatest error the United States 
ever made. After having induced China to break off 
relations with Germany and pushed her to declare 
war by promises of financial support, there was a 
complete failure to produce so much as a single dol- 
lar. Although it would have been the richest 
moral and political investment conceivable to have 
made modest advances to the Chinese Exchequer, 
China was left with not money enough to execute a 
single measure. Her disastrous loan operations with 
Japan were as directly due to the action of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States as the seizure of 
Shantung and the Twenty-one Demands were due 
to the action of England. Precisely the same moral 
responsibility attached to both Powers. 

Yet like England, the United States was repre- 
sented in Peking by a lover of the Chinese people, 
which makes the case all the more extraordinary. In 
Dr. Paul S. Reinsch America had just as exemplary 
an official. Passionately interested in the problem of 
the Far East, he had brought with him from his 
university professorship a degree of accurate knowl- 
edge and psychological understanding seldom if ever 
before possessed by previous occupants of his post. 



26 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

During four years prior to 1917 he had served an 
arduous apprenticeship in the endless poUtical strug- 
gle which rages in the Chinese capital. If nothing 
very tangible had come out of it all, circumstances 
were partially to blame. A certain doctrinaire 
quahty of mind perhaps rendered fruition of schemes 
more difficult than it would have been in the case of 
a more practical man. Nevertheless, in restless 
energy Dr. Reinsch made up for everything else ; and 
he was therefore as ripe for the crisis which arose in 
February 1917, when the United States invited China 
to share her submarine policy, as any man could be.^ 

He threw himself with as much zest into the matter 
of getting China to the war as if the subject had never 
been broached before. And he succeeded so well that 
he entirely lost sight of the central fact — which was 
not what China was going to do for the world, but 
what America was going to do for China. 

China did not forget the central fact^ — she pressed 
for information and money. Characteristically, Dr. 
Reinsch begged the issue. Instead of making cash 
the touchstone of American policy, he declared that 
goodwill would do as well. Had he bluntly informed 
his government that unless they were prepared to 
jSnance China as a belligerent it was futile to proceed 
further he would have gone down in history as the 
first American minister to Peking who had under- 
stood how to handle a crisis in a practical way. 

1 See the volume "An American Diplomat in China," one of the most 
singular "diplomatic" accoiuits recently published, for further details 
of this period. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 27 

This is how he wrote to the Chinese Government 
on the 7th February, when the final decision came up, 
as has been disclosed in his own book: 

"Excellency, 

"In our recent conversation concerning the policy of your 
Government in associating itself with the United States in 
active opposition to the unrestricted submarine warfare by 
which Germany is indiscriminately jeopardizing the lives of 
neutral citizens, you have with entire frankness pointed out 
to me that, whereas the Chinese Government is in principle 
disposed to adopt the suggestion of the President of the 
United States in that regard, it nevertheless finds itself in a 
position in which it would not feel safe in so doing unless 
assured that it could obtain from American sources such 
financial and other assistance as would enable it to take the 
measures appropriate to the situation which would thus be 
created, 

"With like candour I have stated to you that I have 
recommended to my Government that in the event of the 
Chinese Government's associating itself with the President's 
suggestion, the Government of the United States should take 
measures to put at its disposition the sums immediately re- 
quired for the purposes you have indicated, and should take 
steps with a view to such a funding of the Boxer Indemnity 
as would for the time being make available for the purpose 
of the Chinese Government at least the major portion of the 
current indemnity instalments : and I have indicated to you 
my personal conviction that my Government would be found 
just and liberal in effecting this or other such arrangements 
to enable the Chinese Government to meet the responsibilities 
which it might assume upon the suggestion of the President. 
I should not be wholly frank with you, however, if I were to 
fail to point out that the exact nature of any assistance to 



28 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

be given or any measure to be taken must be determined 
through consultation of various administrative organs, in 
some cases including reference to Congress, in order to make 
effective such arrangements as might have been agreed to in 
principle between the executive authorities of the two coun- 
tries ; and I therefore could not in good faith make in behalf 
of my Government any definite commitments upon your sug- 
gestions at the present time. 

"I do, however, feel warranted in assuming the responsi- 
bility of assuring you in behalf of my Government that by 
the methods you have suggested, or otherwise, adequate means 
will be devised to enable China to fulfil the responsibilities 
consequent upon associating herself with the action of the 
United States Government, without any impairment of her 
national independence and of her control of her military 
establishment and general administration." 

As a result of the assurance contained in this des- 
patch China took the first step in regard to Germany. 
On the 9th February the presence of the Gennan 
minister was requested and a Note was read to him 
to the effect that China would break off diplomatic 
relations with Germany if unrestricted submarine 
warfare was persisted in. And on that date, Amer- 
ican influence, so far as Chinese action was con- 
cerned, came as completely to an end as if the United 
States had dropped down a bottomless hole. Noth- 
ing tangible ever came of the assurance of financial 
help; and if one is to accept the indications in his 
own book, Dr. Reinsch was made to suffer by his 
own government for his zeal. When the full Chinese 
declaration of war finally matured six months later. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 29 

Japan had secretly tied her Allies in such tight knots 
that the disposal of Shantung and the Pacific is- 
lands, north of the equator were cJioses jugees. The 
whole Chinese action subsequent to the 9th February, 
indeed, depended on Japan. The German Minister to 
Peking was handed his passports on the 14th March, 
only when the Japanese Minister on secret inform- 
ation from Tokyo pressed for war. The hoodwink- 
ing of America was complete. All the measures of 
relief granted to China, when her belligerency was 
officially established, were general measures granted 
by all the Powers alike, such as temporary suspension 
of the Boxer indemnities and Tariff revision. The 
one Power who gave her special consideration for her 
own purposes was not the United States but Japan, 
who obtained for her under various headings during 
the next two years a sum equivalent to one hundred 
million gold dollars. The United States contented 
herself by writing an epitaph on the grave which she 
had dug for herself by handing China a note on the 
5th June which declared that "the entry of China into 
war with Germany — or the continuance of the status 
quo of her relations with that government are matters 
of secondary importance. The principal necessity 
for China is to resume and continue her political 
entity, to proceed along the road of national develop- 
ment on which she has made such marked progress." 
In all diplomatic archives there is nothing quite 
similar. 



30 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 



VII 



If official policy was erring so astoundingly, there 
was fortunately another factor becoming operative. 
Some subtle instinct was causing a profound change 
in the relations between America and Britain which 
showed itself in many small ways. Somehow it 
seemed clear that on the Pacific, if nowhere else, pru- 
dence demanded a revaluation of things. Those 
whose fundamental principles were the same should 
surely take counsel together. The history of the Far 
East began to be re-read; men looked back to the 
days when only the English-speaking race had been 
important in China and Japan. What was going to 
happen to England and America on the Pacific if a 
powerful rival secured all the points of vantage? 
That was an interrogation which the Paris Treaties 
left unanswered. But so long as the fundamental 
element governing the action of the Powers in the 
Far East remained unchanged, nothing beneficent 
was to be hoped for, i. e., so long as the relationship of 
England to the United States was conditioned by the 
Japanese Alliance so long would China remain a 
secondary matter. 

As early as the spring of 1920 we had decided in 
Peking that no reasonable hope could be entertained 
for China's salvation with this treaty in the way. 
The agreement of 1911 nominally terminated on the 
13th July, 1921 : but all inquiries and notes addressed 
to London had produced such little result that it was 



FROM THE PACIFIC 31 

clear that due consideration of the problem was being 
purposely avoided. 

Consequently the time seemed to have arrived in 
1921 for forcing the issue, forcing it in such a way ^ 
that the ultimate consequences could no longer be 
shirked or the dangers masked. The Japanese Al- 
liance was the greatest matter in the Far East, mak- 
ing even finance very secondary. Until now the 
problem had only concerned the two cabinets of 
London and Tokyo. But with the new orientation 
which post-war policy had brought, it was possible to 
interest others. Either the English-speaking races 
must be brought to an understanding of the position 
in which they were placed, or else they would become 
entangled in war. 



PAUT II 

THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF CANADA 



Canada is perhaps the greatest living proof that a 
special Providence watches over the destinies of the 
British Empire. Without Canada there would be 
constant and growing rivalries between England and 
America both on the Atlantic and the Pacific: with 
Canada there is more than a reasonable chance that 
unity of action will not only be achieved by the 
English-speaking peoples, but that this unity will be 
the dominating feature in world-politics. 

Geographically, Canada is so definitely a portion 
of the same territory as the United States that there 
is at first sight no reason why it should not have ad- 
hered to the same government. But historically there 
are vital differences which isolate the mood of 1776 
from this vast rich belt which projects itself from 
ocean to ocean, and is so richly furnished with rivers 
and lakes and so chained with railways that its high- 
way qualities almost overtop all else. 

Canada is preeminently the child of the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries when the mercantile theory 
is no more. Its older portions, inhabited by French 
and English squierarchies, were sufficiently self-con- 
tained to acquire long ago essential characteristics 

32 



AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 33 

which sharply distinguish them from the Union to 
the South and which still form the bedrock of govern- 
ment. Newcomers, particularly the Scottish, have 
tended to accentuate these characteristics, which have 
created an autonomy almost precisely modelled on 
what would have satisfied all colonists prior to 1776. 
The British North America act of 1867, having been 
made under favourable circumstances, has flexibility 
and suitability to modern conditions, and is an earnest 
that be the difficulties ever so great the future will 
unroll smoothly. . . . 

Canada has an equally unique position in her rela- 
tion to the Far East which has always been well 
understood in China. Canada is not only the quick 
route to China and Japan (the distance between 
Vancouver and Yokohama being not much more than 
the distance between Liverpool and Cuba), but by 
its curious mixture of British methods and American 
ideas it has been possible for the Canadian Govern- 
ment to diminish, if not entirely to escape from the 
fierce racial rivalries which have embittered men in 
California. Yet Canada has the same Oriental 
problem, and withal possesses a far more delicate 
strategical problem than the United States. The 
coast region is an El Dorado for both Chinese and 
Japanese because of the richness of opportunity 
which it provides. There are 50,000 Chinese and 
25,000 Japanese in British Columbia alone, and one 
of the difficult questions of the hour is how to limit 
this invasion without making the cure more harmful 



34 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

than the disease. If the Chinese were eliminated, 
and their growing sympathy alienated, such grave 
losses would threaten the coast province that the 
quick route would be cut off. They do much to 
lighten the cost of living and to make shipping profit- 
able; and the settlement which is almost certain to 
be made is a gentlemen's agreement which will throw 
the onus of stopping the invasion on China herself. 
The activities of the Japanese are entirely different 
from those of the Chinese who haunt the cities and 
instinctively direct their attack on the stomach, and 
who are interested in nothing except profit-earning. 
The Japanese are primarily fishermen; they have 
made a monopoly of the salmon fishing and canning 
industry ; and their exploration of river and coast has 
been so elaborate that they are believed to know the 
richly indented Pacific region more accurately than 
any one else. A naval writer such as Mr. Bywater, 
who compiled in 1921, such a highly interesting book 
on the Pacific at the moment when it was most needed 
should have brought more fully within his purview 
this question of the Northern Pacific. Had he done 
so, far from insisting on the overwhelming importance 
of the Western Pacific and seeing in Guam the key 
to naval mastery, he would have speedily understood 
that there was another aspect to the whole Pacific 
problem which requires to be studied in the region 
immediately adjoining the Behring Sea. Possession 
of Saghalien and predominance on the rich promon- 
tories on the Asiatic side, such as the Kamchatka 



FROM THE PACIFIC 35 

Peninsula which Japan is aiming at, recalls the fact 
that on the American shores there have long been 
Japanese activities far antedating the present move- 
ment in the Southern Pacific. There can be little 
doubt that the destinies of the continents fronting the 
Behring Sea are indissolubly linked, and that the 
chain of the Aleutian islands not only binds them to- 
gether but gives birth to problems of high strategic 
importance. The recent lease of the Commander 
Islands off Kamchatka brings a Japanese outpost 
less than a thousand miles away from the principal 
American station in the Aleutians, Dutch Harbour, 
and seems to be part of a general plan which rec- 
ognizes the political opportunities afforded by the 
mixture and possible conflict of British and Amer- 
ican interests in the zone north of the 49th parallel. 

For many years both the Canadian and American 
coasts north of the Straits of Juan de Fueco have 
been exhaustively explored until Japan has settled 
where in case of necessity she could establish an im- 
pregnable naval base so wedged in as to be impreg- 
nable. 

Quatseno Sound, one of the finest anchorages in 
the world, is that place. It is the key to the vast 
densely wooded island of Vancouver which has not 
yet been properly explored, and is strategically of 
the highest importance because it is located where 
there is practically no development. The seizure of 
Quatseno would place the entire line of Canadian and 
American Pacific ports at the mercy of the raider. 



36 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Canada and the United States are deplorably weak on 
the shores of the Northern Paeifie, weak not in the 
subsidiary matter of fortifieations, but in the all-im- 
portant faetors of modern strength. The absence of 
iron and steel works and the entire dependence of 
this zone on the Atlantic seaboard for many essentials 
isolates this great coast region and makes it a hostage 
in the hands of potential enemies. British Columbia, 
the Yukon and Alaska have been deplorably neglected 
by the two governments concerned and remain, even 
to-day, weak settlements which a strong power could 
easily dominate. The ease with which a policy of 
force has been carried out on the Asiatic shores of 
the Northern Pacific, where there are settlements of 
white men just as large if not larger than the settle- 
ments on the American shores, has been a matter of 
international concern. That in case of necessity the 
same policy could be applied to Alaska and British 
Columbia cannot be doubted by any who have studied 
the history of the past fifty years. The submarine and 
the swift cruiser have made it a political necessity to 
do something to remove a weakness which influences 
the whole problem of the Northern Pacific and gives 
it a doubtful aspect. While Canada has been as re- 
miss as the United States she has less of a defence. 
Having expended vast sums of government money to 
give her trans-continental railways an outlet on the 
Pacific, prudence required long ago that national 
measures, inaugurated and guaranteed by the State, 
should quicken the development and ojiening-up of 



FROM THE PACIFIC 37 

Vancouver island and the Jiritisli Columbia coast. 
As a counterblast to tbc negative policy of restrict- 
ing the only people wbo have shown willingness or 
enterprise in this Far West — Orientals — that was es- 
sential hefore the world-v^ar and is dou}>ly essential 
now. With a Prime Minister in office as energetic and 
as well-grounded in the problem of Kastern Asia as 
Mr. Mackenzie King there is hope that the matter 
will at last attract attention, and the lack, of initiative 
of past years he replaced })y a well-thought out 
scheme. 

II 

In the Spring of 1921 the question of .lapan, after 
slumbering during the war-period, had become acute 
again in Canada not hecause of any growing feeling 
against the Japanese, but hecause Canadians had at 
length realized that with the possihility of war he- 
tween America and .Japan drawing nearer Canada 
could not hut he directly involved. It was felt that 
so long as the British Empire was committed to 
Japan by a formal Treaty so long would it he im- 
possible to he sure of the consequences no matter 
what reservations might have hcen made, both in 
the Agreement and in subsequent communications. 
Vancouver and Victoria, which are like windows look- 
ing out on the vast ]*acific, thoroughly appreciated 
what the future might bring and showed particular 
interest in the facts as v/e construed them in China. 
Separated as liritish Columhia is by the formidahle 



38 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

barrier of the Rocky Mountains from the real 
Canada, ail realize that a coup dei main could be 
carried out here — and that there would be no means 
of resisting it. There were other matters inviting at- 
tention. The imaginary boundary running along the 
49th parallel is a customs frontier but not a racial 
one. Popular acts would soon reduce to dust all 
political and diplomatic contrivances if any occasion 
arose; for whilst Canadians are first and last Cana- 
dians and are immeasurably proud of the fact, they 
are also Americans and would flock to the defence of 
North American territoiy no matter whether the 
flag floating over the area involved happened to 
be the Union Jack or the Stars and Stripes. All 
the discussion which had raged for many months re- 
garding the advisabihty of a North American naval 
agreement had been prompted by this view which was 
so widely held that it was paramount; and although 
in the end the discussion proved abortive it was 
highly valuable as a sign of the times. 

Three months off lay the question of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance which was to be decided at the 
Imperial Conference. What was Canada to do? 
Would it be possible to discover a formula which 
would neither shelve the matter nor have it said that 
Canadians were merely blind followers of American 
policy? Moreover, there was the matter of China to 
be considered, a matter of great future importance 
- to the Canadian people — if their commerce was in the 
future to flow across the Pacific as it flows to-day 



FROM THE PACIFIC 39 

across the Atlantic. In all public discussion of this 
matter I was careful to have it understood that China 
was not inherently a foe of Japan's, but that so long 
as the old position taken up by Britain regarding the 
Far East was not abandoned, so long would it be im- 
possible for China not to take sides with whoever was 
in conflict with Japan. In such circumstances to 
construe an offensive and defensive Treaty as a guar- 
antee of security, when it ignored this prime essential, 
was deliberately to offend against the political wis- 
dom which is supposed to be so conspicuous a quality 
in the English-speaking race. If war ever came in 
the Far East, the inevitable battle-ground would be 
China, as has proved the case in every clash during 
and since the Nineteenth Century. That China 
would strike sooner or later on her own account, and 
help those who helped her, was amply evident to those 
whose business it was to keep their fingers on the 
pulse of public opinion. There was a great out- 
standing account to be settled. It was madness to 
trifle with the issue any longer, or to decline to be- 
lieve that great changes of sentiment had come. . . . 
I found a gratifying response to these arguments. 



Ill 

If in the coast region the matter was being anxi- 
ously discussed from the point of view of personal 
safety, elsewhere other factors entered into the prob- 
lem. As you travel away through the majestic 



40 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

scenery of the Rocky Mountains, past glacier-fed, 
green rivers, and dome-like heights, you at last de- 
bouch on the illimitable plain where that is a wider 
point of view. There is no longer the restricted 
arithmetic of exposed sea-ports : here now is the home 
of the nation in the making. In the prairie provinces 
and Eastern Canada more profound considerations 
were arresting concern. Men were debating the con- 
stitutional aspects of foreign policy and the impli- 
cations of that policy. What share was Canada hence- 
forth to have in British Empire matters? Was she 
to be treated with indifference, her acquiescence being 
taken as a matter of course; or was she to enter into 
full partnership? The question had seemingly been 
answered by the events of the war and in the making 
of the peace; for was not Canada a full nation from 
the very fact that she had signed the peace treaties? 
Canadians, however, are cool men and not easily led 
astray. They had already concluded that nothing 
which had been done under the stress and glamour 
of the war could be held permanently established. 
There was already some divergence of views regard- 
ing the nature of the periodic meetings between the 
British Cabinet and the Dominion Prime Ministers 
and the advisability of accepting such meetings with- 
out a clearer definition of their import. Did these 
gatherings constitute an Imperial Cabinet; or were 
they merely a Conference of Prime Ministers of the 
Empire, who met as a preliminary measure, and 
whose final acts would have to seek a proper sane- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 41 

tion? In other words, did they become a consoH- 
dated Executive, or was each Imperial Conference 
merely a consultative gathering of responsible chiefs 
who must refer back to their own Parliaments all de- 
cisions arrived at? The question of centralization, 
so dear to every bureaucrat, was drawn up in battle- 
array against the principle of devolution and auton- 
omy which is the people's buckler. And since Eng- 
lish-speaking men will not long waste their time over 
pohtical theories unless an immediate application is 
involved, two test cases were before the Canadian 
Parliament, — the question of separate Canadian 
diplomatic representation at Washington, and the 
precise attitude of Canada at the Imperial Confer- 
ence in regard to the allied subjects of foreign policy 
and defence. 

On the 21st April the first matter was taken up 
in the House of Commons at Ottawa sitting in Com- 
mittee of Supply in a remarkable debate in which 
the constitutional relationship to the British Crown 
was examined from every possible point of view. 
Once more, was Canada a "nation;" if so, what con- 
stituted a nation ; and how was nationhood within the 
empire to be fitly expressed ? The Imperial Govern- 
ment had after much correspondence agreed that 
Canadian business with the United States had as- 
sumed such importance as to necessitate a Canadian 
Plenipotentiary in Washington who would be as- 
sociated with the British Ambassador, and in his 
absence assume his duties. A vote had been duly 



42 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

sanctioned the previous year to cover the necessary- 
expenditure but there had been no appointment. 
Why? The official answer, that the office had not 
been filled because the government had not decided 
who was the best person to fill such an important 
position, was like most official answers not more than 
a half-truth. The adroitness of the British (Im- 
perial) proposal that there should be a Canadian 
plenipotentiary stationed side by side with the British 
Ambassador, who would automatically assume his 
duties and responsibilities whenever necessary, seemed 
the main stumbling-block; but the position of the 
United States, confronted by such a double repre- 
sentation, and the complications which might very 
easily arise, was also plainly a matter of concern.^ 
Nationhood within an empire clearly meant a mul- 
titude of knotty points outside the empire. It was 
not the relatively unimportant matter of a single ap- 
pointment which loomed up ever larger as the dis- 
cussion proceeded; it was the colossally difficult mat- 
ter of deciding precisely where the British empire 
commences and where it ends. Something of the 
problem before men in the territory to the South 
prior to 1776 could not fail to rise in the mind of 
every listener of this debate. . . . 

Interesting as was this discussion, it was surpassed 
by the extraordinary debate which followed only six 

1 It is significant that nothing has been done in this matter yet — a 
year and a half after Mr. Mackenzie King, now Prime Minister, then 
oflfieial leader of the Opposition, declared: "We ought to have something 
which will set forth in precise detail what are the rights, duties and 
functions of this particular appointee." . . . 



FROM THE PACIFIC 43 

days later. Then, their appetites whetted with their 
previous inquiry, the Commons of Canada made an 
analysis of the nature of Imperial Conferences from 
the historical and constitutional viewpoint far more 
searching than anything ever attempted in England 
— a discussion designed to show that Canadians would 
not recede an inch from the position they had already 
taken up. Canada must retain complete control of 
all matters affecting her welfare; no new expendi- 
tures for naval or military purposes could be con- 
templated; it was highly undesirable to allow any 
change in the constitutional relationship between 
Canada and the Mother country. Great dicta 
emerged that day clearly and without contradiction. 
Every word said in Ottawa had an important bear- 
ing on the events of the next eight months. It was 
Sir Robert Borden, the War Prime Minister, who 
made the most brilliant contribution. In words 
which summarized the problem of this new State so 
well that they were like an endless succession of his- 
torical pictures, he unfolded the politics of the case. 

"It may be worth while," he said, "in discussing 
the approaching conference and the representation 
of Canada, at that conference, to consider for a little 
the conditions out of which our present status has 
arisen." 

And then following this remarkable analysis : 



44 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ly 

"The British Empire is, after all, a very modern organiza- 
tion in respect of both its vast possessions and the methods 
by which it is governed. I am informed by the Dominion 
statistician that the population of the British Empire, at 
the time of the Congress of Vienna in 1814, was computed 
to amount to 62,558,650 persons, and that at the present 
time it is estimated that the population comprised within 
the boundaries of the British Empire is no less than 445,- 
388,500 persons. I do not offer any figures as to the area 
of the British Empire, but I believe the area of the Empire 
during that period has increased very much in proportion 
to the increase of population. 

"But it is as to the constitutional development within the 
Empire that I wish chiefly to speak, and I desire to em- 
phasize the point that constitutional development within the 
United Kingdom itself has been as marked since the beginning 
of the Eighteenth Century as in this country. During the 
reign of the Georges the Government of the United Kingdom 
was, in form, but not in reality, based upon representative 
institutions. Only a small portion of the people were repre- 
sented in Parliament. The majority of the seats were under 
the control of an oligarchy, most of whom had seats in the 
House of Lords. The Government was indeed responsible to 
Parliament, but the Parliament was not representative of the 
people. It was under this system that the American revolu- 
tion took place, and I hope that our friends of the great 
neighbouring republic will sometimes remember that the Par- 
liament of the United Kingdom at that time was not by any 
means representative of the people. It is a tribute to the 
respect of the British people for law and authority that these 
conditions continued as long as they did : and doubtless that 
continuance was in some measure due to the fact that from 
the middle of the Eighteenth Century to 1815 the Empire was 



FROM THE PACIFIC 45 

very frequently involved in war. As a matter of fact, demo- 
cratic government did not come into effect in Great Britain 
until after the Reform Bill of 1832. It was followed by the 
reform enactments of 1867-1868, by those of 1884-1885, and 
finally by that of 1918. Up till 1834 in Great Britain min- 
isters were regarded rather as servants of the Crown than of 
Parliament. Peel took office after Melbourne, in 1834, in 
the belief that Melbourne had been dismissed, and thus recog- 
nized his acquiescence in the constitutional principle that the 
King had the right to dismiss his ministers at pleasure. The 
events which followed Sir Robert Peel's acceptance of office 
marked a new departure in that respect. It is perfectly clear 
that the King has the constitutional right to dismiss his min- 
isters, but only in the interests of the State, and not at 
pleasure, and only when the grounds for dismissal can be jus- 
tified to Parliament, or to a new Parliament after dissolution. 

*'Now from 1791 we had in Canada, for more than fifty 
years, representative institutions on a broader basis than 
those of Great Britain, as the franchise was wider and more 
evenly distributed, but we had not responsible government. 
It is curious that the struggle in Great Britain was for 
representative government and in Canada for responsible 
government. In both cases the reform was not effected with- 
out disorders. From 18S0 to 1832 there were serious riots 
in Great Britain. In truth, the Reform Act of 1832 effected 
a political revolution in Great Britain, but, fortunately, 
without civil war. 

"We had the beginnings of responsible government in 
Canada in the early forties ; Lord Durham's report laid the 
foundation, but some limitations which he advocated were 
soon swept away. The task was not accomplished without 
difficulty. British statesmen were convinced that responsible 
government was entirely unsuited to the colonies, and could 
not safely be applied to them. They freely predicted, and 
were perfectly sincere in their belief, that the grant of re- 



46 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

sponsible government to the North American colonies marked 
the first stage of a movement which would speedily and 
inevitably bring about the disintegration of the Empire. It 
has had precisely the contrary effect, and the reason of this 
seems to me very plain. If there are errors in an adminis- 
tration controlled by the people of a country, the remedy 
lies in the hands of the people themselves, but if there are 
errors in an administration by a government controlled by 
the Governor or by the Colonial Office, the criticism turns 
upon the Governor, as an Imperial officer, or upon the 
Colonial Office in its administration of the affairs of the 
colony. Naturally, all this tends to weaken the tie which 
binds the colony to the Mother Country. 

"I should like to emphasize the point that the movement 
for responsible government in Canada is the basis of the 
present constitution of the Empire. A group of free democ- 
racies, enjoying complete powers of self-government in their 
domestic affairs, and acting in close association with the 
Mother Country, has proved during the late war that unity 
is strongest when it is based upon freedom and autonomy. 
It is not unworthy of remark that the initiative in this move- 
ment came from this Dominion, and that their point of view 
has been fully recognized in Great Britain. . . . 

"But there are, of course, the higher questions of foreign 
relations hitherto determined by the British Government as 
to which the Dominions in the future must have a recognized 
voice and influence. To that question, the Constitutional 
Conference, as provided by the resolution of 1917, must ad- 
dress itself. I am not so unwise as to hazard any prediction 
as to the method which will be adopted. I am, however, of 
those who believe that the voice of the Dominions will exer- 
cise an important influence upon the great questions which 
affect our foreign relations. Moreover, I am confident that 
this influence will be so exercised as to assist in the avoid- 
ance of treaties or understandings which might involve the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 47 

Empire In war. Indeed, at the present day, I think Great 
Britain might hesitate to engage in war against a strong 
public opinion in either Canada or Australia. Further, the 
voice and influence of the Dominions should tend more and 
more to turn the attention of British statesmen to the enor- 
mous task which confronts the Empire in the governance and 
development of the vast possessions which are included within 
its limits. I speak entirely for myelf in the observations 
which I am addressing to the House, but I may say that per- 
sonally I should regret to see the Empire engage in difficult 
commitments, whether in Eastern Europe or Western Asia, 
or elsewhere. We have quite enough, and perhaps more than 
enough, on our hands at present. . . . 

"Honourable Gentlemen who have made themselves ac- 
quainted with this subject will recollect that at the Imperial 
Conference of 1911 there was a meeting of the Committee on 
Imperial Defence which the Dominion Prime Ministers at- 
tended and at which vital questions of foreign policy were 
very fully discussed. Mr. Asqulth, in the concluding stages 
of the conference, spoke of the Dominion ministers as having 
been admitted to the Arcana Imperil. 

"The status of Canada at the Peace Conference, and after- 
wards In the Labour Conference at Washington and in the 
Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, has already 
been discussed, and I shall speak of It only for a moment. 
Much ingenuity and logic have been displayed in pointing 
out the anomalies of the situation, and in declaring that 
nothing has been accomplished in advancement of status. 
The best answer can be given by reference to the high position 
which Canada took, through Its representatives, at Wash- 
ington In 1919 and at Geneva during recent months. There 
has been much alarm that the representatives of Great Brit- 
ain and the Dominions did not on these occasions always see 
eye to eye on minor questions. There would be much ground 
for criticism, and even regret, if the result had been other- 



48 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

wise. We should be in an utterly false position if we were 
expected to re-echo on all occasions the opinions of the repre- 
sentatives of the United Kingdom : Our points of view are not 
always the same as our conditions differ. On essential ques- 
tions of policy I agree that there should be a united front — 
not of the United Kingdom alone but of the whole Empire — • 
established by previous conference and consultations. There 
are those that are apprehensive of the consequence of the 
exercise of wide powers not by the Mother Country but by 
the Dominions, and they would do well to remember that the 
constitution of the British Empire (if it can be called a con- 
stitution) is based largely upon usage and convention. It 
would be practically impossible in any of the five democracies 
of the Empire to carry on Government which continually 
exercised its powers to the utmost extent. . . ." 



In this frank and illuminating way did the Prime 
Minister of the war-period state his case. His schol- 
arly remarks were not meant to be critical but in- 
troductory; and they in fact could do little to muffle 
the thunder of the rising storm. There whs revolt 
in the air on that cool April day, a revolt due both 
to questions of general policy and the long contin- 
uance of a coalition government which no longer cor- 
responded to the will of the electorate. 

At an early stage in the discussion Mr. Mackenzie 
King, Leader of the Opposition (now Prime Min- 
ister), moved the following amendment: 

"That the House while recognizing the propriety of Canada 
being represented at any Imperial Conference or Conference 



FROM THE PACIFIC 49 

of the Prime Ministers of the Empire that may be called, 
desires to record its opinion that at the coming conference 
no steps should be taken involving any change in the rela- 
tions of Canada to other parts of the empire: and that in 
view of the present financial position of Canada, no action 
should be taken implying any obligation on the part of 
Canada to undertake new expenditures for naval and mili- 
tary purposes." 

Mr. Meiglien, the Prime Minister, the net of op- 
position closing round him, sought to extricate him- 
self from a difficult position by insisting on the pre- 
cise and limited agenda of the coming Imperial Con- 
ference, which, in his opinion, by no means justified 
the remarks made and only included preparation for 
a special constitutional conference, a general review 
of foreign relations so as to fix policy, and the ques- 
tion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. "This last is 
a subject of great and definite moment," said Mr. 
Meighen in sudden solemnity at 5 o'clock on the 
afternoon of the 27th April, perhaps little suspect- 
ing that he was uttering words which forecast a 
definite change in the relations of the English-speak- 
ing peoples. Other members rose to the remarks. 
"The only great subject taking the Prime Minister 
to London was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," they 
declared. The cat was out of the bag and it would 
be impossible ever to put him inside again! For here 
a member, who deserves to have his name perma- 
nently recorded, Mr. Lapointe, interjected an in- 
terrogation which two months later burst like a 



50 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

powerful bomb and shattered the Imperial Confer- 
ence and all its plans. 

"May I ask," he inquired very politely, "before 
my right honourable friend leaves the question of the 
Japanese Alliance, if it is his intention to insist that 
a clause be inserted in the Treaty, if renewed, of the 
nature of the clause which was embodied in the Brit- 
ish-French War Treaty — ^that it will not be bind- 
ing upon Canada without the approval of the Cana- 
dian Parliament?" 

His right honourable friend, too expert a parlia- 
mentarian to be so easily trapped, retreated, boggled, 
advanced. Here are the exact words since they have 
permanent importance: 

"Mr. Meighen: The very fact that we are called to a 
Conference that reviews that subject indicates that Canada 
has the right of assent or non-assent. As to the extent to 
which we are bound in case war actually takes place, that is 
another question. We have the power of approval or dis- 
approval. The question of what results from either course 
I do not propose to enter upon now. 

"Mr. Lapointe : The treaty will not be binding upon us 
without the approval of the Canadian Parliament ? 

"Mr. Meighen : I say we have the power of approval or 
disapproval. Anything that I might say as to how far it is 
binding or how far it Is not binding if we do not approve 
would be very easily misconstrued, because there are in- 
numerable circumstances that may follow. But the general 
power of approval or disapproval involves that if we do not 
approve, then so far as it Is not possible to be bound as part 
of the Empire we are not bound. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 51 

"Mr. Lapointe : Why was such a clause Inserted in the 
British-French Treaty if it was not necessary? 

"Mr. Meighen : There may be such a clause in that 
Treaty; but my honourable friend seems to think that I 
should be prepared to make a statement as to what conclu- 
sions should be reached after the conference. I presume if 
there is such a clause in the British-French Treaty it might 
be appropriate to insert one if a similar treaty is made in 
this case." 



So did the passage-at-arms abruptly end. The 
net result was, however, quite plain. The Prime 
Minister had been instructed, in spite of himself, in 
the subtle parliamentary way which has no counter- 
part in other walks in life; for here was the senti- 
ment of the Canadian people disclosing itself. Soon 
another member from Quebec, speaking in French 
as was his constitutional right, declared in unequiv- 
ocal language, ''Dans les hautes spheres britanniques 
on pense a se servir du Canada partout et en toute 
occasion comme materiel de guerre/' Canada mere 
war material! Then he added in prophetic vein that 
the time had arrived for writing a corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine, — a man must be found who would 
imitate Canning by securing a consolidated Ameri- 
can-Continent policy towards the problem of the 
Pacific and of Japan. . . . 

The debate went on, lasting far into the night. 
In the small hours the House divided on the amend- 
ment of Mr. Mackenzie King which was negatived 
by 96 votes to 64. But that was only the parlia- 



52 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

mentary appearance of things. In reality it had 
been carried — carried not only here, but in London 
and throughout the Empire. . . . 



VI 

Here under the blue skies of a Canadian Spring 
China was at last finding the ally she had so long 
searched for. The great and growing agitation re- 
garding a matter which had such a vital bearing on 
Chinese freedom could only have one end, if matters 
were pushed to their logical conclusion. That China 
could no longer be counted on as a passive factor, 
but would on her own account find ways and means 
to take action against those who derided her, was 
an element which prudent statesmanship could not 
ignore whilst there was yet time to consider it. 

In a personal interview with the troubled Prime 
Minister I enlarged in great detail on these aspects 
— and disclosed what we already knew in Peking, 
— that tentative drafts of a renewed Japanese Alh- 
ance were already in existence. The pale, tired face 
of the man who by his personal integrity broke Eng- 
land's arrangement with Japan quickened with in- 
terest. Faced as he was with a spirit of revolt at 
home, that did not turn him an instant from the 
true quest of statesmanship, — national security based 
on permanent and just solutions. Mr. Meighen was 
instantly aware that here was a matter which de- 
rived its importance from its many-sided and far- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 53 

reaching implications which had been hitherto ig- 
nored. The wooded heights of Ottawa took on a 
new aspect; for Canada by the magic of destiny was 
being called to action in a matter which concerned 
a region hitherto as unrelated to her political des- 
tinies as the Antipodes. Mr. Meighen, his keen 
mind already on the alert, no doubt made a mo- 
mentous mental decision. The Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance and what it had done to China's harm acquired 
a new flavour. It was not enough to show the harsh 
military results of the Agreement: it was essential 
to dwell on the political and fiscal immorality which 
reduced China to poverty and governmental weak- 
ness under the specious plea of international security. 
Being invited to set forth the facts in a Memoran- 
dum, the following is an exact copy : 

MEMORANDUM— CHINA AND THE ANGLO- 
JAPANESE ALLIANCE 

"The steps China has taken in regard to the renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are rehearsed in the copy of 
the press communique she issued in June last year, which is 
annexed hereto. China, having no status in the matter ex- 
cept as a protestant, could not raise the essential point in 
her communication — that i any renewal of the Alliance would 
be considered by all China as an endorsement by Great Brit- 
ain of all the wrongs Japan inflicted upon her during the 
war, and also a deliberate endorsement of the admittedly out- 
rageous Shantung clauses in the Versailles Treaty. 

"It is well at the very start to' grasp these points thor- 
oughly, since whatever decisions are arrived at at the Imperial 



54 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Conference will infallibly be measured by the Government 
and the people of China by this yardstick. 

"The writer is unable to say officially whether the sketch 
of the four modifications in the Treaty, copy of which be 
handed the Prime Minister, is accurate or not, as they only 
reached the Peking Government as a confidential communica- 
tion, reporting informal conversations. But the probabili- 
ties are that they are accurate in the main. We know that 
a London Foreign Office Commission, including Sir John 
Jordan, recently British Minister to China, has been sitting 
for a year engaged in a study of the Treaty. Obviously by 
now these 'studies' must be embodied In a draft, and this 
appears to be the document of which we have received a 
telegraphic sketch. 

"So far as the ostensible aim of the Alliance is concerned — 
namely to guarantee peace and security — the proposed new 
agreement will be just as ineffective as the three preceding 
instruments. In fact the only possible character it can 
possess is that of a fighting compact, a military document, 
to be invoked when it suits the senior partner. Great Britain. 
And because beneath its smooth phrases the alliance pos- 
sesses precisely this quality, Britain is forced to allow Japan 
to recoup herself for the risk involved to her own polity by 
spoliations carried out in China. 

"This point is thoroughly realized by the Peking Govern- 
ment, who know that their principal enemy is not Japan, but 
British policy, which for twenty years has declined to infuse 
morality into its consideration of China's political future. 

"The chief and indeed the only reason for the Alliance in 
the past has been the weakness and ineffectiveness of China 
as an international factor. The first steps which would be 
taken were China a European country instead of an Asiatic 
country would be to find the seat of the trouble. And be- 
cause of the importance of this point the writer would ven- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 55 

ture particularly to bring to the notice of the Prime Minister 
what he is quite sure is the source of China's difficulties which 
ought to be considered at the Imperial Conference if that 
conference desires to safeguard peace on the Pacific — and to 
do away with the possibility of war between Japan and the 
United States. 

"The principal weakness of the Central Government in 
China is that it is debarred by the commercial Treaties from 
increasing the Customs tariff, indirect taxation being the 
only really profitable taxation in a country where the 
standard of living is very low and where it is impossible to 
make other levies without riot. 

"At the present moment the Chinese Customs tariff is the 
same as it has been for 80 years, i.e. based on a nominal 5% 
levy (which in practice, owing to rise in values, is not more 
than S% or 4%) and which produces annually not more 
than $80 million Mexican or say Gold $40 millions. This 
ridiculous sum, which is exactly one-quarter of what Canada 
gets from her tariff, is entirely absorbed by the service of 
the foreign debt — nothing is left for the government which 
must rely on the salt tax, railway surpluses, stamps and 
wine and tobacco taxes for its upkeep and existence. 

"No attempt has been made for 20 years to deal with this 
matter. 

"The continued absence of funds is the source of all 
trouble in China, no government being able to exercise au- 
thority unless it disposes of adequate revenues. The pallia- 
tive which Western nations have offered is entirely wrong, to 
form a banking Consortium which will lend money so long 
as it is granted monopolistic rights. China requires to be 
prevented from borrowings not assisted. If she accepts 
bankers' terms she would to-day be given money in quanti- 
ties and another Turkey created. That is the position. 

"What she really needs is an emergency Tariff, which will 



56 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

give her double the Customs revenues she possesses to-day,: 
With that money in hand a commencement would at least 
be made towards consolidation and reform. 

"This is a subject which can be fitly considered in con- 
nection with the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; 
for Japan is the one Power that would certainly block such 
a reform indefinitely unless there is direct British pressure — 
and the only time Britain can exercise effective pressure is 
at a moment such as the present when Japan is seeking 
renewal of her British understanding in any form that Brit- 
ain will grant. 

"The second point which can be equally well considered 
at the Imperial Conference is the settlement of the Shantung 
question. In view of the Chinese contention that any fresh 
understanding with Japan this summer will in effect be a 
British endorsement of all Japan's action in China during the 
war, it seems elementary prudence to solve the Shantung 
issue and thereby get China's signature to the Versailles 
Treaty. What will satisfy China is this : 

"(1) Evacuation of all Japanese troops from Shantung, 
"(2) Handing back of the leased territory of Kiaochow, 
*'(3) Sale of the Shantung railway to China, after in- 
dependent valuation, and uniting this road with 
the Chinese Government railway system, Japanese 
being retained in technical posts in the same pro- 
portion as on the British-built railways in China 
( Peking-Moukden railway, Shanghai-Nanking), 
*'(4) Creation of a port authority at the port of Tsing- 
tao, under the chairmanship of the local com- 
missioner of Customs, with all docks, piers, etc., 
lately German Government property, paid for by 
bond issue as in case of Port of London authority 
and controlled by the local board. 
*'These four points will solve the Shantung question and 
diminish the possibility of war in the Far East to a very 



FROM THE PACIFIC 57 

considerable extent by removing a great portion of the pres- 
ent Chinese passion. 

*'In the opinion of the writer the only two urgent matters 
in regard to China are the tariff and Shantung, and a just 
handling of them at such a juncture as the Imperial Con- 
ference will give an entirely new colour to the International 
situation, and check the disturbing tendencies which are rap- 
idly growing. 

"It will certainly arrest the Turkification of China. 

"It will have a powerful influence on American opinion, 
which unites with Chinese opinion in nearly all matters the 
writer has discussed. 

"Moreover, if instead of a dangerous document such as 
Alliance Treaty, any commitments Britain and Japan care 
to enter into on the subject of defence are covered by the 
exchange of notes, which can be voluminous or terse, ex- 
plicit or general in character, then the precedent made by the 
United States herself, in the case of the Lansing-Ishii Notes 
of 1917 will be followed, and a vast amount of the present 
American suspicion and anger done away with. 

"If, on the other hand, stereotyped diplomacy wins the 
day and a new Treaty of Alliance is signed (modified but 
still retaining its old character), this is what will happen. 

*'China must seek a rapprochement with the United States 
and offer her naval bases on her coasts together with any 
other concessions she may desire. 

^'Already there is a naval scheme drawn up called 'The 
defence of the Gulf of Pechili scheme' which is under con- 
sideration, and is designed to protect the approaches to the 
capital, Peking, pending American mobilization. This docu- 
ment, which is strictly confidential, is annexed hereto. 

"A new Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Jiapan 
would also force China to avail herself of the constant offers 
of help she is receiving from Russia. Such a Treaty of 
alliance would tend indeed to drive China in the direction of 



58 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Persia and Afghanistan, both of which countries have found 
that they obtain more consideration from the Soviet Gov- 
ernment than from Britain. 

"Finally, there is this to be remembered. No treaty can 
be called a Treaty of Alliance unless it can be invoked 
against some one. Even if the new Treaty is so worded that 
it exempts Britain specifically and absolutely from partici- 
pation in an American-Japanese struggle, it will have to 
apply against China if she throws in her lot with the United 
States. And thus sooner or later it would in effect bring 
Britain and the United States into collision with one another, 
first on Chinese soil and then by natural processes everywhere 
on the Pacific. 

"This Memorandum, though written hastily and without 
notes, gives a true view of the situation as it actually exists." 

4th May, 1921. 

VII 

The interweaving of Canadian and Chinese des- 
tinies proceeded apace. I found that Mr. Macken- 
zie King, having had personal contact with China, 
was exceptionally well posted. The whole question 
of peace on the Pacific interested him profoundly; 
and particularly the omission of China from all con- 
sideration as a possible war-factor. 

I emphasized in a new way how the matter 
would work out — if there was no change. With the 
map as a background we considered war. 

The Preamble of the Japanese AlMance stated 
clearly that the object of the Treaty was: 

"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general 
peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India: 




FROM THE PACIFIC 59 

"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all the 
Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity 
of the Chinese empire and the principle of equal opportuni- 
ties for the commerce and industry of all nations in China : 

"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the 
high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and 
India and the defence of their special interests in the said 
regions." 

The special interests of Japan in Manchuria and 
Mongolia had been acknowledged by the United 
States four years before in the Lansing-Ishii notes 
by the hitherto unknown political doctrine that geo- 
graphical propinquity creates special interest. 

In the event of war with America Japan would 
certainly act with a high hand in Chinese territory 
in order to provision herself. Thereby she would 
provoke reprisals — certainly in Shantung if nowhere 
else. Article II of the Alliance could then be in- 
voked by Japan against China just as it had been 
invoked by Britain in August, 1914, against Ger- 
many in China, namely: 

"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action 
wherever arising on the part of any Power or Powers either 
high contracting party should be involved in war in defence 
of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the 
preamble of this Agreement, the other high contracting 
party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and 
will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual 
agreement with it." 

British action would perforce have to be both naval 
and military. How could she continue to preserve 



60 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

peace with the United States, as she was entitled to 
in spite of the AlHance by virtue of the arbitration 
clause. Article IV, of which the so-called Anglo- 
American Peace Commission Treaty of 15th Sep- 
tember, 1914, was the pendent, having been construed 
as an arbitration Treaty, if America gave aid and 
comfort to China — and officers and munitions? And 
what in such circumstances would be the fate of 
Canadian territory, with all the ex-soldiers of Canada 
influenced by geographical and racial propinquity 
pouring in tens of thousands into the United States 
k assist her? 

There was only one answer. 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as it stood, was a 
symbol of the break-up of the British empire. Stand- 
ing half-way between Britain and the United States, 
Canada in peace-time could be something more than 
a mere interpreter of the sentiments of one people 
to the other: she could interpose without danger in 
contentious matters because she could speak the polit- 
ical dialects of both countries like a native. But 
with such a war, begun in such a way, with such a 
race as the Japanese as Allies, one date covered the 
situation. 

1776. . . . 



PART III 

THE UNITED STATES MAKES A FIRST STEP 



If Canada was faced by a dilemma, the United 
States was in a worse quandary. Here was a coun- 
try at the poMtical cross-roads with nothing to assist 
her but a dim feehng that she must take such un- 
usual action that in the end it would constitute a 
clean break with the past and draw her towards un- 
charted seas and monstrous precipices. Committed 
to a vast expenditure in naval construction as a 
heritage from the war, she was still more emphati- 
cally committed by the will of the people to a new 
policy of peace and retrenchment. How were the 
two to be reconciled? 

It was possible to pick up in the United States a 
feeling of apprehension absent in Canada. In the 
Spring of 1921 Americans who followed foreign 
affairs were overcome by those vague premonitions 
which precede the birth of great things. That some- 
thing must be done to prevent navies from being 
piled up and policies blindly persisted in until the 
inevitable crash came was strongly felt throughout 
the country. Canadian action had begun to be 
spoken of as an important element, but there was still 

61 



62 AN INDISCKEET CHRONICLE 

no means of knowing whether it would really have 
a decisive character or merely prove a palliative. 

It was the affair of the new Secretary of State, 
Charles Evans Hughes, to make up his mind on these 
issues, so that the Harding Administration would at 
least start on its way with foreign affairs no longer 
tied in a Gordian Knot. Tall, quick and intelligent, 
with a magnificent head and still more magnificent 
teeth, it seemed at first sight as if here was the very 
person to rend all enemies like a mastiff. But Sec- 
retary Hughes, standing still, with his arms hang- 
ing loosely beside him, disclosed imperfect knees, and 
small feet — ^two dangerous characteristics in a man. 
They mean a proneness to the influence of others; 
a tendency to accept formulas without proper in- 
quiry; an absence of true conviction. Men's legs 
are more important as a political indication than 
their hands and heads, and should always be atten- 
tively studied. Although there was no doubt that 
the new Secretary of State could do a great deal 
with specific facts. Thanks to his legal training, it 
seemed doubtful whether he could push along a whole 
group of policies unless he himself were propelled 
from behind. 

There was, however, one good point already clearly 
marked. After being only two months in harness, 
he had already discovered that so far from being able 
to negotiate on any matter affecting the Far East, 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance inevitably proved a 
hopeless barrier. The reservations and qualifications 



FROM THE PACIFIC 63 

which he constantly came across had made him un- 
derstand that it was not only the major obstruction 
but a most dangerous weapon. The Pacific question, 
vital to the United States long before there had been 
any question of naval competition with Japan, had 
been immensely complicated by the events of the 
war. The position in the Philippines was unsafe; 
the position in the Hawaiian islands was weakened; 
and as for the policy of the Open Door in China even 
a tyro could recognize that it was merely the integu- 
ment of a moribund hope. 

Washington was embarrassed. There was embar- 
rassment at the White House, there was embarrass- 
ment at the State Department, there was embarrass- 
ment at the Capitol. Highly interesting indeed was 
this perplexity in conjunction with the impending 
stand of Canada. Here was a matter vitally affect- 
ing the whole future of the United States coming 
up for decision in London, and yet not a word might 
be publicly said about it without outraging the diplo- 
matic conventions. 'Never had there been a greater 
political irony than this: that after years of most 
intimate war-dealings between England and the 
United States, calling for complete frankness in 
naval and military affairs, the major commitment 
governing the relationship of the two throughout the 
Pacific was to be reviewed in pseudo-secrecy. 

Fortunately the men who invented the United 
States were men with some knowledge of the neces- 
sity of stiffening government and pegging out its 



64 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

course of action by a distribution of authority so 
designed that no person would carry more than he 
was fit for. The Senate, for instance, was already 
highly concerned. The Annual Navy Bill was be- 
fore it: either vast increases in expenditure must be 
faced or else some new contrivance thought out to 
halt the onward momentum of this Juggernaut's 
Car. ... 

Senator Borah formed at that moment another 
illuminating comment on the nature of things con- 
fronting the new administration, and of the machin- 
ery which had to be set in motion to undo the harm 
of the old administration. Short, massive, his hair 
brushed back in a leonine energetic mane from a 
clean-shaven face, the Senator from Idaho, whether 
sitting down or walking hurriedly away, seems a 
man obsessed with the necessity for action. Placed 
at the head of the Inter-Oceanic Canal Coromittee, 
he was giving thought for the morrow in the matter 
of the sea. Here he was in the middle of May with 
his mind made up that the Navy Appropriation Bill 
alone afforded the opportunity to raise the issue 
of the Pacific with England and Japan. 

It was plainer every hour that the elements in an 
involved situation were being gradually marshalled 
in such a fashion as to preclude evasion. I found 
in discussion with Senators a curious and interesting 
viewpoint. Whereas Canadian statesmen were afraid 
that no matter what care might be taken with a new 
Japanese treaty, it would sooner or later lead to a 



FROM THE PACIFIC 65 

violent disturbance of a century-old peace on this 
North American Continent, this was by no means 
the main concern in Washington. American states- 
men held it urgent and humiliating that the Philip- 
pines, after having been an American possession for 
a quarter of a century, virtually lay in the hollow of 
Japan's hand. The islands north of the Equator 
were in their eyes so many bases to destroy their 
communications; that British action tended to en- 
dorse this state of affairs seemed to them deeper and 
more sinister than anything in any other part of 
the world. 

The Foreign Relations Committee were united 
about this. From Senator McCormick I received in 
an illuminating sentence a true definition of the 
matter. "England and Japan can no doubt make 
a Treaty acceptable to the American Government," 
he said in words which were broadcasted through the 
agency of the press, "but they can make no treaty 
acceptable to the American people; and as it is the 
American people who in the last analysis decide 
things you can draw your own conclusions." 

And as if to point the particular moral, Senator 
Lodge, the Chairman of the Committee, destined 
half a year later to be the grave-digger in the piece 
and to utter the public lament over poor Yorick's 
skull, added: "It would be well to remember that if 
the interests of a great empire on the other side of 
the water are involved there is an equally great em- 
pire on this side to be considered." 



66 AN INDISCKEET CHRONICLE 

The great empire of the New World, cut off by 
the boundary of the ocean and destined no man knew 
how — ! These senators were men of the same con- 
tinent as the right honourable Arthur Meighen, 
Prime Minister of Canada, and Mr. Mackenzie King, 
the official leader of the Opposition ; and it was inevit- 
able that in many situations they should put on the 
same spectacles. 

II 

There was another matter which also entered into 
the problem. The personality of the new President 
was just as much a factor as his campaign pledges. 
He was pledged not so much to destroy the policies 
of his predecessor as to recover the norm of Amer- 
ican political life. Normalcy — that was the word. 
In actual practice the solution might amount to much 
the same thing: but the fiction of a new kind of con- 
structive action had at least to be preserved. In his 
first message to Congress spoken only two months 
before he had very patently hedged ; for if he would 
have no part in the European League of Nations 
what was his association of nations which he had in 
mind to preserve the peace of the world? The signs 
of disapproval in his electorate had been so manifest 
that the problem would have to be tackled with the 
utmost caution. 

He could not remain blind to the steady drift to- 
wards the inevitable solution. That the naval handle 
was the only safe one to grasp was increasingly evi- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 67 

dent; for even before he had been installed as Presi- 
dent there had been a Senate recommendation to call 
a meeting with Britain and Japan. But was the 
navy really everything and did not an American 
meeting with two Powers already bound by an iron- 
clad treaty signify entering the conference room 
faced by an insurmountable handicap? The matter 
was an ever-increasing source of worry and anxiety. 
A false move at the beginning of the term was the 
last thing to contemplate. To the wise man (and 
President Harding is emphatically wise in his cau- 
tiousness) the electorate is forever there; watchful, 
suspicious, irrational in a sense, yet with the mass 
instinct for safety developed beyond every other in- 
stinct. Safety first is not merely a conventional 
slogan ; it is the command of the people everywhere — 
the basis of the modern life, the very groundwork on 
which we stand. To place safety where it belonged 
in this very involved problem was no light matter. 

But just as in the debates in the Canadian House 
of Commons I had somehow received the impression 
that in some undisclosed way Americans were luke- 
warm to the idea of a Canada which would treat with 
them on terms of diplomatic equality, so now did I 
perceive that the role Canada might play was meas- 
ured differently from what one might have expected. 
It seemed that it was not enough that one section of 
the British Empire should want to control in a 
reasonable way foreign affairs, even though the par- 
ticular issue might be handled to the advantage of the 



68 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

United States. What was frankly desired was the 
wholehearted conversion of Britain — a modification 
of policy so profound that the matter of Canada 
would be a mere detail, the great thing being the 
frank abandonment by Downing Street of a whole 
web of formulas built up on age-old foundations. 

For what was the secret behind the powerful ad- 
vocacy of Premier Hughes of Australia in favour 
of the Japanese? What forces impelled him; was he 
merely the mouthpiece of others who astutely used 
him to mask their own plans? 

I found in every one's hands printed copies of the 
lengthy and very carefully considered speech made 
by the Australian Premier on the 7th April in the 
Federal House of Representatives at Melbourne. It 
had been distributed thoroughly. The matter had 
significance. He had said, "Our idea at the confer- 
ence is a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 
such a form, modified if that be deemed proper as 
will be acceptable to Britain, to America, to Japan, 
to ourselves." 

But this was a thing beyond human ingenuity even 
for statesmen in the antipodes: incidentally it dis- 
regarded China as completely as if that country did 
not exist. Perhaps it concealed an artifice so elabo- 
rate that the Washington Monument would rock to 
earth with its glory tarnished. . . . 

The Secretary of State with the magnificent head 
plodded on methodically trying to disentangle such 
matters as the control of the island of Yap and the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 69 

right of America to put up wireless stations in China 
on terms of equality with the corporations of other 
nationalities. Conversation with him showed that 
he was fully alive to all the possibilities of the situ- 
ation. His chief weakness was what he had inherited 
from his predecessor. A tradition of flabbiness is 
the hardest of all traditions to banish. The State 
Department was still as flabby as a wet pancake. 

It was at the Senate that the real drive was to be 
found. The man with the leonine mane kept his eyes 
fixed steadily on the main objective. With his 
powerful, persistent, sledge-hammer oratory Sen- 
ator Borah beat down opposition and worked towards 
his formal resolution. One trump card the United ^ 
States held so admittedly that the game of the others 
was in her hands. The dollar, after many ups and 
downs, had become the irresistible factor not in inter- 
national commerce "(because Here the right tradition 
was absent), but as a national battering-ram when 
others wanted to batter. For every dollar spent by 
other nations America had the gold which would en- 
able her to spend a hundred. It required but the 
simplest calculation to show that the naval game of 
beggar-my-neighbour was really over. This fact 
having been admitted by the premier sea-power, • 
Britain, it stood to reason that the others would be 
dragged along directly the machinery moved and the 
gears enmeshed. 



70 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

in 

Definite, however, as the naval plan was now be- 
coming the array of difficulties so far as China was 
concerned was by no means lessened, nor were the 
prospects materially improved unless totally new 
counsels won the day. 

Difficulties — their name was indeed legion! They 
had been accumulating through inept diplomacy at 
a terrific rate. Like float-ice moving endlessly down 
a river, they had at last piled up in a solid barrier 
which was constantly being added to. Heroic meas- 
ures were needed to free the stream of international 
relations from this grave peril. Unfortunately for 
China the age of heroes had seemingly passed. We 
live in a prosaic era when the brightest invention is 
the transparent game of "passing the buck," — which 
means avoiding responsibilities in a rather cowardly 
way. 

The United States had so recently missed one of 
those supreme opportunities which a statesman of 
imagination would have leaped at that it was hard to 
be very optimistic. Just as in the case of the Suez 
Canal shares, the investment of a relatively speaking 
unimportant sum was made a masterstroke, so could 
the prestige and credit of the United States in China 
have been secured forever by seventy-five million 
dollars in cash. The amateurish handling of the in- 
vitation to China (among other neutral Powers) to 
associate herself with American action in the war was 



FROM THE PACIFIC 71 

a matter which had piled up such a debit that — in- 
dependently of the Japanese issue — years of con- 
scientious effort could alone work it off. China, still 
in the most difficult and painful stage of evolution 
from a provincial barter and bullion system to the 
cash and credit system of the West, had been at the 
mercy of the world's money markets for twenty years. 
The yard-stick with which everything had to be meas- 
ured, not because the Chinese were corrupt but be- 
cause they were rapidly becoming just as other 
nations, was cash and credit. In a community im- 
mobilized by the weight of the economic revolution, 
money alone could produce swift results. The issue 
was paramount to an extent which can be understood 
by referring to the economic history of the world at 
the close of the Napoleonic wars. Here in a capital 
stuffed full of gold and silver bulhon, lying at a 
stone's throw from the executive offices, it seemed in- 
credible that this essential matter had never been 
rightly understood, and that the business instinct of 
Americans should have so profoundly erred. The 
breakdown of the Chinese Government in 1917, the 
temporary ruin of President Li Yuan Hung, the at- 
tempted restoration of the Manchus, counter-move- 
ments, confusion, camarillas, and Japanese predomi- 
nance, all were due to the Government of the United 
States which had set in motion by its deliberate acts 
forces which it refused to control. 

Now that after four chequered years we were get- 
ting back to first principles, the deadweight of the 



72 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

problem seemed very great; for under the Lansing- 
Ishii Notes there was a commitment of a serious char- 
acter which existed independently of everything else. 
And here it is best to tell the true story. 



IV 

In Peking I had often discussed with President Li 
Yuan Hung questions of foreign policy and the con- 
ception of the United States as the palladium of 
Chinese liberty. The gradual strangulation of the 
Chinese Government, owing to the American failure, 
had made us more and more pessimistic. The coun- 
try became prey in 1917 to violent propaganda. By 
May of that year we had obtained secret information 
that Japan had determined to take up directly with 
the United States the question of the Pacific, mak- 
ing a desperate effort to secure the withdrawal of 
the American Asiatic squadron as a preliminary to es- 
tablishing the so-called Japanese Monroe doctrine for 
Eastern Asia. I was asked to proceed to America so 
as to convey a warning and get consideration of the 
vital fact^. 

Unfortunately Government in Peking so com- 
pletely collapsed that there was much delay. Fate 
willed that I should sail from Japan on the very same 
day in July as the Ishii Mission which was expected 
to complete the work of the Twenty-one Demands 
by publicly eliminating the United States from the 
Far East, The quick Canadian route placed me in 



FROM THE PACIFIC 73 

San Francisco days before this fateful mission had 
arrived. The anxiety of a government that had 
chained itself almost completely to empty formulas 
was now apparent. There was an official reception 
Delegation under Assistant Secretary Breckenridge 
Long waiting anxiously in San Francisco for the first 
indications of what might be expected. Was the 
real object of the Japanese demarche nothing less 
than American naval evacuation of the Pacific and 
the acceptance of a new financial formula which 
would place the financial leadership in China in 
Japan's hands? She needed these two last things to 
have China completely at her mercy. What was to 
be done to ward off such a determined assault? 

Two days later the Mission arrived. I can still 
see the surprised faces of the Japanese officials as 
they arrived at their hotel after the official reception. 
Soldiers had been so thick on the ground that the 
Japanese must have wondered why Homer Lea in 
his remarkable warning, "The Valour of Ignorance," 
which was than still being read, had declared that 
California and the territory west of the Rockies lay 
in the hollow of Japan's hand. Nothing but troops 
and camps, and camps and troops. America was not 
only arming but showing her men. The official re- 
ception committee worked without ceasing; and any 
idea of getting the United States to accept the gen- 
eral scheme which had eliminated the British fleet 
east of Singapore must in face of this demonstration 
have been quietly dropped by the Japanese Mission 



74 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

into the bay of San Francisco twenty-four hours 
after they landed. 

In Washington, a month later, I found that the 
situation was one of stalemate. Viscount Ishii had 
been there for several weeks, imprisoned by official 
dinners and receptions. Some of which had been 
shocking failures. Curious inspired articles were 
beginning to appear, hinting that although he had 
specially come to America to discuss important busi- 
ness no opportunity was being afforded him to do so. 
Japanese discontent was plainly rising in face of the 
tactics adopted. There had already been an incident. 
Invitations had been sent to attend a special review 
of the American fleet in honour of the Mission. As 
Viscount Ishii had not answered the invitation a State 
Department official was sent to see him and ask him 
what he proposed to do. He found Viscount Ishii 
in a bad humour. The meaning of this excess of 
entertainments and armament displays was beginning 
to penetrate Japanese consciousness. "My naval 
and military staff will go with pleasure," Viscount 
Ishii declared, "but is it necessary for me to go?" 
"Certainly not," urbanely replied the Department 
official, "but the Secretary of State is going." Vis- 
count Ishii paused, and then quietly accepted. 

At the naval review the Japanese were shown 
capital ships in battle array amounting to twice their 
own 1917 fleet, not to speak of many other vessels. 
The Secretary of the Navy apologized for the com- 
parative absence of torpedo-craft, as there were 



FROM THE PACIFIC 75 

forty-five destroyers off England assisting the 
British navy, — quite a subtle little thrust for Secre- 
tary Daniels. At the end of the day the Secretary 
of War added a final friendly declaration suitable 
to allied and associated Powers in the form of a warn- 
ing not to suppose that the American navy was going 
to monopolize all American attention. During fu- 
ture years the American army would always have five 
million trained men at its disposal to support the ac- 
tion of the fleet ; for all these millions being called out 
by the draft would be available. 

Yet, in spite of this byplay the position was not 
reassuring. Secretary Lansing was characteristic- 
ally more concerned with the position in Russia than 
in China — because that just then seemed more dis- 
tant. Both he and President Wilson were interested 
in discovering whether the Korniloff-Cossack move- 
ment could overthrow the Kerensky regime — not 
whether China was to be a Japanese enclave. They 
had remarkable ideas concerning the Cossacks, whom 
they looked upon as an enormous military force be- 
longing to a race entirely different from the ordinary 
Russian. Europe was also proving very annoying. 
The Italian Ambassador wanted one hundred million 
dollars to save Italy from collapse. He was refused. 
Less than two months later I had the ironical satis- 
faction on the Pacific to listen to the American wire- 
less station at Dutch Harbour in the Aleutians flash 
the news of Caporetto: with the further information 
a day or two later that the United States Govern- 



76 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ment was advancing Italy one hundred million dol- 
lars. ... If it needed a first-class disaster to get 
common sense in European affairs, it can be left to 
the imagination what must happen to China before 
anything is done. — 

Viscount Ishii constantly postponed his return to 
Japan, declaring quite openly that to do so would 
place the Military Party at the head of affairs and 
precipitate the gravest occurrences. He went to 
Philadelphia and made a speech about the Liberty 
Bell — a droll subject in all truth for a bureaucratic 
Japanese. Then he went on elsewhere, always be- 
coming gloomier and gloomier. In New York he 
finally instructed his private secretary to pay a cer- 
tain confidential visit with very confidential words. 

President Wilson at length sent for him. After 
three drafts of the proposed agreement had been 
worked over, the fourth one was accepted and signed 
on the 2nd November, Secretary Lansing weakly ac- 
cepting the Japanese definition, that "special interest" 
did not mean paramount interest, and not troubling 
himself about the essential point — the question of 
interpretation. As neither the naval nor the financial 
issue had come up openly, and the doctrine of geogra- 
phical propinquity had been balanced against the 
open-door and equal opportunity in Manchuria, the 
Wilson administration pretended to attach no im- 
portance to the notes which were in any case merely 
an additional postscript to the old and well-estab- 
lished policy of evasion. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 77 

From the Asiatic point of view the whole transac- 
tion was another phase of that year's surrender. 



J. 

The last paragraph to this business was written 
next year — 1918. Washington at last became dimly 
aware from the flood of loans Japan was pouring ' 
into China that a fearful blunder in tactics had been 
committed. The administration uttered a cry of 
alarm which reached the cliffs and caverns of Wall 
Street. Instead of rising to the occasion, New York 
bankers, after profound deliberations, came back 
with precisely the same formula which had proved 
abortive for them five years before, and which, inci- 
dentally, was the formula of their Chinese currency 
Loan of 1910 for fifty million dollars which has never 
been anything but a project. The international Con- 
sortium, from which they had been told solemnly to 
retire in 1913 by President Wilson, was just as 
solemnly revived by them in what they were pleased 
to believe was a new and convincing form. They 
believed that the world-war had placed financial 
hegemony so securely in their hands that at last it 
would be possible for them successfully to dictate a 
China policy. The date of the first conversation in 
Washington between the gOA^ernment and bankers 
appears to have been in June. On the 8th July the "^ 
bankers expressed themselves in the following writ- 



78 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ten terms on the suggestion that they should make a 
loan to China :^ 



". . . An arrangement of this sort, which contemplates 
transactions spread over a considerable period of time, in 
our opinion should be made on the broadest basis in order to 
give the best protection to our investors, and, with the 
right foundation established, confidence would follow and 
anxiety and jealousy disappear. At the conference held in 
Washington recently, there was mentioned, as a course per- 
haps advisable, that Americans and Japanese co-operate in 
a loan to China. We are disposed to believe that it would 
be better if such an international co-operation were to be 
made broader. We suggest, therefore, that this can best be 
accomplished if a four-Power group be constituted consisting 
of financial members to be recognized by the respective Gov- 
ernments of Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United 
States ; our Government to recognize as their member of 
such group the American banks or firms which may become 
associated for this purpose, and which we should hope to 
have representative of the whole country. Although, under 
the present circumstances, it would be expected that Japan 
and the United States should carry England and France, 
such carrying should not diminish the vitality of their mem- 
berships in the four-Power group. 

"One of the conditions of membership in such a four- 
Power group should be that there should be relinquishment 
by the members of the group either to China or to the 

1 It is a significant and remarkable fact that the direct investment of 
American, bankers in China on their own account consisted on that 
date, as to-day, of two loans — one for $5,500,000 and the second also 
for $5,500,000; the first negotiated in 1916 by the Continental Bank of 
Chicago as part of loan of $25,000,000 which was never consummated; 
the second by Pacific Development Company as first instalment of a loan 
of $30,000,000 which also was abandoned. The subsequent remarkable 
developments regarding these two loans is dealt with in Part VI of 
the present volume. 



FKOM THE PACIFIC 79 

group of any options to make loans which they now hold, 
and all loans to China by any of them should be considered 
as a four-Power group business. Through co-operation of 
England, France, Japan and the United States much can be 
accomplished for the maintenance of Chinese sovereignty and ^ 
the preservation of the 'open-door'; and, furthermore, such 
co-operation might greatly facilitate the full development 
of the large revenue sources, from only a very few of which 
China at present realizes a satisfactory income. 

"It would seem to be necessary, if now and after the war 
we are successfully to carry out the responsibilities imposed 
upon us by our new international position, that our Govern- 
ment should be prepared in principle to recognize the change 
in our international relations, both diplomatic and com- 
mercial, brought about by the war." 

The salient facts in this document are highly inter- 
esting. The State Department, true to traditional 
policy of avoiding at all costs direct responsibilities, 
had evidently accepted the suggestion which Japan- 
ese had been busily making through Baron Shibusawa 
and others: — that the United States should invest 
their capital in China under Japanese auspices. 
New York bankers, with a keener knowledge of 
profits, not only differed, but made straight for the 
big prize — Chinese railways. The meaning of the 
sentence in which they call for the relinquishment of 
options held by others lies in the fact that American 
participation in railway concessions in China having 
been of a most modest character, other Powers would 
retain all the Chinese plums unless Americans were 
assisted to a share. 



80 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Thereupon commenced a long and elaborate negoti- 
ation lasting two years, and shifting from Washing- 
ton to London and from London to Paris, and finally 
ending in Tokyo and Peking. The original purpose 
of the loan, which in terms of the State Department's 
despatches was "to strengthen China and fit her for 
a more active part in the war against the Central 
European Powers," was never referred to again for 
the obvious reason that the war was over long before 
any one got down to business. It took one year of 
correspondence and meetings to force the other mem- 
bers of the proposed new Consortium — England, 
France, and Japan — to agree to the principle of pool- 
ing their Chinese railway concessions. Mr. Balfour, 
then in the British Foreign Office, pointed out in a 
moving despatch that the old Consortium had only 
commenced to work in 1913 after the various groups 
had agreed in writing to exclude industrial and rail- 
way loans from the scope of their enterprise and that 
the new policy meant a complete reversal. To dis- 
lodge these dissidents was hard work. In the end 
they gave way because the possibility that America, 
if frustrated, might induce China to cancel all options 
herself, was too near to be pleasant. The principle 
of unification of the railway system of China having 
been definitely adopted as the basis of the plan, in 
May, 1919, a draft Agreement was entered into in 
Paris, almost on the date of the Shantung surrender 
made by President Wilson during the Peace negoti- 
ations. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 81 

But although British and French interests had be- 
come pHable, Japan still rigidly maintained her stand 
that the special interests conceded her under the 
Lansing-Ishii Notes meant exclusive privileges in 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. In 
the ensuing correspondence between governments 
and banking groups remarkable facts gradually 
emerged. In a Japanese Memorandum of the 14th 
April, 1920, it transpired, for instance, that the net- 
work of projected railways in South Manchuria and 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, for which Japan had paid 
the Peking Government twenty million Gold Dollars 
in the form of advances in 1918, had been designed 
as a "means of common defence on the part of China 
and Japan against foreign invasion coming from the 
the direction of Urga." It was only then understood 
in the chancelleries concerned that the action taken 
on the initiative of the United States in the Russian 
Far East, nominally to save the Czecho-Slovaks, in 
which Japan had so unwillingly concurred, had been 
dehberately utilized by Japan for the development of 
her Russo-Chinese policy. That is, whilst others 
were foolish enough still to consider their China 
policy as a detached matter, bearing no relation to 
the general political problem of the world, Japan was 
carefully making a synthesis in which every factor 
(and the whims of every chancellery) had its allotted 
place. The temporary "success" of this policy, im- 
moral as were the motives, was due to the fact that 
it was scientifically conceived, being based on the 



82 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

doctrines of Clausewitz : its ultimate collapse was due 
to the fact that timidity finally intervened, energy 
being replaced by indecision and parsimony invading 
a sphere where large-handed spending and unity of 
action was the essential driving-force. . . . 

By way of reply to the Japanese Memorandum the 
American banking group, in the person of Mr. 
Thomas A. Lamont, of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., 
made a pilgrimage to Tokyo. It was a point of 
honour with American financiers not to have it said 
that in the case of Japan they had acquiesced in the 
principle of spheres of influence when their whole 
plan of railway pooling was based on the open door 
and equal opportunity for all. In this they were 
very materially assisted by British bankers who 
^through their own Foreign Ofiice brought strong and 
direct pressure on Japan. Mr. Lamont was con- 
sequently able to perform in Tokyo a rather remark- 
able feat in inducing the Japanese Government to 
accept the position that all railways which could not 
be considered as feeder-lines to the existing South 
Manchuria system must be brought into the common 
pool. 

With this moral victory in his pocket he came to 
Peking and met a smarting defeat — a defeat very 
largely caused by a subsidiary and relatively unim- 
portant point. The issue was a large block of Ger- 
man-Chinese railway -bonds (Hukwang bonds) which 
had been acquired in some undisclosed way by his 
firm, either during or immediately after the war, and 



FROM THE PACIFIC 83 

which had been advertised by China as cancelled, ex- 
cepting serial numbers acquired prior to the Chinese 
declaration of war of 14th August, 1917. The total 
amount involved was under four million dollars 
(gold) ; and although the Chinese allegation that 
some of the bonds belonged to the Hohenzollern fam- 
ily was not proved one block appeared to have been 
acquired from the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg. 
With quite extraordinary tenacity the Chinese held 
to their repudiation of these "enemy bonds" and the 
'New York Stock Exchange ordered them off the 
market. Mr. Lamont admitted that he had not 
scrutinized the scrip or noticed that they were signed 
by the Chinese Minister to Berlin; but he took the 
stand that the Hukwang Hailway Loan of thirty mil- 
lion gold dollars was a single obligation of the 
Chinese Government and must be honoured accord- 
ingly. 

Once more, as in the case of the East India Com- 
pany, this insignificant matter illustrated that it is 
not sound policy to allow institutions depending on 
profit to be responsible agents in what are purely 
governmental affairs. In spite of the clever piece 
of work in Tokyo, American finance again registered 
a failure, which was bound to take on a more sombre 
character from year to year. Nevertheless, the work 
of completing the international scheme was pushed 
on with, the definitive consortium Agreement being 
duly completed between the four national groups on 



84 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

the 15th October, 1920, in New York as if every diffi- 
culty had been removed. 

The agreement has remained to this day a dead- 
letter. 

VI 

The new administration which had come in Wash- 
ington understood very imperfectly this very involved 
story, which indeed requires years of study on the spot 
thoroughly to appreciate. The new administration, 
though working towards solutions in a far more hope- 
ful way than had ever occurred before, was too in- 
clined to believe that a new grouping of the Powers 
in the Far East would of itself cure China's ills. 
Therein lay the great danger. That a modification 
of that grouping was a first essential was true. But 
the internal Chinese question was vastly more difficult 
than the external one, and could not be handled in 
the same way. That American money-power had 
already committed itself along wrong lines was 
deeply disturbing, since Asia demands a technique 
entirely different from that which is employed else- 
where. All the enthusiasm and altruism in the world 
cannot alter such a decisive fact. Quick returns and 
efficiency, in the way the West understands them, are 
abhorred as nature abhors a vacuum. Energy is 
thrice-cursed and always suspect. It is only when 
you have suited your method to a lackadaisical and 
somewhat slipshod atmosphere, and are content to 
let the years go by in winning confidence that you 



FROM THE PACIFIC 85 

finally triumph, though even triumph differs from 
what any man has imagined elsewhere in his 
dreams. . . . 

Still there were good points in 1921 which had pre- 
viously been non-existent. 

The greatest stroke since Monroe's days had been 
successfully if wastefully carried out. After being 
stranded for half a century America had really put 
to sea again. The creation of an American mercan- 
tile marine, through the agency of the United States ^ 
Shipping Board, had become the basis of American 
policy on the Pacific. For the first time for fifty 
years there was a tangible stake on the high seas ; and 
no matter how it might be looked on elsewhere, on 
the Pacific that stake had become absolutely essential 
to give meaning and reality to policy. 

The sea beckoned — it was sea-power that was the 
issue. The entire trend of men's minds was in that 
direction. Secretary Hughes' persistence in the mat- 
ter of the island of Yap arose from a due appreci- 
ation of the fact. For if the sea was important, of 
almost equal importance was what lay under the seas 
— submarine cables. The United States was badly 
placed in the matter. Instead of having at least one 
cable linking her to the continent of Asia she had 
none. That American submarine communication, 
giving access to the markets of China, terminated 
and, for all business purposes, died in an office of the 
imperial Japanese telegraph system was a dismal 
conclusion. 



86 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Under the sea, on the sea, on land, the difficulties 
seemed to multiply. All the inaction of past years, 
all the attempts to avert responsibility by the use of 
fine phrases, were like Mother Carey's chickens com- 
ing home to roost. There was reason for the anxiety 
of the hour ; for the fear that unless extreme vigilance 
were shown an ugly and unescapable situation might 
develop overnight necessitating the rude and detested 
arbitrament. It might be exaggerated and even un- 
true to proclaim, as Homer Lea had done in "The 
Valour of Ignorance," that swarms of khaki-clad 
Japanese infantry could ever invade the peaceful val- 
leys of California; but it was not exaggerated or 
untrue to suppose that the Philippines lay in the 
hollow of Japan's hand and that even Hawaii would 
be menaced if there was stalemate at sea. Looking 
at the possibilities which the island-chains and the 
indented coasts afforded in the Northern Pacific, as 
well as in the Western and Central Pacific (and re- 
membering that the strategic harbours in the Alaskan 
Peninsula were equidistant from Japan and San 
Francisco), there was no limit to what a resourceful 
and energetic enemy might do. Determination and 
valour, when there has been adequate preparation, are 
indeed letters of marque and reprisal which give 
license to pass over the boundary into an enemy's 
country and territorial waters and set no term to am- 
bition. To agi'ce on points by trumpery diplomatic 
methods, when there was this prospect in the offing, 
was plainly an evasion. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 87 

Consequently, on the twenty-sixth day of this im- 
portant month of May the Senate duly adopted the 
formal resolution requesting the President to call a 
conference with Great Britain and Japan on naval 
reduction ; and after weeks of conferences between the 
two Houses this was added as an Amendment to the 
Naval Bill and was the origin of the Washington 
Conference. 



»^ 



PART IV 

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1921 



The first impression of the observer in England in 
the summer of 1921 was that no one outside of a 
narrow official and parliamentary circle had yet taken 
cognizance of the fact that an elaborate play was 
about to be staged. Coming from Canada and the 
United States, where the problem of the Pacific was 
no idle matter but a burning issue which might flame 
up with the utmost fierceness at any moment and in- 
volve every shore washed by the waters of that 
mighty ocean, it was extraordinary to note the indif- 
ference. England, mother of nations, was immersed 
in her own affairs. The Imperial Conference, with 
its complicated agenda, was plainly an unwelcome 
guest. Here were not only routine departmental 
matters requiring profound peace adequately to 
discuss, but foreign and imperial questions the details 
of which were so complicated that only experts could 
be expected to work their way through the maze of 
facts and know what importance to give them. 

The machinery, however, commenced to work. 
The Press, still with something of the old war-res- 
traint, gradually turned its attention to the question 
of the hour. It was noticeable, however, that Japan 

88 



AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 89 

was always mentioned with caution, a certain vague- 
ness characterizing all references to the Alliance as 
though a too precise investigation of pending issues 
was out of place. The mot d'ordre having been 
passed round to avoid hurting susceptibilities, editors 
were doing their best to oblige. Still some light was 
thrown on dark places. Especially valuable was 
the prominence given by "The Times" to the brilliant 
articles of the young Australian writer, Mr. Duncan 
HaU, whose views expressed in his "Horizons of Em- 
pii'e" depicted accurately and admirably, as I knew 
from personal contact, what the men of the Domin- 
ions and the outposts were anxiously debating. Nor 
would it be fair to omit mention of the great services 
rendered to the cause of English-speaking men by 
Mr. St. Loe Strachey. His brilliant, persistent, and 
logical argumentation in "The Spectator" gave that 
publication a special niche in the hearts of all who 
understood the issues and were determined that no 
folly should be shown. Still on the whole indiffer- 
ence remained predominant, and had it not been for 
the powerful influences already at work across the 
Atlantic there would have been a doubtful and 
dangerous conclusion to the pending discussions. 
"Before the war," proclaimed Mr. Lloyd George in 
his best oracular vein, "Downing Street was in charge 
of the Empire but now the Empire is in charge of 
Downing Street." That epigrammatic remark might 
be popular as a trumpet-blast to herald the assem- 
bUng delegates but it was not easy to believe all its 



90 AN INDISCREET CHUONICLE . 

implications. If local self-interest had really taken 
the place of the old centrahzed system it meant a spec- 
tacular political bonfire. That the Empire was, how- 
ever, in charge of Downing Street on speech-days 
only was amply proved by the fact that although the 
Dominions termed this a Conference of Prime Min- 
isters of the Empire, Hansard and other authorities 
called it without fail the "Imperial Cabinet." Oceans 
separate the two ideas — the oceans of the Atlantic 
and the Pacific — not to speak of the seven seas. 



II 

What information was possessed prior to the open- 
ing of the Conference of the various factors behind 
the scenes which I have already dealt with? Was it 
fully realized in London that a first-class crisis was 
imminent unless discretion and resourcefulness were 
shown? Yes — to a very large extent. No matter 
what exception may be taken to the manner in which 
foreign policy is still conducted by old-fashioned 
Foreign Ofiices, there can be little doubt that Lon- 
don enjoys such exceptional advantages owing to its 
early and accurate information that it is seldom 
surprised. The error lay deeper. There was no 
adequate comprehension of the psychology of the 
business. That Canada and the United States 
loomed up as danger-spots might be true; but much 
importance was given to the results which skill might 
win. If the initiative could be retained not only in 



FROM THE PACIFIC 91 

the matter of the Japanese Alliance, but in all those 
more general issues involving defence, it was still be- 
lieved that fertility in inventing formulas would over- 
come objections. To prevent the raising of awkward 
and unanswerable questions until certain definite 
stages had been passed, to give vagueness and polite- 
ness capital places, and to make the United States no 
less than Japan aware of the profoundly friendly 
state of mind into which governance had been thrown 
— these were the aspects of authoritative policy. If 
this could be accomplished all would be well. If not, 
the agenda paper might as well be scrapped. 

And China? China, not being armed and united 
in the European sense, was a very minor matter. 
Questions of the second or third rank could not be 
permitted to intrude until the capital issue was re- 
solved. True, China could no longer be so com- 
pletely ignored as in the old days since she was an 
official member of an official League with a place on 
the council. But so far as being considered as a vital 
element, there was little likelihood of such a policy 
being inaugurated unless her strange case were 
brought before the public in such a way that it could 
not be ignored. 

Publication was what was needed — much pub- 
lication — persistent publication. 

Publication of the facts, with the central conten- 
tion that force of circumstances had now forged a 
nexus between the opposite shores of the Pacific, and 
therefore conferred on China a new international rat- 



92 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

ing, at once awakened interest. It was not an easy 
matter, however, to make converts; for passionate 
loyalty to an outworn policy is one of the most 
marked characteristics of the English people. Little 
or nothing had been heard of the Far East for seven 
long years. Although Japan's sins had been oc- 
casionally trumpeted as far abroad as this, it seemed 
a little incredible that a small nation of fifty odd mil- 
lions could really terrorize a giant of four hundred 
millions unless there was something congenitally 
wrong with the giant. ) The constant reiteration that 
Australasia at least was convinced that Japanese 
friendship could only be secured by a Japanese Al- 
liance was held to be an argument of more than pass- 
ing moment, seeing that the Dominions in the anti- 
podes had more at stake than any one else. ) 

The outline of a new policy for the Pacific Ocean 
was, nevertheless, becoming more and more clearly 
traced. For months the discussion had been proceed- 
ing in a fitful way; now it had gathered sufficient 
strength to make it a vital issue. That it was vital I 
soon had adequate proof: for being fortunate enough 
to address the Coalition Foreign Affairs Committee 
in the House of Commons two days prior to the 
formal Debate on the Imperial Conference of the 
17th June, I found not only sound information but 
general agreement that a Pacific Ocean policy in con- 
tradistinction to the old Far Eastern policy was an 
urgent requirement. The matter had indeed taken 
such immense strides that it was the question of the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 93 

hour. Members were also agreed that something 
ought to be done for China, and that it was danger- 
ous as well as useless to attempt to ignore the forces 
which were at work since the Republic had been 
founded. It was on this date (15th June) that I 
learnt that a request had been officially addressed by 
Britain to Japan at the end of May (presumably as 
soon as the Borah resolution had been tacked to the 
Naval appropriation Bill in Washington) for an ex- 
tension of three months of the Alliance Treaty from 
its date of termination, 13th July, which would carry 
it to the 13th October. No answer had come from 
Tokyo : the silence of Japan was creating anxiety. 

The matter was very important since it established 
beyond question the fact that events in Washington 
were being very carefully watched, and that every- 
thing done there not only found an immediate echo 
in Downing Street but was looked upon as decisive. 
Plainly, the plan in mind before the conference 
opened was to win dissidents to the idea that if the 
British Empire Delegates would only stand together 
and be reasonable, all would be well; for then, im- 
mediately this Conference was over another one could 
take place attended by America and Japan, when 
a modified Japanese Agreement could be tabled and 
win sanction. 

Nothing showed more clearly how the psychology 
of the issue was misunderstood. Moreover, no mat- 
ter how great might be the modifications made on the 
Pacific so as to bring the United States within the 



94 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

circle of friendship, China stood just as poor a chance 
of fair treatment. Directly to include her in inter- 
national arrangements never having been attempted 
(the failure of the United States in this matter being 
every whit as marked as the failure of England), it 
was abundantly plain that no radical change could be 
expected at such a juncture unless the greatest pres- 
sure were exerted. The strength of the Chinese 
people was still held to be capable of expression only 
in negative forms, i. e. by their usual method of re- 
fusing to buy or trade when their interests were 
menaced. No one who had experienced the Chinese 
boycott system, applied either publicly or privately, 
had any wish to see it repeated. But that was held 
to be the limit of their action. 

The British Foreign Office, guided in most of its 
China policy by mercantile considerations, relied very 
greatly on what it was told by British interests with 
China connections. These interests were almost en- 
tirely ignorant of — and incapable of understanding — 
the fundamental changes in the country. They per- 
sisted in believing, as so many believed for years in 
the case of Russia, that the revolution was entirely on 
the surface; and that whilst in such a flagrant case 
as Shantung, their own interests as well as Chinese 
interests demanded a reconsideration of the Paris de- 
cision, it was by no means necessary to scrap the idea 
that China was first and last a trade-area inhabited by 
individuals to be measured solely by their purchas- 
ing-power and to be guaranteed against the creation 



FROM THE PACIFIC 95 

of political enclaves merely because that would mean 
a restriction of the import and export market. The 
dangers arising from a persistence in the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty were therefore looked upon as being 
not military but mercantile; unaccustomed to the 
study of politics, the vision of merchants did not ex- 
tend beyond the entrepots of trade which their enter- 
prise had created along the China Coast. That we 
were within measurable distance of a conflict, which 
from its resultant complications might tear asunder 
the fabric of empire unless something radical were 
done, was beyond their philosophy. 

If the Foreign Office was barricaded against new 
ideas, there was at least something to be hoped from 
the Prime Minister's office. Mr. Lloyd George, no 
matter what his detractors may say, has great vision, 
and takes care to inform himself from every possible 
quarter. 

Ill 

I was fortunate, in these circumstances, to be able 
in conversations with Lord Riddell to bring the im- 
portance of these matters forward in such a way as to 
be convincing. Lord Riddell, who six months later 
in Washington was to prove such a remarkable suc- 
cess, has Scottish sound common sense and can re- 
cognize new facts without being irremediably upset 
by them. That China had really a case and that it 
was not common sense to ignore her, or to treat her as 
negligible, seemed at once patent to him. He invited 



96 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

me to summarize my remarks in nmnbered para- 
graphs in the simplest and clearest way so that what 
China wanted could be easily grasped, and the new 
problem put into proper focus. 

I did so in the form that follows. Bald as the 
document is, I have every reason to believe that it was 
read and digested in the proper quarter. — 

"MEMORANDUM 

"1. I have been sent to London by the Chinese Govern- 
ment to make clear China's position, which does not seem to 
be at all understood in England. 

"2. The seven years since the outbreak of war have caused 
China to be entirely forgotten. The great changes which 
have taken place there are unknown in England. Practically 
the only news published regarding China is bad news. This 
comes perhaps ten or fifteen times a year, but the fact is left 
entirely unrecorded that during the other S50 days life is 
normal and uneventful. 

"3. One aspect regarding which hardly a word has ap- 
peared in the English press is the vast municipal improve- 
ments all over the country. Modern cities have arisen with 
broad well-metalled thoroughfares, thronged with motor cars, 
lighted with electricity and furnished with telephones, and 
water-works, and policed by well-trained constabulary. The 
old city walls are being torn down and boulevards con- 
structed, the general tendency under the Republic being to 
become up-to-date in all conveniences of polite life. China 
is indeed fast losing her Oriental character and resembles 
more a country such as Brazil. She should in fact be 
thought of more as a new country than an old one, with a 
new country's problems and a new country's hopes and rough- 
nesses. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 97 

"4f. The great mass of people involved is also not under- 
stood. In the 21 years since the Boxer revolt there has 
been a net increase of population between 60 and 70 millions. 
Both the Post Office and the Customs administrations, which 
have European organization and general management, have 
this year independently investigated the population in every 
district and have arrived at the conclusion that the total 
to-day is 447 millions, or at least 30 millions more than the 
population of Europe. The biggest province (Szechuan) 
has a population considerably more than France's and ap- 
proaching that of Germany. 

"5. Naturally in a country of such size there are from 
time to time serious happenings, but life is nevertheless safer 
in China than in Europe. The main characteristic of the 
country is its newslessness and commonplace life. 

"6. The growth of public opinion is an enormous factor 
to be reckoned with to-day. There are 2,000 newspapers, 
of which 800 are dailies. At least 20% of the population 
read newspapers or hear what they have said. This press is 
strongly nationalist and continually preaching nationalism. 
The biggest newspaper has a circulation of 50,000, but 
there are many with 10,000 and 20,000 serving their 
localities. 

"7. Foreign news and politics are a great feature. Great 
numbers of newspapers publish European and American 
telegrams. The big names in politics are just as familiar to 
Chinese newspaper readers as those of continental or Amer- 
ican newspapers. The political issue is endlessly discussed 
and there is much passion being displayed regarding Chinese 
rights. 

"8. The student movement is another great feature. 
There are now 700,000 students in the great Students' Union 
and they act like clockwork from one end of the country to 
the other in national matters. There are constant agitations 
and demonstrations ; and such is the antipathy for Japan 



98 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

that no Cabinet Minister's life would be worth an hour's 
purchase if he dared for instance to discuss the possibility of 
negotiating with Japan on such an issue as Shantung. 

"9. The trade of the country remains small on a per 
capita basis because of difficulties and disabilities referred to 
below. China's foreign trade is under £400,000,000 a year, 
or less than £1 per head of population, whereas if it were 
pushed to the Japanese average (£10 per head) it would be 
worth £4,000,000,000 annually, or considerably more than 
that of any modern State. The commercial possibilities are 
indeed so gigantic that all powers covet the premier place. 

"10. Mediasval taxation is the chief cause for the small 
total which is only about the value of the trade of Italy, 
when it should equal if not surpass the trade of the British 
Empire. This taxation, i.e., Customs duties, is controlled 
through the Commercial Treaties by foreign nations, with- 
out whose unanimous consent nothing can be done. China 
for 80 years has had the same 5% tariff, producing not more 
than 10 millions sterling in revenue. To make up for this, 
there is interprovincial trade taxation, i.e., China is broken 
up into petty states and trade impeded simply because no 
nation has had sufficient intelligence to see that a Chinese 
customs union (Zollverein) with free trade within the limits 
of her own territory will bring such a vast increase of profit 
that all nations would benefit. 

"The entire British war debt could be paid off by the great 
increase in exports to China which would automatically 
come if England took the lead in this matter and brought it 
to a successful conclusion, as she easily could with American 
co-operation. 

"11. Japan is opposed to all such reforms because she 
does not wish China to go ahead and increase in wealth and 
power so rapidly that the present position is reversed. Her 
aim and object, therefore, is to impede China's real progress 
until she can entrench herself on her territory so strongly 



FROM THE PACIFIC 99 

as to offset China's natural advantage in numbers, resources, 
and extent of territory. 

"IS. The real role of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has 
been for the last ten years to impede China. Japan, by 
representing to China almost daily that she has the support 
of Britain, and by blocking all vital matters, is making a 
desperate effort to prevent the restoration of the natural ♦ 
equilibrium in the Far East which can only be based on a 
balance being preserved between the two countries. 

"Every child in China knows this to-day. The native 
press has been repeating it daily for years, and nothing will ^ 
ever modify the Chinese conviction that the Alliance is an 
instrument to hold them down. 

"13. It is not generally understood that Sinn Fein as a 
method has been absorbed by every country in Asia. In 
China there is an absolute determination to begin practising 
first trade boycott, then other methods, if at this supreme 
opportunity of the Imperial Conference China's rights are 
not respected, and the Alliance as a military agreement 
terminated. 

"14. The fears expressed that the termination of the Al- 
liance would be followed by dangerous Japanese action are 
based on ignorance of the psychology of Asia — the same * 
ignorance, for instance, as was displayed in the post-war 
Anglo-Persian Agreement. 

"If the Alliance is ended nothing will happen anywhere 
except in Japan. There the more liberal elements in less 
than a year will gain control; there will be a collapse of 
the military party ; a modification of the constitution ; friend- - 
ship with China and a settlement of such issues as Shantung.'* 

At the present moment the British are looked upon 
throughout Asia as being foolish, if not actually fools, 
because they have not been able to see that the win- 



100 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ning side is the nationalist or people's side in each 
country. The writer has heard the expression "fools" 
applied to them in three Asiatic languages. The 
net result of correct action in the Far East will he 
not the creation of new dangers, but simply a chorus 
passing round Asia that we have at last learnt some- 
thing, and are admitting the existence of facts which 
every one else has long known. 
17th June, 1921. 

IV 

On the 17th June, the Debate on the Imperial 
Conference took place before a thinly-attended 
House of Commons. But for one who had the issues 
at heart it was a supremely interesting occasion 
since there was the unique opportunity of not only 
listening to what Britons thought of the Empire, 
but what the Empire thought of the Britons who 
were speaking.^ Owing to the condition of Irish 
affairs the galleries were closed, but in the special 
gallery were the Dominion Ministers and their per- 
sonnel keenly following the trend of a discussion 
which had already raged in their own legislatures. 
As the debate proceeded and dropped from high- 
sounding generalities to a particular consideration 

1 Although modesty makes reference difficult, the Hansard Report of 
this date contains a significant entry, dealing with some personal refer- 
ences made by that most courteous parliamentary veteran, Mr. T. P. 
O'Connor. By an extraordinary mistake of the official reporters I was 
inadvertently knighted during the debate — thus adding to the comedy 
of errors which the Imperial Conference produced. For record of this 
honour, which is purely platonic, since it has never been confirmed, see 
Official Report, Friday, 17th June, 1921, volume 143, No. 79, page 823, 
Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Liverpool, Scotland Division, speaking. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 101 

of the matter of defence, the comments in the gal- 
lery became more interesting than the oratory; for 
when gallant members who had been general officers 
began to give their views as to the role which com- 
ponent parts of the empire could play in times of 
emergency, the instinctive attitude of Dominion rep- 
resentatives was hostility, — ^hostility to ideas which 
are the natural outcome of European power-politics 
and which are directly opposed to oversea ideas where 
the starting-point is the farm and the mine. Through 
the long hours of the debate the fact was more and 
more patent that the real problem of the British 
Empire is not defence or alliances or commerce or 
finance, but similarity of ideas. The resentment 
which is common among Canadians, Australians, 
South Africans and New Zealanders, because of the 
assumption that they will endorse the execution of 
policies over which they have no control and in which 
they have no interest, is a matter which may pass 
unnoticed for a number of years but which in the 
end will acquire a decisive character. The tendency 
to allow foreign affairs to be excluded from the 
scope of the post-war, levelling movement is one 
that requires checking — or else it will be redressed 
in a far more drastic way than was the case with 
the question of supporting Polish intervention in 
Russian affairs. There was one good point, however. 
That the bulk of opinion had already swung into 
line on the subject of the Pacific, and on the neces- 
sity of reaching a proper understanding with inter- 



102 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ested Powers emerged clearly enough in this debate: 
and for the first time since the late Lord Salisbury 
took up the cudgels for China twenty-five years be- 
fore in defending the cession of Weihaiwei (declar- 
ing that it was meant to hearten the Chinese and 
prevent them from giving way to despair at the 
actions of Russia) the tone of the House was almost 
imiformly flattering and favourable to the Chinese 
people. 

Unfortunately there was no large-minded man 
like the late Marquess of Salisbury to carry the 
matter further. Too much hinged on the person- 
ality of the Foreign Secretary and his natural predi- 
lections. Fifty years ago, when men were still asleep. 
Lord Curzon would have been a most valuable asset ; 
in 1921 he was a danger. Understanding accurately 
virtually every problem in Asia, author of brilliant 
books on each phase of the subject, he yet possessed 
that type of mind which has been largely responsible 
for the amazing unpopularity of England beyond 
the Suez Canal during the last twenty years. That 
he would naturally and infallibly favour Japan at 
the expense of China, and remain convinced to the 
bitter end that nothing was to be gained by reversing 
policy, was as certain as the action of the moon on 
the tides. The Bolshevists have been right in one 
article of their faith: a certain type of mind is be- 
yond change because it imagines that it is beyond 
good and evil. That it was not possible to cure a 
disease if you perpetuated the conditions which had 



<-. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 103 

produced the disease, seemed too elementary a prop- 
osition to require discussion. That, however, was 
not the official view. Very far from it indeed. Al- 
though the precise contrary was not publicly argued, 
it was secretly loved, making it seem that the only 
way of dealing with professional British diplomacy 
is to get rid of it. 

On the morning of the 20th June the Conference 
duly opened. "The Daily Telegraph," through the 
friendly interest of that most genial of all men. Lord 
Burnham, was good enough on that date to give 
prominence to my diagnosis of the main problem. 
But it was held necessary to add a caveat in the 
form of an editorial note. To the analysis I made 
of a situation which was so plain to us who lived 
in the Far East (that it was the condition of China, 
coupled with Britain's Japanese commitments which 
formed the gravest menace on the Pacific Ocean) 
there was the rejoinder that many factors of Im- 
perial concern had to be reckoned with in a full con- 
sideration of the subject and not solely the question 
of China and Japan. That, indeed, was obvious to 
all of us. But the starting-point of all the factors 
of Imperial concern was Japan; and the main issue 
which had not yet been publicly approached — was 
whether Japan or Canada was to dominate British 
Pacific policy. 

The general statement by Mr. Lloyd George with 
which the conference opened was amiable enough. 
With his instinct for immediately scenting and tack- 



104 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ling the decisive issue, he declared that he was ready- 
to discuss with American statesmen any proposal 
for the limitation of armaments which they might 
wish to set out. Friendly co-operation with the 
United States was a cardinal principle for Britain, 
who desired to work with her in all parts of the world. 
England desired to avoid the growth of armaments 
on the Pacific as elsewhere and England rejoiced 
that there should be so much earnestness in America 
in that matter. Sea-power, however, was the basis 
of the British empire's existence — sea security, there- 
fore, was the prime consideration. England, he de- 
clared, desired to preserve the well-tried friendship 
of Japan in order to apply it to the solution of all 
questions in the Far East where Japan has special 
interests and where England like the United States 
desired equal opportunities and the open door. Brit- 
ish foreign policy could never range itself upon the 
difference of race and civilization between East and 
West, since that would be fatal for empire. On that 
note he finished — ^which was a bad piece of history. 
For that was precisely the manner in which foreign 
policy had ranged itself in Asia for nearly four 
centuries in the case of all nations that had proved 
submissive. Except in the sense that this observa- 
tion was an indirect notice that Japan could not be 
discriminated against even to please the United 
States it was hardly worth being so inaccurate. 

London aimed at renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, pari passu with conversations with the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 105 

United States and Japan on the subject of naval 
reductions, — ^that was now publicly the official posi- , 
tion. That renewal was out of the question until 
negotiation had definitely removed from the path- 
way of the three nations the obstacles to peace stand- 
ing there was an equally obvious proposition; but 
since China was the chief obstacle, and since she had 
no right to demand that foreign policy should not 
range itself upon the difference of race and civiliza- 
tion between East and West because of the mediocre 
quality of her armed forces, it seemed that the Prime 
Minister had provided himself with a puzzle which 
even his ingenuity could not solve. 

Following Mr. Lloyd George came the speeches 
of the Dominion Prime Ministers. Mr. Meighen 
avoided direct references to the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance, but Mr. Hughes, who was plainly working 
along preconcerted lines, advocated renewal. On the 
22nd Lord Curzon gave a long exposition of British 
foreign policy and he was followed by Mr. Winston 
Churchill, with a similar exposition of Colonial pol- 
icy which were intended to show these men from 
overseas the really complicated work of directing a 
great empire and the need for tightening up the 
parts. They remained unconvinced. Further dis- 
cussion, both formal and informal, rapidly brought 
realization of the fact that the mood of the Dominions 
was averse to discussing constitutional relations which 
they held completely covered by existing legislation. 
As if guided by an irresistible force attention became 



106 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

slowly and definitely centred on the Japanese ques- 
tion, even naval defence dropping far below the hori- 
zon of the conference room for the good and ample 
reason that all the Dominion Governments were dis- 
inclined to agree to any departure from the statics 
quo. 



Just then the conference struck the first snag — ; 
not lightly, but hard and head-on, in such a way 
that it was impossible to avoid feelmg the shock. 
It has never been disclosed who sent the inspired 
statements at this stage across the Atlantic, declaring 
that the British Government was keeping the Ameri- 
can Government fully informed regarding the nego- 
tiations affecting the Japanese Treaty; but that it 
was ofiicial propaganda there is every reason to sus- 
pect. The remarkable step at once taken by Sec- 
retary Hughes of issuing in Washington an official 
dementi on the 22nd June, in which he stated cate- 
gorically that the State Department was not in- 
formed regarding the plans of the British Govern- 
^ ment, showed that uncustomary vigilance was being 
displayed. Taken in conjunction with the pubhshed 
speeches of Secretary Hughes, that the cardinal 
principle of the Harding Administration was friend- 
ship among the English-speaking nations, the action 
amounted to a formal notification that the practi- 
cability of bluffing through this vital issue must be 
abandoned. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 107 

The mystery deepened and public attention at last 
was fully aroused. After five days' meeting and 
debates nothing had been concluded. Opinion was 
still sharply divided whether the Japanese Alliance 
should be taken up alone, or in conjunction with 
naval policy, or as part and parcel of the general ^ 
question of relations with the United States. On 
the 27th June Mr. Lloyd George, impelled to do 
so by the general embarrassment caused by the state- 
ment of Secretary Hughes in Washington (which 
Secretary Hughes took occasion to reiterate), re- 
turned to the charge and took all the Prime Minis- 
ters into his confidence. In an attempt to preserve 
strict secrecy, even secretaries and legal advisers were 
sent out of the room, only Prime Ministers remain- 
ing. Whether, then, a detailed account was given 
of Japanese proposals regarding Borneo and the 
Dutch East Indies during the war, and also of her 
proposals in regard to Eastern Siberia must remain 
a matter of conjecture. But that something was 
said of the trials and tribulations of British diplo- 
macy during the war, owing to Japanese action, and 
the necessity of guarding against vengeance if the x 
Alliance were abandoned, may be reasonably con- 
jectured. 

The discussion was followed by fresh arguments 
by Lord Curzon and Mr. Balfour. 

On the 29th June the Canadian Prime Minister, 
so far from being convinced, circulated a confidential 
memorandum in which he came out openly and 



108 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

squarely in reply to all these arguments with the 
declaration that if the Anglo- Japanese Alliance were 
renewed it would not be binding in Canada unless 
ratified by the Dominion Parliament; and that in 
any case military clauses were looked upon with ex- 
treme disfavour by his electorate. 

He was followed by the other Dominion Premiers, 
General Smuts alone contributing anything of im- 
portance by outlining a plan for a general Pacific 
conference on armaments and policy by the inter- 
ested states as an alternative which would secure 
the same results as were expected from the Japanese 
Alliance. Everything, however, was overshadowed 
by what Mr. Meighen had said and done. \J[mme- 
diately the rumour spread that there was to be a 
national referendum in Canada aiid Australia on 
the subject of the Alliance, both countries being 
given a chance to express their opinion before any- 
thing was done, this being the real reason the London 
Government had sought a three months' extension 
of the Alliance — an odd enough explanation which, 
however, looked as well as any other in the neatly- 
printed columns of the evening press.J 

Downing Street was openly and unmistakably in 
a more desperately embarrassed position than ever 
before. All attempts at finding a common formula 
had failed, and opposition to the Japanese Treaty 
was stiffening. Mr. Lloyd George, with his acute- 
ness for adapting his policy to anything that comes 
in handy, would not have hesitated to make a volte- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 109 

face regarding Japan if he could have found a smooth 
way of doing so. But there were no such means; 
all roads were closed. He had compromised him- 
self — at least the office across the street had done 
that for him. And, moreover, he was sufficiently wise 
to know that a first-class power cannot change its 
policy overnight without serious discredit. The 
error committed in former years of taking too much 
for granted regarding the Pacific was being bitterly 
revenged: for to the British request for a three 
months' treaty extension Japan had so far declined 
to reply. Consequently on the tenth day of the con- 
ference the amiable assistance of the highest law 
officer in England, the Lord Chancellor, was invoked 
by private arrangement. He stated that in his 
opinion, despite the ruling made the previous year 
by the two competent law officers of the Crown ( Sir 
Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock) the noti- 
fication made to the League of Nations the previous 
year on the subject of the Alliance (that if it were 
in conflict with the Covenant of the League it would 
be modified before its expiry on the 13th July, 1921) 
did not constitute a legal denunciation of the Alli- 
ance, which would therefore continue in force by vir- 
tue of clause VI until formally denounced. 
Great is the flexibility of the inflexible law. 



110 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

VI 

It was natural in such circumstances that severe 
public criticism of the Conference should appear. 
After having sat two weeks in secrecy and produced 
no result, there was this singular denouement, which 
was virtually a confession that a trick was necessary 
to save the government's face. July opened with 
nothing definitely decided upon excepting the neces- 
sity of finding an avenue of escape,^ — preferably by 
means of a general Pacific Conference. The story 
began to circulate that Mr. Lloyd George, con- 
fronted by the unbending opposition of Mr. Meighen, 
had in an unguarded moment angrily exclaimed, "Sir, 
you speak like a citizen of the United States," re- 
vealing thereby that he did not know all the dialects 
of the British Empire. 

Parliament began to be incensed. The stream 
of questions grew from day to day. The govern- 
ment could no longer blind itself to the fact that it 
was impossible to pursue much longer the ostrich- 
like policy which had been such a remarkable feature 
of the conference. 

On the 30th June I had been fortunate enough 
to address the Commercial Committee and the Lan- 
cashire Members in the House of Commons. I was 
at great pains to lay before them in the clearest 
possible manner the fact that British interest in the 
Far East was first and last commercial; that co-oper- 
ation with the Chinese people was a sine qua non 



FROM THE PACIFIC 111 

to preserving and expanding the great undertakings 
which had been built up during eighty years of en- 
deavour; and that it was monstrous nonsense not 
to see that England would attract to herself pre- 
cisely the same odium Japan had incurred over the 
Shantung business if she renewed the Alliance in 
defiance of Chinese opinion. That odium would 
undoubtedly express itself in the same way in which 
it had been expressed in the case of Japan — by boy- 
cott and other retaliatory measures. Far better 
would it be to utilize the opportunity to secure rem- 
edies. A concerted effort should be made to win 
for China an adequate tariff in return for improved 
trading conditions — for instance the throwing-open 
of all railway zones to foreign trade and residence. 
This might easily be won, if China were given a quid 
pro quo in the Tariff issue, and if certain police 
rights were conceded to her in abatement of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. On the 6th July I was able 
to add to this array of argument by addressing the 
Labour Party and on the 7th the Independent Lib- 
eral Party. The pages of Hansard bear witness to 
the growth of interest in the fate of China in the 
pending negotiations; questions were literally rained 
on ministers who declared themselves unable to sat- 
isfy the general curiosity, insisting that the interests 
of all the Powers concerned were being paid atten- 
tion to. Though honourable members were assured 
that ministers deprecated a discussion by the method 
of question and answer of an important matter of 



112 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

high policy that was engaging the earnest attention 
of His Majesty's government, and of the Prime Min- 
isters and othei representatives of His Majesty's 
Dominions, the House showed itself impenitent. 
Commander Kenworthy had not only squared his 
jaw but was following up his adversaries all round 
the ring. Twenty other members were pressing for 
information in a manner which could no longer be 
repelled. On Thursday, the 7th July, no less than 
seven questions were grouped together dealing with 

^ the position of the Alliance Treaty and the action 
of Japan. Inasmuch as every part of the House was 
concerned in the matter, the Prime Minister declared 
that he hoped to be in a position within four days 
to make a full statement but that premature decla- 
rations would interfere with the success of negotia- 
tions then proceeding. And at the end of his re- 
marks he made curious interjection that his promised 
statement was dependent on the receipt of replies 
from the United States, Japan and China. These 
words, although not in the Hansard report, were 
plainly heard in the Press gallery and printed in the 
newspapers and telegraphed to America. For the 
third time since the Imperial Conference had com- 
menced Secretary Hughes caused a swift denial to 
be sent from Washington, declaring that there could 
be no reply from America as there was nothing to 

" answer. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 113 

VII 

The cat was at last out of the bag here as well 
as elsewhere. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, twisted 
and tugged out of shape by united effort and vir- 
tually thrown on the scrap-heap, was the subject of 
a bitter rear-guard action. The British Foreign 
Office, under Lord Curzon's leadership, was still des- ^ 
perately trying to save it. Conversations and sound- 
ings regarding a possible conference had been con- 
ducted by the Foreign Office with the American Am- 
bassador, the Japanese Ambassador, and the Chinese 
Minister; but there had been no concrete proposal — 
and Secretary Hughes quite rightly declined to ac- 
cept as adequate these side-door negotiations when 
a definite formal programme was the only means of 
atoning for the obscurantism which had been prac- 
tised all through June. That China was to be given 
a place at the round-table was due to the fact that 
there was no longer any means of avoiding it, not ^ 
because there had been any change of heart in those 
dim halls where the Far East is merely labelled as 
a geographical division. 

But the problem did not end with this activity. 
Its roots were deep on the other side of the Atlantic. 
A new element was about to enter into play. The 
Washington Administration held quite rightly that 
so long as there was any question of the Japanese 
Alliance surviving, no matter in what attenuated 
and moribund form, disarmament was out of the 



114 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

question. It was at this stage that President Hard- 
ing determined to rely upon his own initiative. The 
British soundings were not so much an invitation 
as a warning that a new combination was being built 
up. Consequently, immediately the reports from 
London of the 7th July reached Washington, action 
was decided upon. The invitation to Britain to par- 
ticipate in a general Pacific Conference left Wash- 
ington by wire on the night of Saturday, the 9th 
July, having been worked out that day. 

Chequers Court was the setting for an unusual 
scene on Sunday, the 10th July. Mr. Lloyd George, 
like Napoleon at Dresden with the lesser kings, was 
sitting surrounded by the Prime Ministers of the 
Dominions, a little disconsolate after his hectic month, 
when the noise of a motor-car was heard. Enter 
Mr. Harvey, American Ambassador, with the cable 
in his hand. "Read it to me," exclaimed Mr. Lloyd 
George, anxious to hear the worst at once. Mr. 
Harvey read the invitation to a Disarmament and 
Pacific Conference. "Of course we accept," shouted 
Mr. Lloyd George in his enthusiastic manner. "We 
are delighted to accept!" The way out had been 
most providentially provided. Whether he threw 
his hat in the air, or whether he was wearing his 
hat at all, has never been chronicled. 

On the very next day in Parliament (11th July) 
he made his promised statement, which in the light 
of this close record shows itself a masterpiece in the 
concealment of awkward facts and merits reproduc- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 115 

tion as an object-lesson in modern political method. 
It was also noteworthy because he stated categori- 
cally that President Harding favoured a preliminary 
meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern questions, a 
course he directly opposed/ 

*'. . . When I told the House last Thursday that I hoped 
to be in a position to make a statement on Pacific and Far 
Eastern questions to-day, I was awaiting, as I explained at 
the time, replies to conversations which had taken place 
between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the 
representatives of the Governments of the United States, 
Japan and China, as the result of our discussions in the 
Imperial Cabinet. 

"I am very glad to be able to inform the House to-day that 
the views of the Government of the United States reached me 
last night, and are extremely satisfactory. The Chinese 
Government is also favourable. We have not yet had a 
formal reply from the Government of Japan, but we have 
good reason to hope that it will be in the same sense. Now 
that these views have been received, I am glad to be at liberty 

iThe actual language used in the announcement made by the White 
House on the 10th July is worth quoting: 

"The President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the ques- 
tion of limitation of armaments, has approached with informal but 
definite inquiries the group of Powers heretofore known as the Principal 
Allied and Associated Powers — that is, Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Japan — to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take 
part in a conference on this subject to be held in Washington at a time 
to be mutually agreed upon. 

"If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal invitations for 
such a conference will be issued. 

"It is manifest that the question of limitation of armaments has a 
close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President 
has suggested that the Powers especially interested in these problems 
should undertake in connexion with this conference the consideration 
of all matters bearing upon their solution, with a view to reaching a 
common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the 
Far East. 

"This has been communicated to the Powers concerned, and China has 
al?o been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern 
problems." 



116 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

to inform the House of Commons fully regarding the course 
which our discussions in the Imperial Cabinet took, I do 
this with particular satisfaction, because it will show how 
very valuable a step forward we have been able to take by 
common consent in the sphere of foreign affairs. 

"The broad lines of Imperial policy in the Pacific and 
the Far East were the very first subjects to which we ad- 
dressed ourselves at the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet, 
having a special regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 
the future of China and the bearing of both those questions 
on the relations of the British Empire with the United States. 
We were guided in our deliberations by three main considera- 
tions. In Japan, we have an old and proved Ally. The 
agreement of 20 years' standing between us has been of 
very great benefit, not only to ourselves and her, but to the 
peace of the Far East. In China there is a very numerous 
people, with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship 
highly, and whose interests we, on our side, desire to assist 
and advance. In the United States, we see to-day, as we 
have always seen, the people closest to our own aims and 
ideals with whom it is for us, not merely a desire and an 
interest, but a deeply-rooted instinct to consult and co- 
operate. Those were the main considerations in our meet- 
ings, and upon them we were unanimous. The object of our 
discussion was to find a method combining all these three 
factors in a policy which would remove the danger of heavy 
naval expenditure in the Pacific, and would ensure the de- 
velopment of all legitimate national interests of the Far 
East. 

"We had, in the first place, to ascertain our exact position 
with regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. There had 
been much doubt as to whether the notification to the League 
of Nations made last July constituted a denunciation of the 
Agreement in the sense of Clause VI. If it did, it would have 
been necessary to decide upon some interim measure regard- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 117 

ing the Agreement pending fuller discussions with the other 
Pacific Powers, and negotiations with this object in view 
were, in point of fact, already in progress. If, on the other 
hand, it did not, the Agreement would remain in force until 
denounced, whether by Japan or by ourselves, and would not 
be actually determined until 12 months from the date when 
notice of denunciation was given. The Japanese Government 
took the view that no notice of denunciation had yet been 
given. This view was shared by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs: but, as considerable doubt existed, we de- 
cided, after a preliminary discussion in the Imperial Cabinet, 
to refer it to the Lord Chancellor, who considered it with the 
Law Offices of the Crown, and held that no notice of denunci- 
ation had yet been given. 

*'It follows that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement remains 
in force unless it is denounced, and will lapse only at the 
expiration of 12 months from the time when notice of denun- 
ciation is given. It is, however, the desire of both the British 
Empire and Japan that the Agreement should be brought 
into complete harmony with the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, and that wherever the Covenant and the Agree- 
ment are inconsistent, the terms of the Covenant shall pre- 
vail. Notice to this effect has now been given to the League. 

*'The broader discussion of Far Eastern and Pacific policy 
to which we then turned showed general agreement on the 
main lines of the course which the Imperial Cabinet desired 
to pursue. I have already explained that the first prin- 
ciple of our policy was friendly co-operation with the United 
States. We are all convinced that upon this, more than 
any single factor, depends the peace and well-being of the 
world. We also desire, as I have stated, to maintain our 
close friendship and co-operation with Japan. The great- 
est merit of that valuable friendship is that it harmonizes 
the influence and activities of the two greatest Asiatic Powers, 
and thus constitutes an essential safeguard to the well-being 



118 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

of the British Empire and peace of the East. We also 
aim at preserving the open door in China, and at giving the 
Chinese people every opportunity of peaceful progress and 
development. 

"In addition to these considerations, we desire to safe- 
guard our own interests in the Pacific, and to preclude any 
competition in naval armaments between the Pacific Powers. 
All the representatives of the Empire agreed that our stand- 
point on these questions should be communicated with com- 
plete frankness to the United States, Japan, and China, with 
the object of securing an exchange of views which might 
lead to more formal discussion and conference. The Sec- 
retary of State for Foreign Affairs accordingly held con- 
versations last week with the American and Japanese Am- 
bassadors and the Chinese Minister, at which he communi- 
cated to them the views of the Imperial Cabinet, and asked 
in return for the views of their respective Governments. He 
expressed at these conversations a very strong hope that 
this exchange of views might, if their Governments shared 
our desire in that respect, pave the way for a conference on 
the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. 

"The views of the President of the United States were 
made public by the American Government this morning. 
It is known to the House. Mr. Harding has taken the mo- 
mentous step of inviting the Powers to a Conference on the 
limitation of armaments, to be held in Washington in the 
near future, and he also suggests a preliminary meeting on 
Pacific and Far Eastern questions between the Powers most 
directly interested in the peace and welfare of that great re- 
gion, which is assuming the first importance in international 
affairs. I need not say that we welcome with the utmost pleas- 
ure President Harding's wise and courteous initiative. In 
saying this I know that I speak for the Empire as a whole. 
The world has been looking to the United States for such 
a lead. I am confident that the House will esteem it as an 



FROM THE PACIFIC 119 

act of far-seeing statesmanship and will whole-heartedly wish 
it success. I need hardly say that no effort will be lacking 
to make it so on the part of the British Empire, which 
shares to the full the liberal and progressive spirit inspir- 
ing it. 

"Let me add only one word as to the part played in these 
events by the gathering of the Imperial Conference in Down- 
ing Street. I venture to say that the action that we have 
taken could not have been in so prompt, effective and unani- 
mous a fashion but for the intimate personal consultation 
between the Prime Ministers of the Empire and the repre- 
sentatives of India which this gathering has enabled us to 
enjoy. We have taken counsel together without reserve. 
With this result before us, I need not elaborate the in- 
estimable value of that intimate collaboration in the conduct 
of the Empire's affairs." 

At the end of this speech there was a significant 
interpolation by Lieut. Colonel J. Ward. He in- 
quired : 

*'Would the right honourable gentleman inform the House 
and the world in general whether in these negotiations with 
reference to the future of the Pacific, China is to be treated 
as a sovereign state and her representatives left to give the 
decision of the Chinese Government without the interference 
of any other Asiatic Power.?'* 

To which the Prime Minister replied: 

"China will be treated as what she is, an independent 
Power, We made the same communication to the Chinese 
Government as to the other governments." 



120 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

vin 

The matter was apparently at an end. With ut- 
most frankness the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
had, so it seemed, taken the whole world into his con- 
fidence and shown very precisely the nature of the 
difficulties which had heen encountered and so suc- 
cessfully solved. He had admitted the complex 
nature of the problem, adroitly showing each facet 
only for a fraction of time so that in the end the 
bright diamond in his hand should be esteemed a fit 
jewel for the crown of his Imperial endeavours. 

Yet things were not really as they seemed. Be- 
hind the scenes the storm raged on. It was quite 
evident that the matter of initiative was causing great 
heart-burning. That America had stolen England's 
thunder was quite plain. That Lord Curzon should 
give in without a waspish struggle was too good to 
be true. The first fruits were in all good faith ex- 
tremely acid in spite of Mr. Lloyd George's silver 
tongue; and there is every reason to believe that 
this project of a general Pacific Conference would 
have fared badly had it not been for the royal tact 
which was never displayed to better advantage than 
in a little conversation with the American ambassa- 
dor, as was duly chronicled at the time in responsible 
newspapers. In spite of vigorous official denials that 
there had been any discussion whatsoever, the con- 
trary is the truth. The crown showed the same good 
sense as was displayed just then in the Irish settle- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 121 

ment, proving that there are times when Cabinet 
Ministers need instruction. 

The result was that the idea of a preliminary con- 
ference in London — to precede the formal conference 
at Washington and settle the agenda — was destroyed. 
Unwilling to admit that the slovenly handling of the 
question of the Japanese Treaty had brought dis- 
credit, the alternate suggestion was put forward of 
a preliminary conference in Washington, to be held 
immediately the Imperial Conference dispersed so 
that Dominion Prime Ministers could proceed thither 
on their way home, and in company with the Ambas- 
sadors of invited Powers, settle the programme. 

From Secretary Hughes, now emphatically the 
master of the situation, came an equally emphatic 
"no." He had got the thunder securely in his hands 
at last; and he was not prepared to allow any one 
to steal it away from him. He let it be known that 
any attempt to anticipate deliberations which were 
planned to commence on Armistice Day were looked 
upon with strong disfavour. 

That was the end. The Prime Ministers of the 
Dominions might meet in strict privacy and hold 
discussions of several hours regarding the Pacific 
Conference, but they were caught on the barbed wire 
of the Japanese Alliance. The magnificent last-hour 
opportunity to denounce the Treaty, immediately 
President Harding had issued his momentous invi- 
tation, had been missed: therefore there was nothing 
left to discuss. Had Mr. Lloyd George quickly de- 



122 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

clared that he regarded Britain's acceptance of the 
invitation as requiring the denunciation of the Alli- 
ance in order that England might go into the Con- 
ference without prejudice, there might have been a 
different American attitude on the subject of a pre- 
liminary London conference which was in many ways 
a desirable meeting since certain matters, particu- 
larly financial matters, could be more rapidly at- 
tended to in London than in Washington. But so 
long as the Alliance remained undenounced, the 
United States took the proper and reasonable view 
that precisely the same crippling assumptions would 
be visible as had disclosed themselves in previous 
negotiations concerning the Far East. Mr. Lloyd 
George, deep in the throes of the Irish settlement, 
could not be held to blame. The onus was on the 
shoulders of the Foreign Secretary. Though it might 
be excessive to castigate him as the Times did 
on the 13th July regarding his business incapacity 
as exhibited in the state of his Department which 
"unfitted him for the discharge of responsible 
duties," it was certainly true that nothing that he 
did during the Imperial Conference showed any re- 
alization of the new problems throughout the world. 
When he declared in Parliament in regard to Per- 
sia on the 26th July and his efforts in that country 
that "he viewed the situation with a feeling of dis- 
appointment and almost of despair," he was using 
language which corresponded to his feelings on the 
problem of Japan. Later I was to learn in all its 



FROM THE PACIFIC 123 

trivial detail the efforts his Department made 
throughout this conference to suppress by the method 
of diplomatic pressure on the Peking Government, 
a public presentation in London of China's case. 
One instance may be selected as an illustration. 

In pursuance of the policy that the Far Eastern 
question was of equal importance to all sections of 
the community, because of trade, I furnished the La- 
bour organ, "The Daily* Herald," as I furnished 
fifty other newspapers and reviews, with an inter- 
view in which the reasonable statement was made 
that China was a nation of labourers in the highest 
sense of the term and that friendly assistance by 
the workers of Britain would be looked upon as 
peculiarly appropriate in the crisis which had come; 
that China provided an unlimited field for British 
enterprise and industry; but that should the treaty 
with Japan be continued a vast boycott of British 
goods would be the result. 

Each one of these statements was a statement 
of fact beyond dispute. Not, however, for Lord 
Curzon's Department. It was Bolshevism which 
called for a Wrangel. Accordingly, the Chinese 
Government was advised that the good relations sub- 
sisting between England and China would be seri- 
ously endangered and perhaps permanently cancelled 
if such "messages" to the British people were con- 
tinued; and that it was imperative immediately to 
carry out a correction by drastic steps. 

That Mr. Lloyd George should have been driven 



124 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

to build up in his own office a foreign department 
during recent years is not only understandable but 
laudable. Had he not done so the trivial and even 
childish manner in which foreign affairs are attended 
to in the office opposite No. 10 Downing Street would 
long ago have vitally wounded England where she 
can stand no more wounds — in her commercial and 
industrial paunch. 



PART V 

CANOSSA 



The preliminary report issued on the evening of 
the 5th August announced the end of what had 
proved one of the most singular conferences of 
modern times. Of the original agenda only two 
items had been seriously considered: the Japanese 
Alliance and the matter of a future constitutional 
conference. The first had shown itself a hopeless 
stumbling-block ; the second had been abandoned with 
the eminently discreet remark that no advantage 
was to be gained by considering it. As for the other 
items on the agenda paper, they were quietly swal- 
lowed up in the great void where he most official 
things.^ A subtle realization of their meaningless- 

1 Since the White Paper makes no mention of the principal items in 
the agenda, it is well to quote the list given in the Canadian House of 
Commons during the historic debate of the 27th April from a previous 
statement of the Canadian Prime Minister: 

". . . The proposal was made and accepted last October on the basis 
that the June meeting would be of a special and preliminary character 
having in view the necessity of discussing 

"(1) Preparation for the special Constitutional Conference con- 
templated in Resolution 9 of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 to 
be held at a later date, this preparatory discussion to include such 
questions as the meeting place, date, composition and agenda. 

"At the same time it was considered that the June meeting would 
afford an opportunity for discussing certain other matters of common 
concern which are of an urgent or important nature, such as: 

"(2)_ The question of the renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 
which is indeed only a part of the general subject of foreign relations, 
but which is especially urgent since under the terms of the Alliance 
a decision should be reached this year. 

125 



126 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ness in the face of the unliquidated business was 
enough to despatch them to this congenial limb. 
Foreign policy. Imperial migration, the League of 
Nations, defence, communications — ^what did they all 
amount to when no unity had been discovered in 
matters of prime importance? The requiem mass on 
the conference was significantly enough contained in 
the resolution on naval defence, a resolution consti- 
tuting in itself a very important footnote on British 
Constitutional history and therefore worthy of being 
preserved in a more popular form than between the 
covers of a White Book. 

"That while recognizing the necessity of co-operation 
among the various portions of the empire to provide such 
naval defence as may prove to be essential for security, and 
while holding that equality with the naval strength of any 
other Power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this 
conference is of opinion that the method and expense of 
such co-operation are matters for the final determination 
of the several Parliaments concerned and that any recom- 
mendations thereon should be deferred until after the coming 
conference on Disarmament." 

Of all the members of the British Cabinet one and 
one only realized that the failure which had been re- 
corded in London was a failure due to lack of imagi- 

"(3) A general review of the main features of foreign relations, 
particularly as they affect the Dominions. 

"(4) Preliminary consideration, preparatory for the proposed Con- 
stitutional Conference, of some working method for arriving at a com- 
mon understanding as to policy in such external affairs as concern all 
parts of the Empire. 

"Since that time various other subjects have been suggested for 
inclusion in the agenda of the Jxme meeting." 



FROM THE PACIFIC 127 

native understanding. Mr. Lloyd George, in 1921 
as in previous years, stood head and shoulders above 
his colleagues in grasping that the oversea is differ- 
ent from the British point of view. That Europe was 
no longer the immovable pivot of world events, but 
that the countries of the Pacific Ocean pivot on the 
North American Continent, had been estabhshed for 
him as an indisputable fact. Quick as a flash to 
realize a new development, he had been able to grasp, 
as Canning had grasped a hundred years before him, 
that the New World has a system of dynamics and 
a technique of its own. Flung into the conference 
with explosive force by the action of Canada, that 
fact had closely resembled Mr. H. G. Wells' phan- 
tasy of the atomic bomb which keeps on exploding 
for days and weeks, constantly enlarging the area 
it devastates until all obstructions are swept away. 
In the end it had cleared the ground so thoroughly 
that it did for inter-British relations and inter-British 
diplomacy much as the American Revolution had 
done in creating British oversea governments. After 
his bitter remark to the Canadian Premier, Mr. Lloyd 
George had accepted that position; and by his vivid 
phrase in Parliament on the 9th August when he 
said, "You are defining life itself when you are de- 
fining the British Empire; you cannot do it"; he had 
shown that his presence at the head of the London 
Government had been of the highest importance for 
the future of the Enghsh-speaking race. 

Yet that Washington was Canossa admitted of no 



128 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

discussion. It might be a Canossa without the snow 
and cold in which the Emperor Henry II stood await- 
ing absolution. But that something of the power 
of a Hildebrand had been given to President Hard- 
ing was plain to those who sat with a naval Annual 
in their hands and a table of taxation and National 
Debts beside them. 

The White Book on the Imperial Conference bears 
this out. A visitor from another planet might sup- 
pose from a perusal of this document that airships 
and the provision of mooring masts had been one of 
the principal anxieties of this gathering; and that in- 
ter-communication and the dissemination of news had 
been held equally important. But even in this vital 
matter — inter-communication and the dissemination 
of news — the vital point was missed. The Depart- 
ment concerned held doggedly to the Imperial Wire- 
less scheme which every authority had condemned as 
ten years out-of-date. The passage of a year since 
this discussion has fortunately led to the abandon- 
ment of the chain of toy stations which then seemed 
so commendable. The adoption of maximum stations 
places England on a parity with defeated Germany. 
Even Chinese stations have been receiving from 
Nauen for five years; for while Hongkong and Sing- 
apore are still isolated from the direct communica- 
tion with London, as if they bore no possible rela- 
tion to the national capital, Berlin has been flood- 
ing Asia with daily gazettes. 

In all this padded report only one section is in- 




pacific possessions of various nations concerned in the prob- 
lems discussed at the washington conference. the mandates over 
Germany's former pacific possessions are indicated by the black 
outlines. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 129 

teresting; elsewhere there is silence and secrecy. 
"Silence and secrecy," cries Carlyle in his extraordi- 
nary apostrophe. "Altars might still be raised to 
them (were this an altar-building time) for universal 
worship. Silence is the element in which great things 
fashion themselves together that at length they may 
emerge, full-formed and majestic, into the daylight 
of Life, which they are henceforth to rule. Silence, 
the great empire of silence, higher than the stars, 
deeper than the kingdom of Death . . ." 

Whether the sage of Chelsea would have approved 
it in the present instance is doubtful; certainly he 
would not have recommended an altar. For leaving 
aside the bad history and the extraordinary reason- 
ing of the Delegates, which is expressed in supposi- 
tions such as "if Japan had been an enemy in 1914- 
18," there is just one illuminating statement dealing 
with Washington which runs as follows: 

"In accordance with the suggestion which was believed 
to have been made by the American Government, that the 
Conference on Disarmament should be preceded by friendly 
conversations or consultations between the Powers who were 
principally concerned in the future of the Far East and the 
Pacific, the Imperial Conference, anxious that for the Anglo- 
Japanese Agreement should be substituted some larger ar- 
rangement between the three Great Powers concerned, namely, 
the United States of America, Japan, and Great Britain, and 
holding the firm conviction that the later discussions on 
Disarmament, to which they attached a transcendent im- 
portance, could best be made effective by a previous mutual 
understanding on Pacific questions between those Powers, 



^ 



130 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

devoted many hours of examination to the question how 
such an understanding could best be arrived at, where the 
proposed conversations could best be held, in what manner 
the representatives of the British Dominions, who were so 
vitally affected, could most easily participate in them, and 
upon what broad principles of policy it was desirable to: 
proceed. It was difficult for the Dominion Prime Ministers, 
owing to the exigencies of time and space, to attend at Wash- 
ington late in the autumn. On the other hand, advantage 
might be taken of their presence in England to exchange 
views with representatives of the other Great Powers who 
had been invited to Washington later on. It was in these 
"' circumstances that the idea was mooted that the prelimi- 
nary conversations or consultations, to which the American 
Government had in principle agreed, should be held in Lon- 
don. 

"^Vhen it transpired a little later that there was some 
misunderstanding as to the nature of the preliminary con- 
versations which had been suggested, the British Govern- 
ment, in the earnest desire to remove any possible miscon- 
ception, and to meet what they believed to be the American 
views at each stage of the impending discussions, volunteered 
to attend a meeting on the other side of the Atlantic, at 
which the agenda of the forthcoming conference at Wash- 
ington could be discussed, and a friendly interchange of 
views take place in order to facilitate the work of the main 
conference later on. The British Prime Minister and For- 
eign Secretary, together with the Dominion Prime Ministers, 
> were prepared to attend such a meeting if invited to do 
so by the American Government. 

"The Japanese Government signified their willingness, if 
invited, to take part in the suggested conversations. 

"The American Government, however, did not favour the 
- idea, which was accordingly dropped. 

"This conclusion was viewed with the utmost regret by 



FROM THE PACIFIC 131 

the members of the Imperial Conference, who had devoted 
no small portion of time to the working out of an arrange- 
ment, which they understood would be equally acceptable to 
all parties, and the abandonment of which could not, they 
feared, be otherwise than prejudicial to the great objects 
which all had in view. At no stage had it been suggested that 
the results of such a consultation as was contemplated should 
either anticipate the work or tie the hands of the Wash- 
ington Conference at a later date. On the contrary, holding, 
as they do, the firm belief that without a Pacific understand- 
ing the Conference on Disarmament will find it less easy to 
attain the supreme results that are hoped for by all, the 
Imperial Conference made the proposal before referred to 
anxious to remove every possible obstacle from the path 
of the Washington Meeting, which they desire to see at- 
tended with complete and triumphant success.'* 



II 

Although it had been the 10th July when the orig- 
inal American proposal was communicated to the 
principal Allied Powers, the formal invitation was 
not issued until thirty-one days later. The problem 
of the preliminary conference, regarding which Brit- 
ish diplomacy had been so concerned, and the matter 
of Japanese participation having then been solved, 
it was held auspicious to send out the official docu- 
ment of the 11th August, which read in conjunction 
with the British Official summary of the Imperial 
Conference of the 6th August fills in the gaps and 
gives a clear picture of the new orientation which 
had come. The careful reader, who is willing to 



132 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

exercise his critical faculties, will see at once that 
across the blue heavens of American altruism certain 
clouds had already passed. Contact with reality was 
destined further to modify the rhapsodies which had 
already been indulged in. 

"The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response 
to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the 
subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which 
Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be dis- 
cussed. 

"Productive labour is staggering under an economic bur- 
den too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public ex- 
penditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for sta- 
bility, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of 
peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive ef- 
fort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expecta- 
tion of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rival- 
ries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of 
the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; 
and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not 
only without economic justification, but is a constant menace 
to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its 
preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to ex- 
pect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the Pow- 
ers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an 
agreement to effect their limitation. The time Is believed to 
be opportune for these Powers to approach this subject di- 
rectly and in conference; and while, In the discussion of 
armament, the question of naval armament may naturally 
have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude ques- 
tions pertaining to other armament to the end that all prac- 
ticable measures of relief may have appropriate consider- 
ation. It may also be found advisable to formulate pro- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 133 

posals by which in the interest of immunity the use of new 
agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled. 

"It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final as- 
surance of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced 
armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expres- 
sion in a practical effort to remove cause of misunderstanding 
and to seek ground for agreement as to the principles and 
their application. It is the earnest wish of this Govern- 
ment that through an interchange of views with the facilities 
afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution 
of Pacific and Far Eastern problems of unquestioned im- 
portance at this time, that is, such common misunderstand- 
ings with respect to matters which have been and are of 
international concern as may serve to promote enduring 
friendship among our peoples. 

"It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to 
define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific 
and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject 
of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the con- 
ference in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a 
cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of 
sources of controversy will govern the final decision. 

"Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been 
made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its 
acceptance, the President invites the Government of Great 
Britain to participate in a conference on the subject of limi- 
tation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and 
Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in 
Washington on the 11th day of November, 19^1." 



ni 

If the proposed Conference was a Canossa for 
Britain, it was a full and complete Sedan for Japan. 



134 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

The Japanese were so stupefied that they could not 
conceal the fact, even when they had won some points 
regarding the agenda. They alone had known thor- 
oughly and perfectly by year-long investigation, that 
the pivot of the countries of the Pacific Ocean was 
really the North American Continent : but they had 
beheved that the fact might be kept concealed for 
some years, if astuteness were shown, when they 
would be in a better position to accept the challenge 
which public recognition must entail. The British 
Alliance had been for them a screen which they had 
imagined no one would be able to pierce. Now the 
screen was on the ground, a discredited piece of 
camouflage! It was a far more tremendous shock 
to their plans than the Chinese Revolution of 1911 
had been with the tragic disappearance of the Man- 
chu dynasty; it upset to an incredible extent the gen- 
eral balance of power and destroyed at one blow the 
value of the steps they had taken so painfully and 
laboriously throughout the war-years. It was not 
merely a question of the money they had "invested" 
in China to further their plan, although that was a 
serious enough issue since the financial stability of 
three semi-government institutions had been compro- 
mised: it was that the whole account was going to 
be called, and the strategical as well as the financial 
balance struck. There was a network of commit- 
ments so finely spun, and so cunning that rough 
hands might ruin in hours what it had taken years 
to work out. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 135 

In self-defence they mechanically acceptei the dis- 
armament proposal and sought to defend themselves 
against the menace in the Far East by gaining time. 
Since the British request (made in May) for a three 
months' extension of the Alliance agreement they 
had been filled with dark suspicions, which the sin- 
gular denouement of the 30th June, contrived with 
the gracious assistance of the Lord Chancellor of 
England, had done little to abate. The idea of a 
Pacific Conference in London had been barely 
broached when the informal invitation came from 
the United States for precisely the same purpose 
with disarmament added to it. 

Disarmament — when arms represented the founda- 
tion of the State and its proudest achievements. . . . 

To a people as slow to adjust themselves to un- 
expected developments as the Japanese, the matter 
rapidly took on the aspect of a conspiracy — a con- 
spiracy of silence which had been turned into a con- 
spiracy of action: The ultimate punishment, which 
some had seen for them in a rigid blockade of their 
coasts by an Anglo-American fleet, seemed to have 
drawn perceptibly nearer. For many weeks after 
the American invitation had been received it rained 
in Japan — ^rained as it can only rain in a semi-trop- 
ical country. Yet that did not interfere for one 
moment with a discussion which never ceased. 
Everything turned on Britain. If she endorsed 
American action in all matters, it was the end. If, 
on the other hand, it was possible to create a diver- 



136 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

sion, there was still some hope of an attenuated pol- 
icy, no matter what happened to the Alliance. The 
Japanese relied upon the fact that vested interests 
would automatically work for them because such 
interests are always hostile to fundamental changes 
in the status quo. In this they showed great com- 
mon sense. 

As soon as possible — to be precise on the 13th July 
— ^they declared their intention gladly to participate 
in the Conference relating to the discussion of the 
question of disarmament. As for the discussion of 
Pacific and Far Eastern problems, they considered 
it more expedient that the character and scope of 
these problems should be first defined before they 
expressed their views. In less diplomatic language, 
what they wished understood was that they were will- 
ing to stop a race in armaments which in the end 
must find them outclassed, but that they would not 
tolerate the re-opening of matters which they re- 
^ garded as accomplished facts. 

The action of the United States at this stage be- 
comes less clear than it had been in the case of the 
London negotiations. Faced with something ap- 
proaching open Japanese hostility to any complete 
discussion of the Far East, there can be little doubt 
that the implications of the note handed on the 23rd 
July by the American Government to the Japanese 
Government amounted to the tacit withdrawal of all 
matters affected by the Versailles Treaty from the 
- scope of the discussion. The embarrassment of Sec- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 137 

retary Hughes in November, when the Washington 
Conference was under way, on the subject of China 
was clearly due to pledges already given : for in July 
he accepted the position that only broad subjects were 
to be discussed and that the Delegates should settle 
among themselves the nature of the agenda and the 
manner in which business should be proceeded with. 
Japan, having been satisfied on these points, on the 
27th July made known her intention "gladly to ac- 
cept an invitation for a conference which shall em- 
brace a discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern ques- 
tions." 

She had scored her first point. Nevertheless little 
was to be expected from this unless she received aid 
and comfort from other quarters. She went to 
Washington in November in much the same mood 
she had been in July, knowing that the Anglo-Jap- 
anese Alliance was doomed and that there could be 
nothing adequately to replace it. 



IV 

That it would have been possible for the United 
States by more astute diplomacy to avoid some of 
the other difficulties which ultimately cropped up 
seems certain. When we examine the particular case 
of France and the unfortunate influence she exer- 
cised on the solution of a number of questions, it 
is clear that a further capital error was made in July. 

Prior to the American invitation, the French Gov- 



138 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

ermnent had been watching with open anxiety the 
course of the Imperial Conference. The question 
of the Japanese Treaty, although apparently not 
of direct consequence to France, closely concerned 
her. Everything Russian was affected by the Alli- 
ance — Siberia; the Chinese Eastern Railway; Rus- 
sian indebtedness. Besides it gave British diplomacy 
a preponderance over France with Japan in prac- 
tically every debatable matter. If the Alliance re- 
mained, it would mean that a certain number of 
subjects would continue to be forbidden; if it dis- 
appeared there would be greater freedom. In fact 
French agreement with Japan on many issues de- 
pended upon whether or not England had a prior 
claim on Japanese diplomacy. This was a matter 
of no small moment. 

The circumstances, then, offered America an ex- 
ceptional opportunity. But unfortunately President 
Harding, still in love with his idea of an "association 
of nations" which would quietly elbow the Geneva 
League out of the way, had persisted too far in his 
desire to have the kernel of the League (the Prin- 
cipal Allied and Associated Powers) brought to 
Washington, and abandoned too completely the orig- 
inal Borah resolution. More adroitness should have 
been shown in making it clear that it was not a diplo- 
matic meeting to which the Powers had been invited, 
but a special conference in which diplomatic prece- 
dents were to be set aside. The delay and embar- 
rassment caused by having two languages used at 



FROM THE PACIFIC 139 

the Conference — a very important tactical matter — 
should have been avoided, as it could have been 
avoided, had the point been properly considered. 
During the preliminary negotiations it should have 
been clearly laid down that delegates might address 
the conference in their own languages if they wished 
on the penalty of being misunderstood ; but no inter- 
preting should have been permitted, or no special 
privileges given any more than no special privileges 
are given in the Canadian or South African Parlia- 
ments where more than one language is used. It was 
folly not to have foreseen that once weakness was 
shown in this question there would inevitably be a 
sequel. 

Of all the items in the agenda the one most highly 
doubtful was land-armaments, which had nothing to 
do with the problem of the Pacific and could in no wise 
affect it. The question of land-armament primarily 
concerned France; had the United States been kept 
properly informed she would not have attempted to 
combine issues so unrelated as the European land 
question and the problem of the Eastern seas. The 
main question was the solution of the problem of the 
Pacific, with which the European question had little 
or nothing to do. It was seapower which was being 
brought to the bar — not the mixed-up policies of 
European States. All who were well-informed knew 
that a very delicate situation actually existed between 
England and France in the summer of 1921 owing 
to French submarine arrangements having been so 



140 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

rapidly advanced that they had virtually closed the 
English channel. It was very generally known in 
London that a great deal of railway work had been 
necessary since 1919 to secure that the London de- 
fence area could be provisioned even if all the chan- 
nel ports were closed. These facts should have been 
within the knowledge of the American government. 
If they were not it must stand as a serious indict- 
ment of their system of intelligence. If they were 
great imprudence was shown. To properly informed 
observers it was as clear in July as it became in 
December that Japan would not be the only com- 
plication at Washington. 



The one country that lived in happy anticipation 
of what was to transpire was China. The Chinese 
people, harried during the whole period of the world- 
war, knew little or nothing of the complicated web 
of events which had brought about the proposed con- 
ference and innocently imagined that the world was 
at last lending an ear to their lamentations. The 
Government of China, it is true, was inclined to be 
more dubious, since the American invitation placed 
China in a lower category than the others in a man- 
ner which was quite unnecessary. It was certainly 
not diplomatic to send China an invitation different 
from the invitation sent to the four major Powers 
only in so far as deleting sentences which had more 



FROM THE PACIFIC 141 

meaning and reality for the Chinese people than for 
others. The hand which made the sapient shorten- 
ing did not notice that precisely the most important 
matter — land armaments — was struck out. China 
had certainly an army as numerous as that of Soviet 
Russia. The enormous disbursements in the rivalry 
of armaments manifestly constituted the greater part 
of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national 
prosperity in China; and avoidable or extravagant 
expense of this nature was not only without economic 
justification, but was a constant menace to the peace 
of the world rather than an assurance of its preser- 
vation. Not, however, in the estimation of the State 
Department. For this language, which is taken text- 
ually from the invitation to the major Powers, finds 
no place in the communication to China. The British 
Prime Minister had been at great pains to state in 
Parliament in the matter of the proposed London 
Conference that precisely the same invitation had 
been sent to China as to the other Powers; Secretary 
Hughes should have taken the same course. A more 
conscientious statesman would not have used methods 
which disclosed so transparently that his main anxiety 
was to get Japan into the conference-room and then 
to trust to the march of events to find her yielding. 
The great nations and the lesser ones affected by the 
issue of the Pacific were to be gathered together pre- 
sumably in a spirit of frankness and equality; but to 
show at the very start that they were differently es- 
teemed destroyed at one blow the platform on which 



142 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

they should have taken their stand together. China 
should also have been kept more closely informed 
regarding what she might reasonably expect and 
what she had best leave alone. Throwing her head- 
long into a conference without a proper plan was an 
act of political immaturity. 



TI 

The Japanese Alliance was the ostensible reason 
for all this pother, but the tap-root of trouble was 
deeper down. Hidden from view lay the ruins of 
the ancient Chinese economical system on top of 
which it was proposed to build a condominiimi which 
would make of Western capitalism the master until 
such time as the Wfestern countries judged that China 
was too turbulent for tutelage. Washington might 
be Canossa for stereotyped diplomacy, but it was just 
as likely to perpetuate the vassalage of militarily 
inefficient nations, since the price paid by Americans 
for the nominal acceptance of their schemes is nearly 
always the surrender of their ideals through the 
legerdemain of diplomats. That the ideals are often 
unworkable in practice is no doubt true ; but between 
modifications honestly worked out and dehberate 
blocking of plans until an opposite policy wins there 
is a mighty chasm. To keep tight hold of the sub- 
stance no matter what happened to the shadow was 
the settled determination of all nations who possessed 
tangible stakes in China. That they were firmly 



FROM THE PACIFIC 143 

resolved to cede nothing for which they could produce 
a contract or a Treaty, except as a last resort, was 
amply evident. And the proof could be found in the 
manoeuvring of financial interests which now com- 
menced behind the scenes. 



VII 

There was nothing complex in the reasons which 
had led European and Japanese concessionaires ap- 
parently to reverse their policy and fall in with 
American proposals regarding the unification of their 
outstanding options in China. Lack of capital was 
one cause ; lack of popular interest, unless some fresh 
bait was held out, was another. But the chief was 
that it was judged politic to utilize America to secure 
a monopoly. The monopoly of the system of 6,000 
miles which had been built meant nothing: nor did 
a monopoly of the projected lines amounting in all 
to another 12,000 miles mean much. But something 
which would give a tight and permanent hold on 
a railway system at least as large as had been de- 
clared necessary in Indian Government Reports in 
the case of the Indian system — 100,000 miles — cost- 
ing $100,000 U. S. Gold a mile, was not only worth 
fighting but caUed for a stupendous effort. The cap- 
ital expenditure involved a sum which would ulti- 
mately approximate the total war indemnity which 
Germany is said to be capable of paying — between 
two and three thousand millions sterling. It was 



144 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

therefore a subject of first-class international impor- 
tance. Difficulties, which would undoubtedly prove 
insuperable for any one Power alone to overcome 
in China, were capable of being smoothed away when 
to the menace of Japanese arms was united the sooth- 
ing sentimentalism of the United States. The vision 
of a four-Power solidarity could indeed be made so 
haunting, if there was persistent unity and energy, 
that the Chinese would not realize until too late 
that a new imperialism had successfully passed 
through their open door, and so well utilized the 
opportunity which is equal for all that there was no 
longer any incentive for others to compete. 

In the British White Paper Miscellaneous No. 9 
of 1921, there is a despatch quoted from the leader 
of the British banking group, Sir Charles Addis, to 
the British Foreign Office, dated 4th June, 1919, in 
which are laid down the general principles of this 
grand policy. After dealing with the question of 
public tenders and the matter of obtaining exclusive 
support so as to fall in with the American proposal, 
the despatch states categorically in paragraph 13 : 

"It may not be out of place to remark here, in paren- 
theses, that the arrangement suggested by the group is to 
be regarded in its industrial aspect as a transitory prelimi- 
nary stage in the accomplishment of the main object, to be 
kept steadily in view, of the establishment at Peking of a 
central railway board to consist of representatives of the 
Chinese Government on the one hand and of the international 
consortium on the other, which should be entrusted with 
the finance, the construction, the administration, and the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 145 

control of the Chinese railway system as a whole; the con- 
sortium to act as financial and industrial agents to the cen- 
tral railway board for the issue of specific railway loans, 
until such time as it may be found possible to issue Chinese 
consolidated stock, and for the preparation, under the di- 
rection of the board, of specifications and tenders for the 
supply of railway material and equipment — " 

A central railway board dominated by the inter- 
national consortium, which would be entrusted with 
the finance, the construction, the administration and 
the control of the Chinese railway system as a whole, 
is a scheme of such magnitude and such far-reaching 
importance that one may ask who are the ^Napoleons 
who have conceived it. The answer is that they are 
not Napoleons, but very unimaginative men who have 
taken the ideas current regarding Indian railways, 
such as were embodied in the Report of the Com- 
mittee appointed by the Secretary of State for India 
to enquire into the administration and working of 
Indian railways (1920-1921) and applied them to 
China, where the essential condition — the right of 
eminent domain — is totally lacking. The complete 
separation of the railway budget, in respect of both 
capital and revenue, from the general budget of 
China, and the earmarking of all profits irrespective 
of national needs, for the continued expansion of the 
system which are laid down as sine qua non, take 
into consideration every factor except the dominat- 
ing one, — the attitude, feelings and possible reprisals 
of the Chinese people. The programme also disre- 



146 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

gards the remarkable development which has come 
under the Republic on Chinese railways owing to 
the fact that railways all the world over infallibly 
attract all troops. The canahzation of internal war- 
fare — which now flows almost exclusively along the 
railway embankments, — has reached such a point that 
concentrations of 100,000 men are common. Twenty 
years ago a force of 6,000 foreign troops in North 
China was a dominating influence; to-day they are 
as powerless as the League of Nations. How would 
an international board entrusted with the finance, 
the construction, the administration and the control 
of the Chinese railway system as a whole act when 
this recurrent provincial warfare breaks out and 
jeopardizes property worth hundreds of millions? 
Would the legislatures of their respective countries 
sanction the mobilization and despatch of expedition- 
ary forces to secure that the finance, the administra- 
tion and the control of the railways remained in ac- 
cordance with bankers' regulations? The matter is 
too farcical to be seriously answered. The central 
Chinese railway board will never come ; but it is well 
to understand at this hour precisely what this proposal 
really means. Even Lord Curzon, who is exclusive 
enough in most matters, declined "exclusive support" 
from first to last and merely committed the British 
Government to the formula of "complete support" 
which is probably what will sink the whole enterprise 
before it gets into harbour. Exclusive support the 
British Government had been willing to give in 1913 



FROM THE PACIFIC 147 

when industrial undertakings were not included. But 
once industry entered into the problem, British free 
trade requirements could not be so shackled. The ex- 
clusion from the British group of great clearing Banks 
such as Lloyd's Bank, the London Joint City and 
Midland Bank, Barclay's, and the National Provin- 
cial and Union Bank of England, not to speak of 
other concerns that had asked for admittance, such 
as Brown Shipley & Co., the Eastern Bank, N. Sam- 
uel & Co., and C. Birch Crisp & Co., has led to a 
unique situation, which had it been understood in 
Washington by Secretary Hughes would have been 
dealt with. For this exclusion, combined with the 
formula which had been finally adopted by the four 
governments concerned, amounts in practice to a 
repudiation of the principle of the Open Door in the 
one matter vital to the rehabilitation of China, — 
money. The precise terms of the declaration of the 
Four Governments should be read: 

*'The Governments of each of the four participating 
groups undertake to give their complete support to their 
respective national groups, members of the Consortium, in all 
operations undertaken pursuant to the resolutions and agree- 
ments of the 11th and 12th May, 1919, respectively entered 
into by the bankers at Paris. In the event of competition in 
the obtaining of any specific loan contract the collective 
support of the diplomatic representatives in Peking of the 
four Governments will be assured to the Consortium for the 
purpose of obtaining such contract." 

Was there ever a less moral bargain? 



148 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

VIII 

If it was desired really to give effect to this under- 
taking, Washington, where the original idea of co- 
operative action had been bom, was certainly the 
place for that. A decision had to be arrived at in one 
sense or another : either the consortium must be made 
successful — or the conference would have its folly 
disclosed later in an unpalatable way. That was evi- 
dent long before the Delegates assembled. 

To men accustomed to the ordinary commonplace 
operations of banking, depending on established sys- 
tems, the long, slow process of economic develop- 
ment through which China must necessarily go (and 
which at the lowest computation will last sixty years) , 
is frankly disliked. Psychologically, there is thus 
some reason for the international scheme. Experi- 
ence having demonstrated that owing to the very dif- 
ferent conceptions of money in China, particularly 
in the reahn of State finance, financial operations 
are apt to be wastefully conducted unless attended by 
supervision, the instinctive thing is to vote for super- 
vision. Irrespective of what supervision may actu- 
ally amount to in practice, the stand is taken that all 
will be well so long as the theory is embodied in a 
legal agreement. Historically, there having been no 
such thing as "finance" in China, wealth having always 
been real and visible, and the idea of property never 
having extended beyond tangible things, it seems to 
stand to reason that when "real and visible" tokens 



FROM THE PACIFIC 149 

of wealth reach Chinese Government departments 
without the processes which have produced them be- 
ing clear, or the responsibilities attached to their 
spending appreciated, the strong hand of friendly 
nations should secure that money flows into the right 
channels and becomes reproductive. 

Yet the whole argument is falsified because con- 
trol is not possible at the bottom, where it is essential, 
but only at the top where it is illusory and purely of 
the window-dressing order. The expense entailed by 
a real system of foreign control would be greater 
than the resultant benefit and would defeat its own 
object, because in China the minimum subsistence 
wage of the white man is forty times higher than 
the minimum wage of the native-born and precludes 
the putting in force of measures demanding the pres- 
ence of foreigners at every spending-point.^ The 
enormous discrepancy between the standards of liv- 
ing is not only a gulf but a bar to installing efficiency 
in the sense it is understood elsewhere. Therefore 
one is driven by the logic of circumstances to seek- 
ing in quite a different way the desired result, and 
securing its popular ratification by means other than 
diplomatic pressure. 

The method to be followed is the method of com- 
mon sense, as will be shown later. Lack of efficiency 
is very largely compensated for in China by cheap- 
ness of operation. In any case international action 

1 This statement is absolutely correct. The minimum wage of a white 
man is $200 silver a month: the minimum of a Chinese $5 silver, 
countless millions living on ten gold cents a day. 



150 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

in such classic examples as Tangiers and Constanti- 
nople should have been enough to teach men that 
national salvation is not to be found that way/ For 
the jealousies in China, even among the principal 
Allied and Associated Powers, are not only acridly 
expressed, but lead to endless actions at the back 
doors. It would serve no useful purpose to give any 
clearer indication than to say that the two Powers 
which are supposed to love each other best — the 
United States and Britain — ^have bickered most bit- 
terly on all subjects connected with money and the 
investment thereof. When you have added thereto 
the possibihties lurking in latter-day Chinese nation- 
alism the outlook becomes more sinister. With all 
that Bolshevism has taught the world, it would be 
natural to suppose that caution would be displayed 
where passions are most easily aroused — in matters 
aJBPecting the pocket. But experience has demon- 

1 Tangiers is in the northwest corner of Africa allotted to Spain, 
but it does not belong to Spain. France, Spain and Great Britain 
claim rights in this quasi-internationalized section of Morocco, which 
comprises Tangiers itself and 140 square miles of territory surrounding 
it. In the original secret treaties of 1904 between France, Spain and 
Great Britain partitioning Morocco between France and Spain, the 
exact status of Tangiers was left undecided. After the Agadir incident, 
which almost led to war between the Kaiser and France (1911), a 
treaty signed at the end of 1912 divided Morocco into three zones — a 
French zone, a Spanish zone, and Tangiers, with its surrounding terri- 
tory, under a "special regime." Supposedly this meant a triple admin- 
istration under the three Powers; rivalries, however, have prevented 
reform, and the resultant government has been lax and inefficient in 
the extreme. All three Powers claim economic interests. Great Britain 
would be satisfied politically if by some form the freedom of the port 
and the non-fortification of the territory could be so guaranteed as to 
remove the menace to the Straits of Gibraltar. But since the allied 
triumph in the great war, the French press has been declaring that the 
present status of Tangiers is intolerable and must be ended. The French 
plan is to recognize the sovereignty of Mulai Yusef, the Sultan of 
Morocco. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 151 

strated that no lesson learnt in one country is ever 
applied to another; and only by cultivating the art 
of making themselves disagreeable have Chinese re- 
cently proved that they are no longer negligible. 

In yet another matter did Washington loom up 
as Canossa. The robes of repentance would have 
to be donned not only by those v^^ho had actually 
erred, but by those who had expressed by written 
undertaking their desire to do so. Never in history 
had there been such a curious medley. 



PART VI 

WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER 



That the imagination of the American people had 
been captured by the idea of the Washington Con- 
ference was soon made plain in every part of the 
United States. As the month of November ap- 
proached and the hour for the assembling of the Del- 
egates drew nearer, interest was visibly stimulated 
by the remarkable manner in which publicity invaded 
every organ of the press. It was not so much a Dis- 
armament Conference as an Arms Conference: the 
world in arms had been summoned to Washington. 
That delighted the American people who were still 
" in a mood which had long since disappeared in Eu- 
rope. The distinction between the way Americans 
looked upon the matter and the way the others con- 
sidered it was of the same order as had been noted 
in London in the matter of the Imperial Conference. 
There the British idea of an Imperial Cabinet and 
the Dominions' idea of a conference of Prime Minis- 
ters had meant the difference between action and dis- 
cussion. Action was certainly demanded by the 
American people in 1921. They were ready for 
dramatic moves; and there seemed no limit to the 
amount of popular support these would win if care 

152 



AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 153 

were taken to explain them properly and to act with 
dignity and resolution. 

There was, however, another fact which should 
have been more adequately noticed had the strategy 
of the Conference been a subject of competent in- 
quiry. Although a sense of the dramatic lies dor- 
mant in Americans and can be rapidly invoked, they 
are a people of swift emotions which burn themselves 
rapidly out. The newspaper world, long before the 
Conference had opened, had set to estimate precisely 
what "the news value" of this international gathering 
would be to them. After some preliminary hesi- 
tation the unanimous opinion was reached that that 
value was not more than thirty days. In other words, 
the attention of the American people could be kept 
riveted on great subjects for just one calendar 
month and no more, after which other matters would 
engage their interest. This estimate was extremely 
important and proved very accurate. Had the 
American delegation been properly advised, they 
would have packed into the compass of thirty days 
all essential matters so that the main objectives would 
by that time have been clearly marked out and the 
immense deadweight of American public opinion al- 
lowed to crush opposition by a law as inexorable as 
the law of gravity. 

These were three issues and the only three impor- 
tant to the United States: 



154 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

First: Naval reduction, 

Second: Cancellation of the Anglo- Japanese Al- 
liance, 

Third: Restoration of China's liberty of action by 
a complete modification of crippling international 
arrangements. 

All the rest was immaterial so far as the security 
of the North-American Continent was concerned. 
The question of Siberia largely depended on the lead 
given in these three major matters, which should 
have been bracketed together and worked as a unit 
instead of being broken into distinct categories. It 
was stupidity to imagine that it was feasible to class 
purely European matters with problems of the Paci- 
fic without entangling both in a maze of difficulties. 
The main and only reason why the Washington Con- 
ference had been summoned was because in the mid- 
Nineteenth Century England had opened China and 
the United States Japan to the commerce and indus- 
itry of the world, and thereby projected into the 
political arena elements which had thrown out of 
balance factors hitherto supreme. That was the posi- 
tion in a single sentence. What had taken place dur- 
ing the seven preceding years in Europe was no 
doubt related through the Russo-Japanese War to 
the problem of the Far East; but the relationship 
was too remote to be of importance and in any case 
it required a very different American policy in Eu- 
ropean affairs to have Asia and Europe jointly con- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 155 

sidered. American statesmen should at least have 
understood that there is an inborn antithesis, a 
cultural antimony, between Europe and Asia and all 
their affairs. President Harding, influenced by his 
desire for world peace, had badly mixed up unrelated 
questions ; but there was no reason why the American 
delegation should not have corrected the initial cru- 
dity and brought things to the point where evasions 
would have been impossible in the essential prob- 
lem of the Pacific. This, however, involved a totally 
new orientation of American policy just as much as a 
change of heart in the case of other Powers. Amer- 
ica had already committed an unforgivable sin in 
China in 1917 which required public expiation; she 
possessed neither the men nor the resolution to wipe 
out President Wilson's capital error in the way in 
which it could easily have been done. In the elders 
gathered together as her representatives there was 
no trace of the generosity or ardour of youth. 



II 

Gargantuan as were the ramifications of the main 
categories of the agenda, if followed to the end, it was 
the details rather than the objectives which were com- 
plex. That is no doubt true of almost every confer- 
ence. But in the present case it only required a show 
of firmness, coupled with a public admission that 
Japan had done what she had done more because of 
the volition of others than because of any inherently 



156 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

different ideals, to create an atmosphere which would 
have permitted the formulation of true solutions. 
That, however, required inspired personalities. Sec- 
retary Hughes, in certain respects, was inspired, not, 
however, regarding the part that China could play 
in the world's affairs provided an immense, concerted 
effort were made to get to the bottom of her diffi- 
culties. As the agenda plainly shows, what was to be 
attacked were not the difficulties but the by-product 
of those difficulties: 

"LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT 

"1. Limitation of naval armament — Basis of Limitation. 

Extent of limitation. Fulfilment of conditions. 
"2. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare, 
"3. Limitation of land armament. 

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS 

"1. Questions relating to China — Principles to be applied. 
"2. Application to subjects: 

A. Territorial integrity, 

B. Administrative integrity, 

C. Open door — equality of administrative and Indus- 
trial opportunity, 

D. Concessions: Monopolies and other economic privi- 
leges, 

E. Development of railways, 

F. Preferential railroad rates. 

G. Status of existing commitments. Questions relating 

to Siberia. Similar questions relating to China. 
"3. Mandated islands." 



FROM THE PACIFIC 157 

Over the question of armaments there were certain 
perfectly clear points. Navies must be dealt with 
drastically and the new agencies of welfare subjected 
to new rules. Armies it was hoped to treat in the 
same way. There were certain precedents to follow. 
But the sub-heads in the agenda-paper proved that 
the whole problem of Chinese reform was deliberately 
made so many-sided that there was virtually no end 
to the discussion. 

With no proper starting-point marked out, how 
could there be an end? 

Yet there was no reason for that. Precisely the 
same phenomenon had to be dealt with in China as 
in Rome when the destruction of the rigid society 
which had come down from the early days of the 
Roman Republic, was brought about by foreign fac- 
tors and the vast increase in currency and commercial 
credits. The great revolutionist in China, which has 
upset everything, had been the cash and credit system 
of the West. Money should have been the measure 
of everything — money in all its various forms ; money 
and nothing but money. Everything under that 
head should have been grouped and a decision reached 
regarding the policy to be pursued. It would have 
taken time to work out the details just as it had taken 
time to work out the naval details. There had been 
that time. Four months had passed since July and 
those four months had been frittered away. Nothing 
had been done. Experts summoned from every part 
of the Far East had been left to kick their heels pre- 



158 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

cisely as President Wilson let his army of experts 
kick their heels in Paris two years before. No com- 
missions had been formed to work up data — ^no ex- 
pert evidence taken. Nothing. Chance, the blind 
Madonna of the Pagan, was the goddess who was to 
preside over China's destiny. 

Consequently eleven days before the conference 
opened this is what was allowed to take place. An 
unseemly wrangle in Peking over a small loan of 5^ 
million gold dollars, which fell due on the 31st Oc- 
tober, was complicated by the sudden disposition of 
the American banking group to do business. They 
put forward a proposition whereby under certain 
terms they would take over this liabihty and another 
for a like amount which fell due on the 30th Novem- 
ber. Their terms were rejected for reasons which 
are still obscure but into which personal motives 
entered. The result was that the month of Novem- 
ber opened with the news trumpeted throughout the 
American press that China was a defaulter in the 
matter of the interest on an American loan of 5^/^ 
millions and that her whole position was so com- 
promised that withdrawal of recognition of her 
government was possible. This coupled with the 
ceaseless propaganda by the Southern or Canton 
government tended to create an atmosphere wholly 
unsatisfactory to a realization of the aims and ob- 
jects of the conference. For Secretary Hughes to 
have allowed such developments shows that his time 



FROM THE PACIFIC 159 

was monopolized by other matters, and that he was 
bereft of competent help. 

With the main portion of America's China policy 
— finance — effectively alienated from the control of 
the government no liberty of action was left. 



Ill 

Since July there had been subtle modifications in 
other directions. The attitude of the British empire 
bloc had changed, partly owing to the fact that 
British Imperial representation was very different 
from what it had been in London, and partly owing 
to the passing of the mood which had then been pre- 
dominant. The absence of Mr. Lloyd George, with 
his phenomenal quickness and political intelligence, 
was a handicap which was never surmounted: his 
leadership would have made all the difference not 
only in the conference hall, but in stimulating and 
keeping alive the interest of the dominant factor — 
the American people. It was also made a little too 
plain that what Secretary Hughes was anxious about 
was Mr. Balfour's vote. Easily influenced by others, 
and with a weak Department behind him, which had 
never known how to utilize the great stacks of infor- 
mation which had been accumulated throughout the 
years, Secretary Hughes needed support and plainly 
showed it. The men associated with him belonged to 
bygone days, and never once realized how far even 



1/ V 



160 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

the Eastern world had swept beyond them. Tied to 
pre-war formulas they could lend little assistance in 
framing the new lexicon. 

All these considerations, important as they proved 
to in the detailed phases of the discussion, were swept 
aside by the immense effect produced by Secretary 
Hughes' opening speech of the 12th November on 
the scrapping of capital ships. It was an earnest 
example of what America can really do when she 
works up a question; grasps every detail, and puts 
into it her granite resolution. It was as if a salvo 
had been fired over the conference by all the heavy 
guns of the condemned vessels ! Men were deafened 
and stunned. The brilliance of the stroke was height- 
ened by the circumstances in which it had been deliv- 
ered. The Armistice Day ceremony at Arlington 
cemetery hung like a halo over the assembly, which 
was in the main a gathering of delegates who knew 
in its bitterest sense the meaning of war. So immense 
was the moral effect that there was no end to the 
roaring echoes. Nothing since the enunciation of the 
Monroe Doctrine had equalled it; it was almost the 
first occasion for nearly a century that American pol- 
icy had boldly gone forward without frittering away 
valuable time. That as in the case of the Monroe 
Doctrine the ground had been prepared in England 
was a significant matter tending to prove that there 
must always be a Canning before there can be a 
Monroe. . . . Equality between the British and 
American navies having already been accepted as a 



FROM THE PACIFIC 161 

principle in London, the rest was merely a question 
of calculation and accommodation. 

Yet in spite of this happy and significant opening 
the first ominous circumstance came to the surface 
with dramatic swiftness. It was a circumstance 
which would not have been deemed ominous by any 
one not acquainted with human nature. Secretary 
Hughes, the man on whom everything hinged as 
chairman of the conference, was going about in such 
an exalted mood that his feet hardly touched earth. 
Unaccustomed to such scenes, the wine had mounted 
to his head at a moment when the real struggle had 
hardly commenced. 

Two days later — on the 14th IN'ovember — came the 
formal speeches of acceptance of the American plan 
by Britain, France, Japan and Italy. In the French 
speech there transpired the first indication that land 
armaments would prove a fatal issue. "Gentlemen," 
said Premier Briand, "when it comes on the agenda, 
as it will inevitably come, to the question of land 
armament, a question particularly delicate for 
France, as you are all aware, we have no intention to 
eschew it." Fateful words indeed which should have 
been anticipated in July. 

The very next day thoughtfulness had invaded the 
American camp. There was a perceptible slowing- 
down whilst the question of Committees and sub- 
Committees was proceeded with by the Committee of 
the Whole. The deafness from the great salvo of 



162 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

the 12th November was wearing off and diplomacy 
was slowly coming to life again. 



IV 

A few minutes before the midnight on the 15th 
November the senior Chinese delegate on returning 
J home found a note from the State Department in- 
forming him that China would be required to state 
her case next morning at 10:30 o'clock before the 
Committee of the Whole. The hour was already so 
late that it was necessary to rouse every one and pre- 
pare for an all-night sitting. Not that the Chinese 
delegation had not already fully discussed its posi- 
tion and its problem. Of all the delegations in 
Washington the Chinese delegation was the most 
numerous, with the possible exception of Japan. It 
contained many capable men. The dossier of China's 
griefs drawn-up in Peking comprised some thirty 
major issues: but preliminary examination and dis- 
cussion in Washington had shown that condensation 
was imperative. That had already been done, — but 
faced now with a categorical request to state their 
case, the delegation fell back on the sub-head in the 
Agenda which read — "Principles to be observed." 
The night of the 15-16th November was consumed in 
working out what seemed a legalistic presentation of 
those principles for the morrow. 

Whether the Chinese Delegation can be blamed for 
this in view of the scant help they received from the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 163 

convening Power is doubtful. The risks of a diplo- 
matic career among oriental nations are not small. 
In the middle ages, if an ambassador was too aggres- 
sive he was apt to be executed by the potentate to 
whom he was accredited, but if he was not aggressive 
enough he ran a chance of a similar fate at the hands 
of his own master. While it is true that these days 
have long passed in the East, something of the psy- 
chology remains. This factor tends to promote ob- 
scurantism and an avoidance of any irrevocable acts 
until the ground is well mapped-out and reasonably 
safe. Secretary Hughes' defence of his action was 
that the United States had in the case of China noth- 
ing comparable to her naval surrender to offer to the 
Powers. Yet this does not accord with the facts. 
The United States had a large number of things to 
offer; her terrifically strong financial position placed 
all the others at her mercy. She could have forced 
prompt acquiescence in several matters. There was, 
for instance, her Tariff treaty with China of 1903 
which had never been executed and which could have 
been made the excuse for a remarkable gesture con- 
ceding to China a new freedom and calhng upon 
other nations to follow suit. Had she made any 
preliminary inquiries she would have learnt that the 
Chinese Delegation was in possession of a Memo- 
randum by the competent British officials in the 
Chinese Customs headquarters recommending, in re- 
turn for abolition of export and coast trade duties, 
the 12%% Import Tariff, which she in company with 



164 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

England and Japan had agreed to 20 years before. 
That would have solved at one stroke most of China's 
financial difficulties. There was also the general 
financial question which could have been immeasur- 
ably simplified by the announcement of an American 
funding plan for all the Chinese unfunded debt. 
Had that been done opposition would have been 
speedily overcome, since it would have been impos- 
sible for nations similarly placed in the matter of 
their debt to the United States to have refused to 
acquiesce in a policy for China which they sought for 
themselves. An open session devoted to Chinese is- 
sues, permitting the Chinese delegates to give the 
world a proper view of their national dilemma, and 
allowing the United States to take the lead in accept- 
ing far-reaching modifications in fiscal-financial mat- 
ters would have registered an advance as far-reach- 
ing in Chinese reform as the naval advance. 

It is my belief that the Chinese Delegation should 
have declined to make any initial statement except in 
public session. That they would have been sup- 
ported by American opinion and won their point is 
absolutely certain. That even a conference of men 
of genius would have been puzzled by the precise 
value of the memorandum which they actually pre- 
sented is certain when the unfamiliar nature of the 
subject-matter is remembered. When the news- 
papers added the next day that China had had the 
advantage of the advice of the retired American offi- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 165 

cials who had been most prominent in the China de- 
bacle of 1917 they had said more than they knew. 



The Memorandum read by the Senior Chinese De- 
legate on the morning of the 16th November was as 
follows : 

"In view of the fact that China must necessarily play an 
important part in the deliberation of this Conference with 
reference to the political situation in the Far East, the Chi- 
nese Delegation has thought it proper that they should take 
the first possible opportunity to state certain General Prin- 
ciples which, in their opinion, should guide the Conference 
in the determinations which it is to make. Certain of the 
specific applications of the Principles which it is expected 
that the Conference will make, it is our intention later to 
bring forward, but at the present time it is deemed sufficient 
simply to propose the principles which I shall presently read. 
In formulating these principles, the purpose has been kept 
steadily in view of obtaining rules in accordance with which 
existing and possible future political and economic prob- 
lems In the Far East and the Pacific may be most justly 
settled and with due regard to the rights and legitimate 
Interests of all the Powers concerned. Thus It has been 
sought to harmonize the particular Interests of China with 
the general Interests of all the world. China is anxious 
to play her part not only In maintaining peace, but in pro- 
moting the material advancement and the cultural develop- 
ment of all the nations. She wishes to make her vast natural 
resources available to all peoples who need them, and in re- 
turn to receive the benefits of free and equal Intercourse with 



166 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

them In order that she may do this, it is necessary that 
she should have every possible opportunity to develop her 
political institution: in accordance with the genius and needs 
of her own people, China is now contending with certain 
difficult problems which necessarily arise, when any country 
makes a radical change in her form of Government. 

"These problems she will be able to solve if given the op- 
portunity to do so. This means not only that she should 
be freed from the danger or threat of foreign aggression, 
but that, so far as circumstances will possibly permit, she 
be relieved from limitations which now deprive her of autono- 
mous administrative action and prevent her from securing 
adequate public revenues. 

"In conformity with the agenda of the Conference, the 
Chinese Government proposes for the consideration of and 
adoption by the Conference the following General Principles 
to be applied in the determination of the questions relat- 
ing to China: 

"1. (a) The Powers engage to respect and observe the 
territorial integrity and political and adminis- 
trative independence of the Chinese Republic, 
(b) China upon her part is prepared to give an un- 
dertaking not to alienate or lease any portion 
of her territory or littoral to any Power. 
"S. China, being in full accord with the principle of the 
so-called open door or equal opportunity for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations having treaty re- 
lations with China, is prepared to accept and apply 
it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without ex- 
ception. 
"S. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and 
maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the 
Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any 
treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 167 

general peace in these regions without previously noti- 
fying China and giving to her an opportunity to par- 
ticipate. 

"4. All special rights, privileges, immunities or icom- 
mitments, whatever their character or contractual 
basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to 
China are to be declared, and all such or future claims 
not so made known are to be deemed null and void. 
The rights, privileges, immunities and commitments 
now known or to be declared are to' be examined with 
a view to determining their scope and validity and, if 
valid, to harmonizing them with one another and with 
the principles declared by this Conference. 

"5. Immediately or as soon as circumstances will permit, 
existing limitations upon China's political jurisdic- 
tional and administrative freedom of action are to 
be removed. 

"6. Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be at- 
tached to China's present commitments which are 
without time limits. 

"7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special 
rights or privileges, the well established principle of 
construction that such grants shall be strictly con- 
strued in favour of the grantors, is to be observed. 

"8. China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected 
in future wars to which she is not a party. 

"9. Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes in the Pacific and the Far 
East. 

*10. Provision is to be made for future conferences to be 
held from time to time for the discussion of inter- 
national questions relative to the Pacific and the 
Far East, as a basis for the determination of common 
policies of the Signatory Powers in relation thereto." 



168 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

VI 

The Memorandum made no great impression on 
the public, which began to believe that the Far East- 
ern question was really an insoluble Chinese puzzle. It 
seemed to assume that the Conference proposed to sit 
indefinitely; that alone was enough to produce an 
undercurrent of hostility. Did the men of the Far 
East not realize that the world had no time to waste 
on fine points? The Chinese attitude was judged 
defensive and doctrinaire; and a Far Eastern Com- 
mittee was organized to classify the subjects to be 
considered. 

On the 19th November the various delegations ad- 
dressed the Committee but the only remarks of im- 
portance came from Japan. The Japanese spokes- 
man significantly expressed the hope that the Confer- 
ence would not go into many details. "We should 
regret undue protraction of the discussions by de- 
tailed examination of innumerable minor matters. 
"All this Conference can achieve, it seems to us, is to 
adjust China's foreign relations, leaving her domestic 
situation to be worked out by the Chinese them- 
selves." 

Clever remarks in all truth since the domestic situ- 
ation was very largely the product of China's deeply 
entangled foreign relations. Everything internally 
hinged on a change in China's international commit- 
ments. The less you changed the international com- 
mitments the more you intensified the factors work- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 169 

ing against an improvement of the domestic situ- 
ation: it was like a proposition in elementary geo- 
metry. The American delegation became gradually 
aware of their tactical, error. It was realized once 
more that Japan, and what she stood for, had really j 
brought about the Conference. It was necessary to 
show a little more directness. But how? In less 
than a week the sunny situation had been radically 
altered. Anxious to make a clear starting-point, on 
the 21st November the following four Resolutions by 
Mr. Elihu Root were framed and finally adopted: 

V 

"It is the firm intention of the Powers attending this Con- 
ference hereinafter mentioned, to wit, the United States of 
America, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands and Portugal: 

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and 
the territorial and administrative integrity of China. 

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed op- 
portunity to China to develop and maintain for herself ef- 
fective and stable government. 

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually 
establishing and maintaining the principle of equal oppor- 
tunity for the commerce and industry of all nations through- ^/ 
out the territory of China. '^' 

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the present / 
~^\ conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which , / 
would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly ' 
States and from countenancing action inimical to the se- 
curity of such States." 

That was all. In one leap the United States had 
got back to John Hay and the Open Door, plus the 



170 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

accretions which had come naturally enough with the 
passage of twenty years ; and with another leap vested 
interests jumped joyfully after them. A British 
official spokesman let it be promptly known that the 
four accepted principles in British opinion meant ac- 
cepting of railroad concessions held by the Powers; 
and continued supervision of China's Customs. 

The Chinese Delegation was deeply aroused. 
Were these marble halls in which they were meeting 
merely a handsome sarcophagus for a spirit that was 
dead? They hastened in committee to bring up all 
the old stalking-horses, tariff autonomy, extra-ter- 
ritoriality, foreign post-offices, foreign railway- 
guards and police, leased territories, wireless instal- 
lations, hoping that this would restore the balance. 
But it was too late. The die had been cast. Having 
leaned on principles, the principles (as Mr. Viviani 
had wittily remarked on another occasion) were 
giving way in the manner inevitable when generalities 
are involved. 

But China on the particular date when the Root 
Resolutions were made public (21st November) was 
already out of the limelight. France, in the person 
of Mr. Briand, occupied the centre of the stage and 
the folly of introducing the question of land-arma- 
ments was made clear. 

VII 

If Russia, Poland, Rumania, Greece, Czecho- 
slovakia and Jugo-Slavia had been represented it 



FROM THE PACIFIC 171 

would have been reasonable and prudent to discuss 
armies; for then some such plan as the League of 
Nations has elaborated could have been seriously 
taken up. Without them, France's stand was so ob- 
vious that it was hardly worth while encountering an 
open rebuff. If the French had been more astute, 
instead of basing their refusal to consider the matter 
on the evidences that German militarism was merely 
dormant, and that Russian militarism was an actual 
menace, they would have accepted land disarmament 
"in principle" and asked for a plan to cover all Eu- 
rope; then what would the United States have done? 
Would she have worked out schedules after the capital 
ship manner and asked Powers not invited to attend 
to give their adhesion by telegraph? What would 
her method have been in regard to Russia; and how 
would she have considered a reply from Poland, — 
that she was perfectly willing to demobilize com- 
pletely if guarantees could be obtained from the 
Soviet Government? And how in such circumstances 
could America have continued to decline to treat with 
the Soviet Government even indirectly, if she inter- 
vened in Russia's domestic affairs to the extent of fix- 
ing the standard of her army? The serious error of 
bringing forward a proposition which could be pro- 
perly considered only with an attendance of nations 
as representative of land-strength as the conference 
was of sea-strength cannot be better exemplified than 
by these few unanswerable questions. For once, let 
it be confessed, the French were trop simpliste. 



172 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

They went straight to the point and gave their 
honest and dii'ect opinion. They should not have 
done this! They should have transfixed Secretary 
Hughes with a complete, whole-hearted, brilliantly- 
worded acceptance. That would have sent him run- 
ning to President Harding, tearing his hair as soon 
as he had realized the implications, and asking for his 
draft of his association of nations. For it would 
have meant not only Geneva and The Hague for 
the United States but a permanent entanglement 
across the Atlantic of a far worse nature than Presi- 
dent Wilson ever wrought. America should bless 
Premier Briand. The presence of the French Prime 
Minister did much to embarrass matters and nothing 
to assist them according to the popular view and M. 
Briand gave the conference such a perfect cold douche 
on the morning of the 21st November that it was 
never forgotten. As a matter of fact his honesty 
saved the United States and ruined his poHtical fu- 
ture, — a conclusion which in a year or two Amer- 
icans will be willing to admit. 

In regard to the Conference agenda the matter 
had particular significance. It cancelled the entire 
European portion, and in doing so left such bad 
blood that the settlement of the submarine ratio was 
out of the question. 

VIII 

Meanwhile China was pegging along in committee 
more or less methodically with her own affairs. The 



FROM THE PACIFIC 178 

tariff question was quite rightly made the centre of 
her case. That it could have been made dramatic 
and popular, had the matter been presented in a 
public session, is certain. Here was a matter suf- 
ficiently familiar to the mass of people throughout 
the world as a general issue to have the particular in- 
iquity of this instance arrest their concern. China 
eighty years ago had had a perpetual 5% tariff im- 
posed upon her at the cannon's mouth: that was a 
splendid beginning. Every effort to escape from 
this iron mould had failed, and her public finances 
had been reduced to a state of terrific disorder ap- 
proaching bankruptcy because the civilized world, 
through the commercial treaties, held her in mort- 
main. Even the 5% Tariff had not been observed 
owing to the refusal of various Powers to revise the 
specific duties on the basis of values, the loss owing 
to a non-effective tariff (which in practice amounted 
to only 3%%) having been in the twenty years since 
the Boxer indemnities $300,000,000 gross. An in- 
demnity should have been asked from the Conference 
of this amount — three hundred million dollars to be 
divided on the averages of the import and export 
trade. 

With such an introduction the ground would have 
been cleared for a precise examination of the future. 
The world needed raw materials. It was the insist- 
ent cry of Japan that only in the Chinese provinces 
could she find the surplus she so badly needed. 
China was prepared to accept this position and do 



174 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

everything to facilitate exports. Inasmuch as the 
-abolition of internal trade taxation {Uhin) was diffi- 
cult and cumbersome until the Republic was better 
organized, she should have offered in lieu thereof 
the total abolition of all export and coast trade 
duties in return for the 12^/^% tariff which had been 
agreed upon after the Boxer settlement and never 
enforced because of the conditions attached to it. 
To Japan she could have held out the additional bait 
that the whole of the borrowings made during the 
war-period would be"inscribed" in the gilt-edged list 
secured on Customs receipts. 

Why was something like this not done? No one 
knows. The Customs Administration in China, as 
I have already said, not only advocated this plan, but 
had written a strong memorandum on the subject 
which was never produced. Inasmuch as the issue 
was one primarily affecting the business community 
it should have been argued not from the juridical but 
from the purely commercial standpoint. The failure 
to hold out an immediate tangible gain to the com- 
mercial community meant the failure of the whole 
proposal. 

The discussion was continued in ensuing days in 
the same vein and with much the same results, the 
general unfamiliarity of the American delegation 
with the technical details rendering progress difficult, 
and fortifying the arguments of the last ditchers who 
declared that additional revenue raised from this 
source would shackle trade and be wasted. A con- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 175 

sideration of extraterritoriality resulted in its shelv- 
ing by the method of appointing an International 
Commission of Jurists who would visit China and re- 
port to their respective governments as to the ability 
of the Chinese authorities to take over the full admin- 
istration of justice exercised by foreign tribunals 
under the extraterritorial privileges. No attempt 
was made to consider the possibility of building up a 
new practice suited to the transitory conditions — 
such as conceding China full police-authority in new 
areas opened to trade and industry, with police- 
power of fining and expulsion but not of imprison- 
ment. In presenting the case for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Chinese soil, the same procedure 
was scrupulously followed. China placed the whole 
dossier on the table and the assembled Powers drop- 
ped it sheet by sheet into the waste-paper basket. 
The case of the garrisons maintained in North China 
under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 was mixed up in 
the mind of the conference with the entirely differ- 
ent problem of Japanese railway guards in Man- 
churia and Shantung and the system of police-boxes. 
No attempt was made to disentangle the issues. 
Foreign post-offices in China fared better since this 
was a trumpery issue and withdrawal of them was 
promised. But even here over the matter of the 
date of the withdrawal, the Japanese contrived to de- 
lay a decision for several weeks on the plea that the 
matter had to be referred to Tokyo, and that Tokyo 
did not reply. 



176 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Leased territories were similarly presented en bloc, 
a serious error in tactics since the case of various 
leased territories was different. Had the story, for 
instance, been simply told of how the Kowloon leased 
territory had been extended in 1899 far beyond what 
the British military authorities had asked for it could 
not have failed to create a profound impression. 
Kowloon, a strip of territory on the mainland op- 
posite Hongkong, was ceded to Britain in 1860 after 
being held on a personal lease by Sir Harry Parkes 
(an early empire-builder) from the time of the ces- 
sion of Hongkong Island ( 1842) . In 1898 the ques- 
tion of obtaining more territory as a military protec- 
tion for Hongkong harbour arose. The British 
General Officer Commanding asked for the hilly 
ground of the mainland to the skyline as a military 
measure to secure that hostile artillery could not 
dominate the shipping, but Peking diplomacy con- 
sidered this a very mild and unintelligent request and 
put in an application for a lease of 300 square miles 
consisting of the whole peninsula south of a hne 
drawn between Deep Bay and Mirs Bay, together 
with the islands of Lantao and the Lammas. A re- 
turn of territory superfluous both from the military 
and commercial viewpoint could have been reasonably 
asked for; since Britain is not in China as a coloniz- 
ing power but merely as a trader. 

Nothing of this transpired. 

Nor in the case of the Port Arthur lease^ — ^which 
according to the original agreement expires on the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 177 

23rd March, 1923 — were the facts made plain, as will 
be shown later. It is true that the words having an 
evil omen, the three Powers with territorial leases — 
England, France and Japan — were anxious to dis- 
play an accommodating spirit. Japan reiterated, as 
she had declared times without number, that she 
would return the Kiaochow lease as soon as negoti- 
ations had settled the details, France announced 
that she was prepared to abandon Kwangchow Wan 
and England declared that she was ready to do the 
same with Weihaiwei. That was all. Then the dis- 
cussion passed hastily to wireless installations and 
led to tedious scenes with delegates talking about 
wave-lengths to show their familiarity with the ether 
of space. 

But this sort of thing could not go on much longer. 
The arrival of a number of independent represent- 
atives from China, who wanted to know more and 
more insistently when it was proposed to bring up 
what was essential to the peace and happiness of the 
Chinese people — Shantung and the Twenty-one De- 
mands — ^gave an ugly tone to proceedings and made 
more drastic action imperative. There was such 
open disappointment among all classes in every 
part of the disturbed Republic that explosions seemed 
likely. America, which had been the most popular 
country on earth, was rapidly falling under the same 
ban as the others. It was openly declared that she 
had convoked this gathering for her own selfish ends, 
and was deliberately keeping China in a subordinate 



178 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

and humiliating position so as to placate Japan. 

Violence was becoming possible. . . . 

The Chinese Delegation communicated their fears 
to the Chairman of the Conference, who invoked Mr. 
Balfour's help. It began to dawn on all that some- 
,thing had to be done rapidly if the Conference was 
not to break down. Conversations on Shantung be- 
tween Japan and China outside the Conference, but 
with British and American official observers present, 
were rapidly agreed upon. 

After three weeks' delay, due to lack of prepa- 
ration and lack of expert advice, the Conference was 
beginning to see where the essentials lay. 

Note: See Appendix, p. 308. 



PART VII 

CLIMAX AND ANTI-CLIMAX 



On the 1st December in the presence of Secretary- 
Hughes and Mr. Balfour, the Japanese and Chinese 
Delegates met and began their Shantung conversa- 
tions, which lasted nearly two months, and required 
in the end the personal intervention of President 
Harding in the one matter of importance (the owner- 
ship and control of the Shantung railway). The 
Chinese Delegates, on leaving their official quarters, 
were greeted with angry cries from fellow-country- 
men who were enraged by what they deemed was a 
surrender. Conversations with Japan meant what 
had been utterly opposed — direct negotiations. It 
seemed to these bystanders, who represented a patri- 
otic emotion which had been boiling and bubbling for 
years, that for their officials to go into a room and 
privately discuss the matter with Japanese officials, 
instead of declaring the truth publicly, was a dread- 
ful piece of blacksliding. Yet it was a sound and 
sensible procedure. Direct negotiations between 
China and Japan, with American and British observ- 
ers present, was what the Far East needed to solve 
most of its difficulties. There were indeed only four 
factors of importance in the Far East and they were 

179 



180 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

all in the room when Japan met China, and England 
and America were present. In any case the time for 
heroics was over: it was a question of making up as 
quickly as possible for the loss of time and the decline 
in public interest which had been brought about by 
the initial incompetence. Throughout these separate 
negotiations Japan showed herself meticulous but 
reasonable as she naturally is once she is convinced 
that unfair advantage is not being taken of her, the 
Shantung railway impasse being solely due to the 
wrong-headed policy which postponed considering the 
essential matter until the end. Regarding all mat- 
ters Japan was indeed breathing more easily. If she 
still delayed, bargained and sometimes showed stub- 
bornness, it was largely due to the manner in which 
the conference had gone to work and the necessity to 
secure that no one should afterwards say that a public 
reckoning had been called and that she had been 
found wanting. 

n 

Whilst the issue which had brought President Wil- 
son to the ground was quietly debated in English 
from day to day in a room full of Japanese and 
Chinese — over whose shoulders looked wonderingly 
American and British observers — elsewhere the gen- 
eral play proceeded. In the Committee on Far 
Eastern and Pacific Affairs the first week in Decem- 
ber was made noteworthy by a renewed attempt to 
find a formula to cover the withdrawal of all foreign 



FROM THE PACIFIC 181 

troops from Chinese territory — including Japan's 
railway guards in South Manchuria — and the ren- 
dition of the leased territories. 

Both matters fared badly. It was not so much 
that there was undue haste, as an undue desire to 
curtail discussion and not to explore all the possibili- 
ties of a situation which was by no means complex. 
Simple solutions were available. The absence of 
quick-witted negotiators was never worse felt than 
at this point. Had Mr. Lloyd George been present 
it is quite certain that he would have found acceptable 
solutions. The American delegation, overwhelmed by 
the multiplicity of issues and their unfamiliarity with 
the practical aspects, were too easily led into by-paths 
and too plainly anxious to avoid deadlocks. Any- 
thing remotely resembling Paris would have shocked 
them beyond recovery: thus they were daily placed 
between Scylla and Charybdis. In any case, they 
were far more deeply interested in the private con- 
versations now proceeding on the second great sub- 
ject of the conference — ^the Anglo- Japanese Alliance 
— than in the question of skeleton garrisons in remote 
spots in China, or in the disputed authority over strips 
of territory through which ran strangely-named rail- 
ways. That in such circumstances the conviction 
should have grown even among the members of the 
Chinese Delegation that they were mere catspaws 
was not very strange. The chiefs of the Delegations 
remained diplomatically silent, the others were more 
vocal. Resignations were the order of the day and 



182 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

matters came to a head when the Secretary-General 
of the Delegation resigned and coolly published the 
following remarkable explanation of his action, which 
merits permanent record as a useful footnote on 
conference tactics; 

"The Washington Conference enters to-day its fourth 
week. So far as China is concerned, the results are so com- 
pletely negative as to suggest that China was only sum- 
moned to provide the necessary background for the naval 
disarmament proposals and not for the purpose of rehabili- 
tating her as a sovereign nation. In no single proposal laid 
before the Conference by her has anything but a stalemate 
been produced. In the questions affecting the tariff, the post- 
office, extraterritoriality, wireless installations, foreign 
troops, foreign police and leased territories, the delegates of 
the Powers assembled in Washington have displayed no dis- 
position as a body to accede to reasonable demands, or to dis- 
tinguish between what are violations of Chinese sovereignty, 
without a vestige of sanction in the treaties made between 
China and foreign nations, which should be immediately 
redressed, and what are matters sanctioned by treaty which 
China requires amended or modified. 

"In the first category fall post offices, wireless installa- 
tions, foreign garrisons other than those covered by the 
protocol of 1901, and all foreign police. Had there been 
any desire to do China justice, all these flagrant violations 
Would have been dealt with, particularly such a matter as the 
foreign post-offices, for which she has asked no compensation. 
In the crucial matter of the customs tariff China has suffered 
since the year 1902, when all the powers solemnly agreed to 
secure for her an effective 5 per cent by constant revision 
a gross loss estimated to amount to no less than $300,000,000 
in the aggregate, which alone accounts for the present dis- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 183 

ordered state of her national finances. China has filed no 
demand for an indemnity amounting to the difference in the 
tariff levy between what has been stipulated for by the treaties 
and what has been actually collected. She has limited her- 
self to asking for the 12^% rate provided for under certain 
stipulations by treaties nearly twenty years old. 

"The indications are at present that there is no likelihood 
at all of even a substantial increase being agreed to although 
every country in the world has made enormous tariff in- 
creases since the war, even India having raised an 11% 
tariff against British goods. The course consistently fol- 
lowed by the conference has been after perfunctory discus- 
sion and agreement in principle, to relegate each matter to 
a committee which has buried it by adopting a meaningless 
formula apparently conceived in a spirit of cynical disbelief 
in China's bona fides. 

"The very latest discussions have disclosed the fact that 
although the new consortium of foreign banks has ever since 
its formation declared in categorical terms that the inclu- 
sion of Japan within the banking group had been accom- 
panied by an abandonment by her of her claims to special 
privileges in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, 
the very opposite is the case, Japan insisting on certain rights 
in these regions which prove that the statements of the con- 
sortium to China are meaningless and untrue. 

^'Meanwhile, the newspapers, supplied with official com- 
muniques and statements from day to day, have contributed 
largely to building up in the mind of the public, particularly 
the American public, the idea that not only was substantial 
progress being registered, but that China was being delivered 
from the bondage and restraint in which she has languished 
for so many years and that her dearest hopes were being 
realized. Thus the valuable support of American public 
opinion on which China has counted so much in the past and 
on which she relies so much in the future has not been avail- 



184 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

able to aid in the great work of liberation and regenera- 
tion which is so stubbornly opposed by Governments and 
vested interests because a bound and captive China is easier 
to exploit." 

Ill 

These signs and portents were by no means ig- 
nored: for up on the hill, not more than a mile or 
two away, the ratifying body sat silently observing 
what was going on. Almost ironically the very next 
day the Far Eastern Committee voted a resolution 
establishing China's right to remain a neutral in fu- 
ture wars to which she was not a party, which had 
been established for the civilized world for over 200 
years but which no one had so far admitted should 
extend to Eastern Asia, unless, of course, there were 
armaments to back up international law as in the 
case of Japan. 

But this was hy-play. The burial garment of the 
Anglo-Japanese AlHance was the matter engaging 
attention and provoking as many whispers as if this 
had been a congress of modistes. It was necessary 
to get on with things. But how? Mr. Elihu Root 
went to Mr. Balfour and talked very confidentially; 
then Mr. Balfour went to Prince Tokugawa; and 
Secretary Hughes visited them all. Monsieur Vivi- 
ani, left behind by Premier Briand, nodded his head 
and affirmed France's readiness to do anything that 
contributed to French prestige. Telegrams passed 
rapidly between Tokyo and Washington. It was 
felt only right that Japan should have, as it were. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 185 

the initiative in the matter as the course of events had 
indeed been devious and somewhat humiliating for 
her. A rough draft of the agreement had been 
brought from London. But in the British draft 
Clause IV was missing. The whole point was to al- 
low Japan to write in Clause IV, which definitely ter- 
minated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as well as her 
own liberty of action, and brought things back to 
where they had been before 1902. 

At last it was done — ^more quickly than any one 
had supposed possible. An open session of the Con- 
ference was arranged for the very minute the neces- 
sary confirmatory telegrams came through from 
Tokyo — an open session rushed through so quickly 
that there was hardly time to get the tickets out. 

On the 10th December, with the galleries crowded, 
the public ceremony of announcing what had been 
done was carried out in a form suitable to the Senate 
and people of the United States, who appeared every 
whit as hard to handle as the Senate and people of 
Rome. To Senator Lodge was confided the task of 
making an oration in which the glamour of the Isles 
of the Pacific would be made so alluring that the pos- 
sibility of the arrangement being regarded as that 
dreadful thing, an Alliance, would be banished. Sen- 
ator Lodge, in accents childlike and bland, exposed 
the geographical factors. This vast Pacific Ocean, 
these many nations grouped on its shores, these blessed 
isles — who could resist the feeling that a Treaty was 
precisely what they needed to round them off and 



y 



186 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

make them content? In all history there never was 
such a case calling so urgently for a Treaty; some- 
thing which would assuage all evil passions and make 
Guam feel sisterly towards the Carolines ; something 
which would prove more clearly than spoken words 
that it was no longer a crime within the meaning of 
the act to be a Pacific. . . . 

Thus his general argument — more or less. Then 
the actual document, the reading of which he made 
appropriately enough like the reading of a will. 
The galaxy of names of the plenipotentiaries was an 
enthralling introduction : how many notable ones were 
actually sitting round the green baize table! Then 
article one and article two and article three — all 
sounding oddly like Anglo-Japanese Alliance arti- 
cles, fumigated, sterihzed, deodorized. Last of all 
Article IV: "This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as 
possible in accordance with the constitutional methods 
of the high contracting parties, and shall take effect 
on the deposit of ratification which shall take place 
at Washington and whereupon the agreement be- 
tween Great Britain and Japan which was concluded 
in London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate." 

It was only the last clause that was interesting and 
important. The rest was padding. Through the 
forest of black coats and white collars I could see in 
profile, motionless and sober, the distinguished head 
of Mr. Balfour. As the last sentence sounded and 
the Anglo-Japanese AlHance publicly perished, his 
head fell forward on his chest exactly as if the spinal 



FROM THE PACIFIC 187 

chord had been severed. It was an amazing reve- 
lation of what the Japanese Treaty had meant to the 
men of a vanished age. It was the spinal chord that 
had been severed. The last time I had seen it done 
in precisely the same way (by a single shot) was 
twenty-one years before in the forgotten siege of the 
Peking Legations, when through a loophole the same 
fate sped forward and overtook a man as uneasy 
dawn came after a rather dreadful night. Dawn had 
come here, too, after a dreadful night. The head of 
stereotyped diplomacy had fallen forward — ^the vital 
chord severed — and new figures hereafter would 
monopolize the scene. 

■ As Senator Lodge sat down the nearest ladies of ; 
the Advisory Committee, sitting in a double row of 
twenty-one, symbolizing the eternal vigilance of the 
American people)'^ had become so excited that they i , 
rose and patted the Senator approvingly and whis- 
pered words to him. It had been done so beautifully.^ 
The nerve was out ; there had been no pain to speak 
of; really modern surgery was wonderful. For a 
few fleeting minutes the magnificence of the opening 
session was duplicated. 

But already Mr. Balfour had risen on the invi- 
tation of the chairman and commenced speaking. 
It was the new Mr. Balfour, accepting the position 
like a gentleman, and justifying the corpse lying be- 
side him in well-chosen words. It was done smoothly 
in the style of the adept parliamentarian, and when 
it was ended the great applause signified that everj'' 



188 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

one had understood not what he had said but what 
had been left out. ^is had been the hand that had 
signed the original Alliance twenty years before; 
and no doubt it had been bitter and painful to see 
pohcy pass far beyond into new and strange fields. 



IV 

The infinite pains made to present a perfectly in- 
ocuous document to the public, so that the bugbear of 
entangling alliances should not be raised, was not as 
successful as had been hoped/ Within forty-eight 
hours, the man who would have been a Prime Min- 
ister, had he been born in England instead of Idaho, 
got to work. Senator Borah's remarks in the first 
Senate debate on the Treaty were as remarkable and 
as much to the point as his previous argumentation 
had been. The legislator whose tenacity and in- 
tegrity had been solely responsible for the convening 
of this remarkable conference — ^which would have 
been still more remarkable had his plan of a tripartite 
naval conference (pltis a consideration of the Pacific 
and Far Eastern problems) been followed — was ask- 
ing some plain questions which were plainly unan- 
swerable. The Conference had been in session a 
month, he said, and in all probability would shortly 
close. Although the cessation of the building of capi- 

iThe Four-Power Treaty was ratified by the Senate on 24th March, 
1922, with this important Reservation: 

"The United States understands that under the statement in the 
preamble, or under the terms of the treaty, there is no commitment to 
armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defence." 



(1 

I' !i 



FROM THE PACIFIC 189 

tal ships was in a fair way towards becoming an ac- 
complished fact, that only covered the question of 
national economy. What promise was there that the 
real weapons of war — those instruments which all ex- 
perts were agreed would be the instruments with 
which the next war would be carried out — would be 
dealt with? Incautious Mr. Borah, always going 
straight for the main point, when even open diplo- 
macy goes round every possible corner and so ostenta- 
tiously sits down to think whenever the "brass tacks" 
stage is reached. Here was the submarine poking 
its periscope up under the very dome of the Capitol! 
And then he aptly pointed out that as in the case of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance so now the new instru- 
ment embodied principles to which China was not 
considered worthy to be asked to subscribe. 

The next day the Conference was not so optimistic 
about ratification. The Senator from Idaho was al- 
ways pulling things up by the roots to see how they 
were growing. The habit just now appeared politi- 
cally atrocious. Still that day {13th December) the 
Treaty was duly signed by the four Powers, with the 
American reservation regarding the mandated islands 
tacked to it, and a growing conviction that there 
would be a far stiffer reservation attached by the 
Senate. And as if encouraged to action by these 
events, the Chinese Delegation delivered a vigorous 
attack on the subject of the famous Twenty-one De- 
mands and the abolition of spheres of influence — sub- 



190 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

jects which should have been the head and front of 
their first assault a month before. 

It was not for nothing that Secretary Hughes was 
a lawyer: he abruptly adjourned the meeting so that 
something more pleasant could be dealt with. How 
indeed could he risk a rupture with Japan at this 
stage when the 5:5:3 ratio had just been settled — 
after one month's acrimonious expert debate — by the 
retention of the superdreadnought "Mutsu" and a 
corresponding modification all round? Besides was 
not work on the Nine-Power Treaty — ^that marvel- 
lously cheerful and vague document which was to be 
the apotheosis of the Four Root Principles — so ac- 
tively proceeding that it was almost ready? America 
could not be expected to force Japan out of Man- 
churia as well as out of Shantung. Caution not 
audacity was necessary, especially as Japan was hold- 
ing up Shantung over the railway question just as 
she had held up the capital ship ratio over the 
"Mutsu." 

There were other anxious matters. England had 
at last brought up submarines, and without directly 
revealing what had taken place in regard to the clos- 
ing of the English Channel was forging closer and 
closer to that revelation. A "compromise" plan on 
the basis of the capital ship ratio which would take 
existing tonnage as the model, was defeated. Christ- 
mas had almost arrived and the season of peace and 
goodwill found every one bitter. The Shantung 
deadlock was held firm by Japan so as to block the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 191 

Manchurian issue. Every one remained officially 
hopeful — with that official hopefulness which comes 
from a complete absence of convictions. Yet noth- 
ing had been done about Manchuria or the Chinese 
tariff or the open door and the short January days 
would soon pass away. 



With the coming of a new year and the dropping 
of the vexed question of armaments Secretary 
Hughes began to work with the truly volcanic energy 
of which he is capable on a typical "American plan" 
for all China's difficulties, past, present, and future. 

It was high time. The failure recorded in the sub- 
marine question, as well as in the matter of auxiliary 
ships, had seriously weakened the final value of the 
naval accord. The errors of JSTovember were fast 
coming home to roost. Significant articles, declar- 
ing that there was only "one inch between Wilson 
and Hughes" and that "the Wilsonization of the 
Secretary of State" would live as one of the most 
curious products of the Conference, were by no means 
to be ignored. Nor was the growing irritation in the 
Senate a matter to be lightly treated. In spite of 
unabated official optimism there was still no means of 
knowing whether the two- thirds ratification majority 
could be really counted upon against the tempestuous 
oratory of the irreconcilables. 

Pressure in the main committee and the sub-com- 
mittees consequently increased and there was much 



192 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

plain speaking. Why not an international board of 
reference to maintain the open door in China— with 
a retroactive clause? The Secretary of State sud- 
denly brought forward a complete plan in four 
clauses. The Japanese, French, and British, for 
once uniting in a queer company because they ap- 
prehended that vested interests were at stake, de- 
clared that they were ready for any kind of action 
except retroaction. Could you ever really go back- 
wards even in China — unless, of course, you happened 
to be Chinese ? Sideways was a possible method — in- 
action another, which had been highly popular 
throughout the years; but retroaction never! 

Two days were devoted to a debate in which these 
Powers explained their honesty of purpose and their 
resolve to support the proposals fully and entirely 
except in this one matter. The French were par- 
ticularly concerned regarding the principle of upset- 
ting commitments already registered by Treaty; for 
if there was a retroactive clause in Chinese affairs 
might not the principle be extended, as some very 
ardently desired, to European treaties? Everybody 
spoke, the Japanese more economically than any one 
else but with telling irony. 

Retroactivity, which now began to sound in the 
ears of the tired delegates as if Einstein had slipped 
in amongst them, was openly abandoned. Secretary 
Hughes fired a heavy ear-guard salvo by suddenly 
proposing that all nations must file their commit- 
ments in China, secret and otherwise. This was 



FROM THE PACIFIC 193 

finally accepted with the tacit understanding that the 
contracts of private individuals must stand outside, 
but that all new commitments under the agreement 
would be communicated to signatory powers within 
sixty days. China took the first and only action in 
this matter by solemnly communicating to the con- 
ference the official text (obtained by telegraph) of the 
forgotten secret treaty made thirty-one years before 
in Petrograd between the Tsars of Muscovy and the 
Manchus after the Sino-Japanese war. Those who 
had already read Count Witte's Memoirs learnt 
nothing new. Those whose reading does not carry 
them to books exclaimed at the commonplace nature 
of the secret — not knowing that all secret diplomacy 
when it is unbared resembles remarkably the empty 
cupboard which Mother Hubbard once opened to the 
confusion of her poor dog. . . . 

Still full official publication of the Treaty was im- 
portant, if for no other purpose than to prove how 
faulty Russian imperial policy had been, and how 
differently history might have unrolled had advan- 
tage been taken in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese 
War of rights freely conceded by China. The docu- 
ment is worthy of being recorded. 

"TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHINA AND 
RUSSIA— MAY, 1896 

** Article 1. The high contracting parties engage to sup- 
port each other reciprocally by all their land and sea forces 
in case of any aggression directed by Japan against Russian 
territory in Eastern Asia, China or Korea. 



194. AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

"Article 2. No treaty of peace with an adverse party can 
be concluded by either of them without the consent of the 
other. 

"Article 3. During miHtary operations all Chinese ports 
shall be open to Russian vessels. 

"Article ^. The Chinese Government consents to the con- 
struction of a railway across the Province of Amur and 
Kirin in the direction of Vladivostock. The construction 
and exploitation of this railway shall be accorded to the 
Russo-Chinese Bank. The contract shall be concluded be- 
tween the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg and the Russo- 
Chinese Bank. 

"Article 5. In time of war Russia shall have free use of 
the railway for the transport and provisioning of her troops. 
In time of peace Russia shall have the same right for the 
transit of her troops and provisions. 

"Article 6. The present treaty shall come into force from 
the day on which the contract stipulated in Article 4 shall 
have been confirmed. It shall have force for iSfteen years." 

It is true that the events of 1898 and 1900 compli- 
cated the effective use of this instrument (which only 
expired in 1911) by Russia in her supreme hour in 
1905. But in spite of the forced lease of Port Ar- 
thur, which Count Witte had so bitterly opposed in 
1898, and in spite of the military operations during 
the Boxer rising, there was ample evidence during 
1900 to observers on the spot that both China and 
Russia were acting in terms of this secret understand- 
ing, several clauses of which had been duly executed. 
Had the Baltic fleet in 1905 invoked article 3 and 
occupied and fortified for five months an anchorage 
in South China, preferably Foochow, which has a 



FROM THE PACIFIC 195 

naval arsenal, after leaving the waters of Indo-China 
as could easily have been done, it would probably 
have meant for Russia the difference between defeat 
and stalemate, — the prolongation of the war into 
1906 being the sole means of exhausting Japan. 
Those among the delegates of the Washington Con- 
ference who had personal knowledge of the Far East 
were impressed by this little flash of lightning into 
the murky past. And as if in obedience to a subcon- 
scious impulse the agenda-paper was referred to 
again. And before there was time to catch your 
breath, Siberia had slipped on to the green baize 
table. 

YI 

Siberia — the land of ice and snow, the vast land of 
knouts and exiles, about which no one knew very 
much excepting that it was very big and very wild — 
was it this that had come up for solution at the close 
of an exhausting session? No! It was just that 
portion beyond Lake Baikal erected into an in- 
dependent Far Eastern Republic in 1920, as a guar- 
antee against pure Bolshevism fouling the Pacific, 
which is entirely composed of Chinese territory 
wrested piece by piece from Peking between the years 
1689 and 1860. It was therefore a semi-Chinese issue. 
The Russian Far East, being economically dependent 
on Manchuria and inexorably tied to it by the thou- 
sand-mile section of the grand trans-Siberian called 
the Chinese Eastern railway, was as much part and 



196 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

parcel of the problem before the conference as Shan- 
tung or the question of Pacific islands. 

Yet for America to try her hand at solving it was 
puerile. The folly displayed during the previous 
Administration had compromised the position so 
badly that all liberty of action had been lost. As 
had been the case with China's entry into the war, 
after a brilliant preliminary gesture in 1918, Presi- 
dent Wilson had been content in 1920 to fold his 
hands and let everything drop in his Paris manner. 
It was as if some evil destiny prompted him to magni- 
ficent beginnings so that the endings might be all the 
more miserable. 

The story merits re-telling. In 1918 the Bol- 
sheviks were not only in power in Siberia but Brest- 
Litovsk had forever humiliated them with the world. 
The Czecho-Slovak legionaries, who had acquired a 
legendary name from the manner in which they had 
fought throughout the war, were trying vainly to dis- 
entangle themselves from the fastnesses of Siberia, 
where strange disruptive movements were constantly 
breaking out due to the enormous Austro-German 
prison-camps and the popularity of communism as a 
doctrine of revolt. The Siberian railway, without 
which Asiatic Russia was a lifeless torso, had slowed 
down almost to inanition. Japan, having already 
written with China so-called "War-participating 
treaties," which enabled her to utilize Chinese terri- 
tory without having to face a storm of public con- 
demnation, was nibbling at Vladivostok. But she 



FROM THE PACIFIC 197 

had not yet landed, being dissuaded from definitely 
committing herself owing to the coldness with which 
her "plan" to give miHtary aid to Russia during the 
Kerensky regime had been received by the British 
Government. President Wilson, about to be con- 
fronted with an accomplished fact, and no doubt irri- 
tated by the amount of money which had already been 
vainly advanced to the fallen Kerensky government, 
invited all the Allies to participate in a joint military 
expedition to save and evacuate the 60,000 Czecho- 
slovak troops. 

The invitation was promptly accepted. Six 
Powers were involved : — the United States, England, . 
France, Italy, Japan and China: and in order that 
American policy should be made crystal clear the fol- 
lowing declaration was issued (in July, 1918) : 

**In the judgment of the Government of the United States, 
a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching 
considerations of the whole situation, military intervention 
in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad con- 
fusion there than to cure it and would injure Russia rather 
than help her out of her distress. Such military interven- 
tion as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it 
to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an 
attack upon Germany from the East, would, in its judg- 
ment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of 
making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. > 
Her people, if they profited by It at all, could not profit 
by it In time to deliver them from their present desperate 
difficulties and their substance would meantime be used to 
maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own, or to 



198 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

feed their own men, women and children. We are bending 
all our energies now to the purpose of winning on the west- 
ern front, and it would, in the judgment of the Govern- 
ment of the United States, be most unwise to divide or 
dissipate our forces. As the Government of the United 
States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military 
action is admissible in Russia now only to render such pro- 
tection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against 

s the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attack- 
ing them and to steady any efforts at self-government or 
self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing 
to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from 
Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which 
American troops will be employed will be to guard military 
stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces 
in the organization of their own self-defence. With such 
object in view the Government of the United States is now 
co-operating with the Governments of France and Great 
Britain in the neighbourhood of Murmansk and Archangel. 
The United States and Japan are the only Powers which 
are just now in position to act in Siberia in sufficient force 
to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have 
been outlined. The Government of the United States has 
therefore proposed to the Government of Japan that each 

^ of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men 
to Vladivostok with the purpose of co-operating as a single 
force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safe-guarding 
so far as it may the country to the rear of the westward 
moving Czecho-Slovaks; and the Japanese Government has 
consented. In taking this action, the Government of the 
United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in 
the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no 
interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no in- 
tervention in her internal affairs, not even in the local affairs 
of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged 



FROM THE PACIFIC 199 

to occupy, and no impairment of Russian territory integ- 
rity, either now or hereafter ; but that what we are about to 
do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid 
as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their 
endeavours to regain control of their own affairs, their own 
territory and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, 
it is understood, will issue a similar assurance. These plans 
and purposes of the Government of the United States have 
been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, 
France and Italy, and those Governments have advised the 
Department of State that they assent to them in principle. 
No conclusion that the Government of the United States 
has arrived at in this important matter is intended, how- 
ever, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with 
the independent judgment of the Governments with which 
we are now associated in the war. It is also the hope and 
purpose of the Government of the United States to talce 
advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia 
a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour ad- 
visers. Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young 
Men's Christian Association, accustomed to organizing the 
best methods of spreading useful information and rendering 
educational help of a modest kind in order in some sympa- 
thetic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of 
the people there in every way for which an opportunity may 
open. The execution of this plan will not be permitted to 
embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho- 
slovaks. It is the hope and expectation of the Govern- 
ment of the United States that the Governments with which 
it is associated will wherever necessary or possible lend their 
active aid in the execution of these military and economic 
plans." 

The United States sent seven thousand troops — 
the Japanese seventy thousand. There in a nutshell 



200 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

was the position which was created: for the only im- 
portant sentence in this long-winded declaration was 
the statement that the United States and Japan were 
the only two Powers which were in a position to act 
in Siberia in sufficient force. Nevertheless there was 
also a British appeal which began in the vein of 
Napoleon's manifestoes: "Your AUies have not for- 
gotten you! We remember all the services your 
heroic army rendered us in the early days of the 
war;" and which ended "Peoples of Russia, join us 
in the defence of your liberties. Our one desire is 
to see Russia strong and free, and then to retire to 
watch the Russian people work out their own des- 
tinies." The British document was signed with a 
single name — Balfour — ^not the penitent Balfour of 
Washington in his Canossa-robes, but the other Bal- 
four. That in the circumstances the heralded re- 
tirement "to watch the Russian people work out their 
destinies" was somewhat delayed and indeed varied 
into an amazing set of adventures from the White 
Sea to the Black Sea, which will provoke the ridicule 
of all future historians, need cause no surprise. 

Japan was on the spot. Time was her ally — ^not 
the peoples of the West. Pending the use of the 
loved instrument — ^the knife — she practised manipu- 
lative surgery. Just as she had done in the case of 
Shantung in 1914, so now in 1918 prior to every- 
thing else she spread out her forces in order to en- 
velop as much country as possible. In this way, 
while the other Allies occupied themselves more or 




MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE MAIN ARE LIMITED TO THE RAILWAYS 
RUNNING BETWEEN THE YANGTZE VALLEY AND PEKING AND THE 
RAILWAY RUNNING TO MUKDEN, IN MANCHURIA. 



FROM THE PACIFIC 201 

less faithfully in attaining their proclaimed objective, 
the trans-Siberian railway — Japan set to work to oc- 
cupy the Ussuri railway, which runs up to the Amur 
river; then the Amur railway which runs for nearly 
2,0Q0 versts along the banks of that great boundary 
river; then all strategic points. Countless incidents, 
varying from the arrest of Allied generals to the 
burning of whole districts, marked her progress ; and 
although the creation of an Inter- Allied Technical 
Railway Board rendered it increasingly difficult for 
her to tamper with communications, particularly as 
an American was elected chairman and secured most 
of the new rolling-stock from his own country; the 
detailed story reads like a tale by Pouschkin. 

Peace at Paris in the summer of 1919 turned the 
heterogeneous expeditionary force, now spread thinly 
to the Ural Mountains, into something very different. 
It became a question of open warfare, i.e., helping 
White Russia to break Red Russia. Koltchak, set 
up at Omsk, soon fell down and fled and was sum- 
marily executed at Irkutsk. It is an interesting his- 
torical fact that he was caught in Irkutsk station 
on the very day and at the very hour that the first 
Japanese troop-train penetrated as far west, the 
Japanese battalion-commander making a frantic at- 
tempt to save him as he was led away. Had the 
Japanese been more honest in 1919, Koltchak would 
not have died in 1920 and the whole Siberian story 
might have been different. 

Koltchak dead; the White Russian movement 



202 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

scotched; the Allies deeply humiliated — ^that was the 
position at the beginning of 1920. The almost for- 
gotten Czecho-Slovaks, still retreating in putrescent 
trains which they had occupied for years, had been 
forced to make their peace with Bolshevism in order 
to get out at all. 

Spring of 1920. Most of the Allied troops had 
long been shipped away out of this horror. The 
putrescent trains still crawled into Vladivostok, rail- 
way movement having been kept up only through 
the amazing energy of American engineers who de- 
fied every effort to check them and pushed on with 
their work like so many Hercules working in an 
Augean stable. The minutes of the Inter-Allied 
Technical Board and its inspectors have to be read 
to obtain any conception of the fearful internecine 
warfare raging endless beneath the surface. Ani- 
mosities were so deep that a complete break seemed 
never more than a day off. The American Com- 
mand still clung doggedly to Vladivostok; but offi- 
cers and men were sick of the chicanery and fraud 
and dirt and confusion, sick of the things they saw 
— sick of a political debauchery which has had no 
counterpart in the present century. The agitation 
in Congress could have one end only. Orders to 
evacuate came at last. 

On the 1st April the last American transport dis- 
appeared out of the peerless bay of the Golden Horn 
with the last American troops. On the night of the 
4th April the Japanese struck as hard as they could 



FROM THE PACIFIC 203 

at every point where the Russian Popular movement, 
a mixture of Bolshevism and so-called Partisan 
bands, looked like succeeding. In Vladivostok, in 
Nikolsk, in Havarovsk, in Chita, it was much the 
same thing — ^gunfire and bayonets for all who were 
in a position to resist. A sort of constituent as- 
sembly was in session at Nikolsk — 500 peasant dep- 
uties talking only as Russians can talk. They talked 
no more. The Partisan forces were butchered 
wherever they refused to scatter. In Vladivostok 
fire was opened on the Zemstvo building from a Jap- 
anese hotel across the street where a mountain gun 
and machine guns had been placed. As germicides 
they were eminently effective. Such embryonic 
forms of popular government as existed duly per- 
ished. 

Was there a close and intimate connection be- 
tween the departure of the last American troops 
and the action of the Japanese? I arrived at the 
conclusion that there was after investigating matters 
on the spot as a member of a Chinese Government 
Commission two months after these events. The 
buffer state, from which has now emerged the so- 
called Far Eastern Republic, was about to be born, 
negotiations going on openly between the various 
groups to that end. The entire territory east of 
Lake Baikal having for three years been overrun 
by all sorts of movements and being economically 
dependent upon "bourgeois" states, it had been felt 
that a non-Bolshevist buffer state was essential. 



204 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

The peasant assembly at Nikolsk, in the maritime 
province, had its counterpart at Verkhne-Udinsk, the 
centre of the Zemstvo government of Pribaibalia, ly- 
ing several hundred miles west of the Japanese ad- 
vance-lines. There on the 6th April, before any 
reliable news of the Japanese assaults had arrived, 
the independence of the Russian Far East, and the 
formation of a Democratic Republic had been pro- 
claimed and communicated to the government of 
Soviet Russia and to the governments of all Allied 
countries. The Japanese believed that the United 
States had purposely evacuated hastily and without 
consultation in order to foster these Russian plans, 
all Americans in Russian territory openly favouring 
the popular movement. 

That the American evacuation was premature can- 
not be contested. The official object of the inter- 
vention, the salving of the Czecho-Slovak force, was 
not accomplished until half a year later — September, 
1920. On that date the last echelons were shipped 
home from Vladivostok and it was on that date that 
the last Americans should have gone, too. 



YII 

There was another aspect. 

Just as the American intervention of 1918 was 
only part of a general policy towards Russia, which 
President Wilson tried to make effective by avail- 
ing himself of the special conditions which had arisen 



FROM THE PACIFIC 205 

in the Far East, so were the events round Vladi- 
vostok and the Siberian railways but incidents in 
the general and permanent Japanese policy of domi- 
nating the Asiatic seaboard. By a lucky chance in 
the winter of 1920, the whole Japanese garrison and 
the township of Nicolaievsk (the Amur port of 
entry) was wiped out by Russian bands composed of 
convicts and exiles of the most desperate description. 

Here indeed was the heaven-sent opportunity. . . . 

Japan went to work methodically. The evacuation 
of Trans-Baikalia was carried out in the summer of 
1920 with a great deal of display, and then came the 
occupation of Northern Saghalien, which was an 
absolutely bare-faced proceeding if there was ever 
one; for as a state of war existed she could hardly 
make the loss of a military force the basis for a claim 
for compensation. Presently gunboats and light 
craft re-established her power at Nicolaievsk and 
carried it along the Siberian coast up to the rich 
promontory of Kamchatka. This killed two birds 
with one stone. For the fisheries were just as im- 
portant as the reversion of Soviet Russia's other 
rights: and so long as Northern Saghalien remained 
in her hands she had the fisheries of river and coast 
bottled up. Possiet Bay — a marvellous anchorage 
situated just at the point where Korean, Chinese, 
and Russian territory meets — was tightly held; so 
was Castries Bay. With her troops concentrated in 
the martime district, Japan had swung her policy 
from participation with the Alhes to a purely selfish 



206 AN INDISCREET CHKONICLE 

one, bearing no relation to the purposes of the inter- 
vention. 

VIII 

Here now in the pure atmosphere of Washington, 
where there was no trace of this dismal background 
of cross purposes and wrecked hopes, the Japanese 
were suddenly asked by the United States when they 
proposed to carry out their oft-repeated pledge and 
evacuate their troops. 

Secretary Hughes required imperturbability to 
V do that. The failure of his predecessors to act in 
concert with Japan had freed the government of 
Tokyo from the corresponding liability. Had he 
been a bolder man with a bolder chief he would have 
announced American recognition of the Far Eastern 
Republic since property-rights and universal suf- 
frage were guaranteed in that State. But how 
could he do that when his government still accorded 
full diplomatic privileges to the ambassador of the 
Kerensky regime who was still allowed full control 
of whatever remained of the 186 million gold dollars 
lent through the instrumentality of Messrs. J. P. 
Morgan & Co.? Believing in 1922 (much as Sec- 
retary Lansing had believed in 1917) that great 
changes were imminent in Russia and that the Bol- 
shevik power was crumbling. Secretary Hughes was 
j really as much tied to a corpse as the Japanese Del- 
egation. It was perhaps as well that in such a 
charnel-house he should have contented himself with 



FROM THE PACIFIC 207 

a long and platitudinous restatement of the Ameri- 
can position in Siberian matters. And as Japan was 
able to declare in reply that she made such a clear 
distinction between the Soviet Government of Mos- 
cow and the Far Eastern Republic at Chita that she 
was actually in negotiations with the Chita Govern- 
ment at Dairen to facilitate evacuation of her troops, 
Secretary Hughes suddenly let the whole matter 
drop. 

Japan had made ample provision for every possible 
contingency. Directly she had seen that it would 
be impossible for her to refuse to attend the Wash- 
ington Conference, and discuss every phase of the 
Far East, she had sent such urgent instruction to 
her Minister in Peking that he had gone in the dead 
of night to the chief of the Chita Mission in Peking, 
pulled him out of bed, and asked him to begin nego- 
tiations in his pyjamas. The actual conversations 
had commenced in Dairen in August, 1920, and were 
going on at the moment of Secretary Hughes' in- 
terrogation. They were broken off in April without 
result when they had served their purpose, having 
been prolonged after the Washington Conference 
so as to serve as camouflage for the Genoa Confer- 
ence. Is not diplomacy amusing? 



IX 

There was method behind American tactics in 
spite of the apparent feebleness regarding Siberia. 



208 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Shantung had to be solved: if Shantung were left 
unsolved the Harding Administration would suffer 
so severely that its future would be compromised. 
The Shantung question was an issue that the Ameri- 
can people not only clearly understood but were de- 
termined about, for had they not fought a Presiden- 

^ tial campaign more or less around it? Therefore 
Shantung was vital and the possibility of the Treaties 
failing to secure Senate ratification was too near not 
to sacrifice everything in favour of Shantung. 

On the 25th January, following a conference be- 
tween President Harding and the senior Chinese 
Delegate, complete agreement was reached on the 
question of the Shantung railway, the formula 
adopted being simply the British practice in regard 
to Chinese railways, i.e., a Chinese Director-General, 
a Foreign Chief Engineer and a Foreign Chief Ac- 
countant with easy terms of redemption of Treasury 
Notes spread over 5-15 year periods. On the 26th 
January Secretary Hughes let go the Siberian issue. 
It was purely a coincidence, of course, tliat Shantung 
had been settled the previous day. It was a signifi- 
cant and ironical fact that the British official ob- 
server who had sat through these Shantung conver- 
sations was no other than the self -same British Min- 
ister in Peking who in 1914 had telegraphed so ur- 
gently to his government that action was imperative 
to secure that Kiaochow was not transferred back to 

^ China, and that Germany by virtue of article V of 
the Convention of 1898 might not reserve for her- 



FROM THE PACIFIC 209 

self more suitable territory. It had taken seven and 
a half years of uproar in Eastern Asia, the ruin of 
a President of the United States, the complete dis- 
ruption of China and the poisoning of world opinion 
against Japan to cancel an error of judgment arising 
from ignorance. 

Never in modern history has there been such a 
singular rebuke. But the rebuke, being a purely 
moral one, was not noticed. Instead, Mr. Balfour 
in a felicitous speech on the 1st February restored 
the one remaining spot in Shantung that remained 
in foreign control — ^the British leased territory of 
Weihaiwei — and so blotted out the memory of the 
past. 

Then Manchuria came up, — first in an indiiect 
form. 



The question of the Chinese Eastern Railway, that 
vital link of the grand trans-Siberian railway which 
is locked to Chinese territory, concerned every one 
because of the machinery set up in 1919 during the 
Allied intervention. It was impossible to take an 
indifferent attitude: yet this was one of the few 
matters in which China had the whip-hand because 
the one Power with rights — Russia — ^was absent. 

She developed her argument with skill. This was 
a railway, a concession for which she had granted to 
a Russo-Chinese bank, under a complicated system 
which left the grantee in full possession of adminis- 



210 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

trative duties of a far-reaching order. The collapse 
of Russia had made it imperative for her not only 
to exercise all her rights but to take over functions 
hitherto exercised by the concessionaires. There had 
been grave political disorders in and around the ter- 
ritory served by the railway. Any attempt on the 
part of the Conference to single out for separate 
treatment this link in the trans-Siberian system would 
be highly unfair. The original inter-allied agree- 
ment provided for supervision over the whole grand 
trunk line from Vladivostok to the Ural Mountains. 
The only portion where that supervision had been 
effective was in Chinese territory with Chinese assist- 
ance. A good point, well-made. 

Finding that no progress was possible with the 
idea of internationalization, the following meaning- 
less resolution was introduced and passed unani- 
mously : 

"Resolved that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway for those in interest requires that better protection 
be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its oper- 
ation and use ; a more careful selection of personnel to secure 
efficiency of service: and a more economical use of funds to 
prevent waste of the property." 

And because reservations have become an essential 
part of the post-war conference, the following was 
promptly added: 

"The powers other than China in agreeing to the resolu- 
tion in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway reserve the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 211 

right to insist hereafter upon the responsibilities of China 
for performance or non-performance of the obligations to- 
wards foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the holders 
deem to result from the contracts under which the railway 
was built and the action of China thereunder and the obli- 
gations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust result- 
ing from the exercising of power by the Chinese Government 
over the possession and administration of the railway." 

Russia had squandered 500 million gold roubles 
in these railways and Count Witte in his Memoirs 
declared that it would cost 700 million roubles to 
buy them back. So when the chairman marked off 
the item in blue-pencil from his agenda-paper the 
question was left exactly as before — an issue between 
China and Russia to be hammered out perhaps in 
ways no one at this Conference dreamed of. 



XI 

At last the matter which had caused the chairman 
so hastily to adjourn discussion only a month be- 
fore — ^Japan's famous Twenty-one Demands. But 
the Conference, after the plain speaking between 
England and France on submarines, was not so 
squeamish, and as one very important group of the 
Demands — Shantung — ^was out of the way, of the 
remaining only Manchuria was vital. 

February opened with some final tilts between 
China and Japan of a more interesting character 



212 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

than the others had been. It cannot be said that 
the Japanese were defeated: on the contrary their 
arguments contained much meat. If China asked 
the Conference to cancel all the Treaties and Notes 
embodying the Twenty-one Demands she was ac- 
knowledging their validity: otherwise if they were 
not valid, why should she seek cancellation? 

It was a shrewd blow. China asked for time to 
prepare a reply which was not so shrewd. The Chi- 
nese argument, after a night of cogitation, produced 
four points which in the cold light of a February 
morning in Washington appeared by no means con- 
clusive : 

"1. That the treaties, so far as benefits derived from them 
were concerned, were unilateral. 

"2. That they were in certain respects in violation of 
treaties between China and the other Powers. 

"&. That they were inconsistent with the principles relat- 
ing to China adopted at the Conference. 

'*4. That they had engendered misunderstandings between 
China and Japan and if not abrogated would tend 
necessarily to disturb good relations between the 
two countries and thus would constitute an obstacle 
in the way of realizing the purpose of the Conference." 

Japan, having already long decided upon it, made 
a gesture in the form of a declaration which was 
solemnly read out in a way which every one ac- 
quainted with the facts knew she would do: 

"Having in view the changes which have taken place in the 
situation since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaties 



FROM THE PACIFIC 213 

and notes of 1915, the Japanese delegation is happy to 
avail itself of the present occasion to make the following 
declaration : 

*'l. Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity 
of the international financial consortium recently or- 
ganized, the right of option granted exclusively in 
favour of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to 
loans for the construction of railways in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and second, to 
loans to be secured on taxes in that region, it being 
understood that nothing in the present declaration 
shall be held to imply any modification or annulment 
of the understanding recorded in the officially an- 
nounced notes and memoranda which were exchanged 
among the Governments of the countries represented 
in the consortium, and also among the national finan- 
cial groups composing the consortium, in relation to 
the scope of the joint activity of that organization. 

"2. Japan has no intention of insisting on her preferential 
right under the Sino-Japanese arrangements in 
questions concerning the engagement by China of 
Japanese advisers or instructors on political, finan- 
cial, military or police matters in South Manchuria. 

"S. Japan is further ready to withdraw the reservation 
which she made in proceeding to the signature of the 
Sino-Japanese treaties and notes of 1915, to the 
effect that Group V of the original proposals of the 
Japanese Government would be postponed for future 
negotiating." 

It was the end! Japan had conceded every non- 
essential. The Twenty-one Demands could not but 
henceforth wear a very different complexion. That 
the two essentials, the Port Arthur lease and the 



214 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

South Manchurian railway concession, the first ex- 
tended to 1997 and the second to the year 2002, had 
been quietly ignored was as much due to the tactics 
adopted as to anything else. The delegates, who 
had been booking and cancelling passages since 
December, were absolutely determined to go. Mon- 
day, the 6th February, was put down as the closing- 
day. 

Six treaties had resulted, three dealing with war- 
fare and the prevention thereof on the Pacific (since 
they cannot apply to non-signatory Powers of Eu- 
rope) and three with Chinese affairs. There had 
been an absolute balance between the two issues. 
Had Secretary Hughes realized this in the begin- 
ning that attitude would have led to a far more bene- 
ficial atmosphere and far more beneficial results. 

As in the case with the opening so with the end- 
ing, President Harding blessed those present. There 
was a last tribute to his abundant good judgment in 
the fact that a supplement to the Pacific treaty was 
entered into which expressly removed the islands of 
Japan Proper from its scope, and left Japan as a 
sovereign unguaranteed power. 

It had been a memorable conference. There was 
only one important omission. The convened Powers 
should have repeated in a chorus that portion of the 
Lord's Prayer which deals so eloquently with our 
hope of forgiveness for the things which we leave 
undone. 



PART VIII 

THE RECKONING 



The record in these pages is the chronicle of the 
first decisive intervention of North America in world 
politics, a totally new phenomenon with particular 
importance in an era of readjustment. Commenced 
by Canada in the historic debates in the Canadian 
House of Commons of the 21st and 26th April, the * 
action terminated appropriately enough in Washing- 
ton with a series of international compacts as notable 
for what they failed to do as for what they actually 
accomplished. 

Through all these things the same strong thread 
runs. The dominating impulse is the common in- 
terest and the fundamental identity of purpose of 
the English-speaking community. Jealousies and 
differences there are which must grow as life and 
life's interests become more complex. Yet the strong 
thread will grow stronger until in the end it has 
the tensile strength of steel. Canada is not only a 
guarantee against the kind of error which is fatal 
to a good understanding, but facilitates in countless ^ 
ways that transfer of power from the western to 
the eastern shores of the Atlantic which is now actu- 
ally occurring. A generation may pass before the 

215 



216 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

process is complete and a proper balance established; 
but the first half of the present century will not have 
ended before it is successfully carried out and a per- 
manent new influence enthroned in place of the 
old. 

This new dispensation is supremely important for 
the Pacific Ocean. Europe is too far away and too 
immersed in its own affairs to concern itself any 
longer with the destinies of peoples on the other 
side of the globe who are rapidly developing racial 
and political consciousness in much the same way as 
occurred among Western nations a hundred years 
ago. The United States has been the first power 
to understand and admit this fact, and to prepare 
for its implications, as befits a new nation grown so 
rapidly to giant stature. The time is not far off 
when the countries of the Pacific will be eager to 
accept a hegemony based on fair dealing. Not only 
Canada but Australia and New Zealand must ulti- 
mately be represented in the new centre of gravity 
— Washington — and by so doing commit England 
still further to the North American movement. To- 
day we are witnessing something very similar to 
what occurred at the end of the Eighteenth Century, 
when the West Indies and the Caribbean from being 
the very centre of conflict and endeavour dropped 
overnight to insignificance because the world move- 
ment led men towards Asia and Africa and the coun- 
tries of the sun. If now as a result of the new type 
civilization which has grown so rich in the region 



FROM THE PACIFIC 217 

north of the Rio Grande, and the vast increase in 
the white population therein, we find a similar dis- 
placement, it is only in accordance with laws to which 
all must bow. 

What are the immediate results likely to be? Can 
so great a modification take place without violent 
disturbances? 

In the fact that the United States is still in the 
making, and that her policy has not yet acquired 
the steady drive and continuity which is a feature 
in older countries, there is a certain danger to be 
discerned. The mixture of altruism and innocence 
so often shown by American spokesmen was saved 
in the case of the Washington Conference from lead- 
ing to openly bad results because certain things were 
pegged down in clear view of all the world and could 
not be made the subject of bargaining. Yet had not 
the reduction of navies and the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance already passed through the 
necessary preliminary stages in England, needing 
only their coup de grace in America, it is by no means ^ 
certain that the performance of Paris would not 
have been repeated. The Washington Conference 
owed its principal success to the fact that it was a 
continuation, under a wider horizon and with keener 
public support, of the British Imperial Conference of 
1921. There can be no question about that. Had 
it come before that Conference it would have almost 
certainly failed. For whilst the government of the 
United States is admirably equipped under the con- 



218 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

stitution for regulating internal business, in the do- 
main of foreign affairs it labours under handicaps 
which are increasingly evident. The weakness of 
the State Department system, and the constantly 
shifting nature of the impulse from the chief execu- 
tive are grave faults : while the absence of really great 
vested interests outside the country means the ab- 
N sence of those spurs to action — and checks on wrong 
action — ^which are the secret of England's political 
success. Moreover, the faulty connection between 
the executive and legislative branches makes the 
machinery creak and groan whenever any strain is 
imposed by the sudden introduction of weighty for- 
eign questions for which the mind of the country 
is not ripe. Under the Parliamentary system, where 
ministerial responsibility is fixed and collective, and 
where policy can be examined from day to day, there 
is a pledge and a guarantee that special interests or 
special whims will not predominate. True enough 
public sentiment can be whipped up speedily in the 
United States; but the inevitable tendency is for 
newspaper opinion to take the place of the voice of 
the people's representatives and for a wild storm to 
arise in place of a steady wind. It needs the thun- 
der of independent Senators to obtain even minute 
corrections of executive illogicalness and the light- 
ning of the Hearst press to show the nature of the 
prospect; for much as it has been the fashion to de- 
nounce the newspapers controlled by William Ran- 
dolph Hearst, it is fact amply evident to impartial 



FROM THE PACIFIC 219 

observers that without that press appalling errors 
would be committed in the domain of foreign affairs. 
Overstatement is good and refreshing in an atmos- 
phere of compromise and indecision, presided over 
by the Golden Calf. . . . 

Until American overseas interests are far more 
widely scattered than at present, the tendency will 
be for policy to be far too much under the domination 
of a "home-guard" form of money-power that is ex- 
cessively timid and excessively provincial. Way- 
wardness of foreign policy will be intensified by the 
type of mind which rules in a country dominated 
by standardization. Standardization in a world of 
endless variety is a sin which brings its own punish- 
ment. It creates a habit of mind unable to deal with 
complexities and tending to be easily disheartened. 
Standardization ultimately leads to paralysis and 
immobility, for by endless repeating things in the 
same pattern a dead level is reached destructive of 
true progress. Standardization is what killed the old 
civilization of China and has left behind a type of 
mind which has made it difficult to give reality and 
meaning to anything new. Everything was stan- 
dardized in the old China — there was a set and for- 
mal scheme for all things beginning with food and 
clothing and ending with the dimensions and style 
of every type of house. The mentality engendered 
by this formalism is timid and halting; and even 
though American policy, because of its essential m- 
nocence and frankness, represents a limitless im- 



22a AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

provement on anything yet seen, it may be deprived 
of its just reward simply from these causes. 



II 

When we examine the provisions made at Wash- 
ington for deahng with China we see that the real 
struggle has yet to come. 

The adjournment of a large number of questions 
until a later day was decided upon because imme- 
diate agreement proved impossible after the faulty 
start. The clause in one treaty which declares that 
in not more than three months after ratification a 
special conference shall assemble at a place to be 
designated by the Chinese Government to deal with 
the consolidation of the tariff is one instance: an- 
other is the resolution regarding the evacuation of 
foreign garrisons: a third the agreement regarding 
the despatch of an international commission of jur- 
ists: a fourth the projected Board of Reference 
which is to sit on debatable questions. As a sketch 
these things are laudable, but unless special pains 
are to be taken by the governments concerned to 
follow up their efforts at Washington, adequate solu- 
tions will not be worked out, as the state in which 
China finds herself is not conducive to radical re- 
form. Already she has unofficially requested that 
the despatch of the judicial commission be postponed 
for one year because it is impossible to allow an ex- 
amination of the legal machinery at such a moment 



FROM THE PACIFIC 221 

as the present. The failure of several Powers, nota- 
bly France, promptly to ratify the Washington en- 
gagements means that it cannot be much before 1923 
that the financial commissions meet. That the Tariff 
in China must be the central theme in the same way 
as it is in the United States, and in all countries 
where raw materials are the important element, is 
abundantly clear to those who are able to appreciate 
the significance of new developments: the history of 
China during the next fifty years will be written 
round the Tariff. The introduction of machinery 
on a wholesale scale means that mass production is 
not far off; and although it will take thirty years to 
set up the thirty million spindles which it is esti- 
mated are required to deal with domestic trade, long 
before that time the question of the Chinese market 
will be a vital one to all great trading nations and 
must lead to desperate rivalries. Had there been 
better informed Delegations at Washington, they 
would have at least insisted that export duties and 
coast trade duties be abolished forthwith so as to 
free trade channels at once. 

All these matters must be taken up anew in 1923 
in China. The men on the spot are certainly not 
of the calibre to inaugurate great constructive pro- 
grammes ; nor have they sufficient imagination to see 
that the old era is at end and that the new one re- 
quires a technique totally different from the methods 
practised in earlier days. Economic questions of a 
highly complicated nature are bound up in the Tariff 



222 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

and in the allied banking and currency problem, but 
nothing which has so far transpired gives promise 
that they will be adequately dealt with. 

The only nexus which binds China and foreign 
countries together is the cash nexus. The symbol 
of that nexus is for the time being the banking inter- 
ests which have united in an international group to 
the detriment of the real source of profit — ^viz., inter- 
national trade. A plan economically as imsound and 
as unworkable as the Reparation Clauses of the Ver- 
sailles Treaty cannot conceivably be the instrumen- 
tality which is to gather up loose ends and bring 
solutions in China, particularly when the issues in- 
volved are of a more complicated nature than the 
issues in Germany or even in Russia. Fatal defects 
within the Banking Consortium, even if it were offi- 
cially accepted by China, would after a short inter- 
val wreck it. The people are unalterably opposed 
to exploitation by foreign capitalists: and even if 
really necessary work such as the construction of 
trunk railways were taken in hand, the popular in- 
stinct would soon rebel against an alien system. 
Without the willing co-operation of the people the 
whole machinery of life stops in China as automati- 
cally as if levers had been pulled: the very bases of 
life seem to vanish overnight because those under- 
lying bases are purely and entirely Chinese. Within 
the past year the colony of Hongkong has been 
taught this great truth in a humiliating and crush- 
ing way: that the procedure adopted there will be 



FROM THE PACIFIC 223 

repeated elsewhere, if similar folly is shown, is clear 
when the growth of the modern labour movement 
in China is understood. 

The way to obtain lasting co-operation in China 
is to recognize that only in spheres removed from 
contact with their daily lives and in matters not harm- 
ful to their own self-development can the foreigner 
intrude. In land and city administration, in the col- 
lection of taxes in the interior, in banking and cur- 
rency, the Chinese are jealous and suspicious like the 
natives of other countries. Instead of attempting 
to extend foreign financial interference in China, 
the boundary of that interference should be the coast 
line and the custom-house. In other words, levies 
on foreign importations are the only levies which 
can be legitimately touched. China's borrowing- 
power ought to be measured solely by the Tariff: with 
what has already been conceded at Washington there 
will be enough revenue to provide the service of a 
debt of one biUion gold dollars (225 millions ster- 
ling) . 

The creation of a Permanent Chinese National 
Debt, with the funding of all indemnities and bor- 
rowings made both prior and during the great war, 
is an essential preliminary to national financial re- 
form. If ever a moral obligation lay upon a country 
to take the lead in this work, that obligation rests 
with the United States. For a people with as much 
at stake on the Pacific as Americans to limit their 
total investment in China to 18% million gold dol- 



224 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

lars as is the case to-day, when the British invest- 
ment is forty times as great, is a satire on political 
prudence which it is difficult to surpass. Secretary 
Hughes has recently said that "the difficulty of 
maintaining an enlightened public opinion with re- 
spect to international matters is very great, and it 
has been increased in this country by the lack of 
general interest, at least until recently, in foreign 
affairs. We have only begun to think internation- 
ally, and we find the attitude of the public mind 
to be still ill-adjusted to the magnitude of our finan- 
cial power and to the international interests which 
we have suddenly accumulated as the results of the 
world war." But precisely the contrary is true — 
at least so far as international interests are con- 
cerned. America's weakness of policy is due to the 
absence of international interests, to the lack of per- 
manent stakes outside the country. The conversion 
and consolidation of outstanding Chinese obligations 
into Chinese consols by American help would remove 
that reproach in one quarter of the globe at least; 
and should not be hard to work out as the gold debt 
of the Chinese people is small and almost entirely 
arises from four political crises — ^the Sino-Japanese 
war, the Boxer revolt, the founding of the Repubhc, 
and the entry of China into the Great War. 

Of the amounts due under the first category — £48 
millions — nearly one half has been paid off, leaving 
about £25 millions outstanding. In the second cate- 
gory — with the claims of Germany, Austria and 



FROM THE PACIFIC 225 

Russia, amounting in all to £74 millions, cancelled 
— about £31 millions has been paid off, leaving £43 
millions outstanding. In the third category — £33 
millions — repayment has not yet commenced. And in 
the fourth category, including American and Japa- 
nese loans, £20 millions sterling, nothing has been 
done even in the matter of securing interest service. 
Thus China's External Debt, excluding Railway 
Loans, amounts to no more than £121 millions net, 
or G. $550 millions, mainly held in England. Though 
funding would entail a considerable increase in the 
gross amount owing to the state of the money-market, 
a considerable margin in liquid revenues would be 
left for further borrowings. It would be fatal, how- 
ever, to encourage the idea that borrowing is neces- 
sary or politic in China except for specified construc- 
tive objects which can only be attained by spreading 
over a term of years — preferably a long term of 
years — the capital provided. It is an incontestable 
fact that any money from abroad in excess of gold 
dollars two million a month cannot be honestly em- 
ployed in China for governmental purposes, and is 
therefore wasted as was the case with the whole 
Reorganization Loan of twenty-five millions sterling 
of 1913 which was supposed to reconstruct the coun- 
try. By strictly limiting the amount of new money, 
and providing it in the form of silver bullion for 
the new national mint at Shanghai, a reasonable 
opportunity for readjustment and reform wiU be 
afforded, and a halt called in the false policy of pre- 



226 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

tending that a balancing of books is the salvation 
of China, when the issue is really an intricate socio- 
logical problem, which only two men from abroad 
have properly understood from study on the spot — 
Dr. Dewey and Professor Bertrand Russell. Quix- 
otic and illusory schemes for the disbandment of the 
military forces will give bankers and officials profits 
but will not bring contentment to the peopla 

The special Chinese conference will be dominated 
by questions of money. Money is everything. The 
fate of the Bank of Korea, the Bank of Formosa 
and the Industrial Bank of Japan, the three semi- 
official Japanese institutions which had their entire 
cash resources raided by the Terauchi Government 
in 1917 and 1918, in a desperate attempt to offset 
the political effects of the action of America when 
she entered the great war, will prove an absorbing 
political issue. It is plain from the chastened re- 
marks of the chairmen of these institutions that the 
pouring of one hundred and fifty million yen into 
Peking has well-nigh crippled them. The acid test 
so far as the United States is concerned is the cor- 
rection of the faulty policy of the Wilson Adminis- 
tration in 1917 which has been so fully dealt with 
in these pages; but that such a test will be possible 
only if there is the great public pressure is obvious 
to those who have watched the failure of American 
finance to play a role in the past^ 

For a bold and ingenious people the lack of bold- 
ness and ingenuity shown has been amazing. It is 



FROM THE PACIFIC 227 

not too much to declare that had British finance had 
the opportunities of American finance in China dur- 
ing the last seven years there would have been no 
opportunities left for any one else. Americans, with 
their altruism, may be inclined to think that such 
a statement is more of a defence for their policy than 
an accusation. But when all is said and done, good 
intentions have the same value in our world as Dante 
declared they had in the nether world. For those 
who fight on the battleground for the victory of 
better things they provide no foothold at all. 



Ill 

Why, if the problem approximates the analysis 
made, did not China state her case differently at 
Washington and deal with essentials? Many things 
conspired against such a course, — disruption at home, 
the memory of the Paris Conference, the absence of 
a plan on the part of the convening Power. Had 
the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty been prop- 
erly led by the United States instead of occupying 
themselves with the overdiscussed and stale question 
of the open door, they would have taken up and 
carefully considered the practical question of getting 
from the open door to every part of the country 
which is to-day the real issue. The open door is 
eighty years old; it was what was fought for round 
the Canton forts in the thirties and forties of last 
century; it stands enshrined, with all its crippling 



228 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

limitations in the fifty-odd Treaty-ports where in- 
ternational commerce may alone be legally conducted 
and where aliens may alone legally reside. But the 
railways, making corridors running deep into the 
country, have in reality cancelled and rendered 
nugatory the earlier conception of "points of con- 
tact" between East and West. They vehemently 
call for a new definition which will make partnership 
and co-operative effort elsewhere than on the fore- 
shore of coast and river a legitimate enterprise. 
Commerce with the real interior is heavily handi- 
capped by the conditions which are permitted to per- 
sist. It is not merely because transportation is 
primitive and highly costly per ton mile; or be- 
cause there is taxation at innumerable points; but 
because the real revolutionary — ^the man who has 
overthrown the old civilization and brought in the new, 
the foreigner — is not leading the fight as he should. 
More and more is he needed — particularly during 
these few last years of his extraterritorialized exist- 
ence when he is a privileged being, about to pro- 
tect and lead. Symbol of the revolution which has 
come, but insulated so to speak against the influences 
which strike down and drag back even forward-look- 
ing Chinese, he is the one person who is essential 
to the continued existence of China as a sover- 
eign State. That he represents what they them- 
selves are trying to attain is proved by all classes 
of Chinese turning to him as an asylum when in 
distress; and thus we have this paradox — ^that the 



FROM THE PACIFIC 229 

very man who is most essential to their progress is 
the one they must officially represent as the violator 
and the disturber of their peace. . . . 

The Washington Conference should have taken 
note of these facts and in return for a throwing-open 
of the railway-zones to foreign factories and foreign 
residence made immediate concessions to China in 
the matter of police- jurisdiction and taxation in such 
zones. The wise pohcy to-day is the pohcy of asso- 
ciation ; of recognizing by measures of worth that the 
new outlines which are slowly but surely being traced 
across the country are the permanent ones and not 
merely transitory features ; of meeting by competent 
measures the necessary incompetence of a governing 
class which must face both ways in order to deal 
with the antinomy between the old vanishing civili- 
zation and the new alien civilization. That ultimately 
the millions in blue overalls now being slowly mus- 
tered out by the industrialization of the country will 
prove more formidable to the world than the mil- 
lions in khaki who so constantly fire their rifles is a 
certain deduction; but they are necessary to increase 
China's resisting power as well as her purchasing 
power, and they are a natural corollary to the phe- 
nomenal rise in the export of many commodities which 
is the feature of the hour. 

From the Chinese historical point of view the 
Washington Conference was only an incident in the 
long drama which commenced eighty years ago, and 
which has many more years to run. The Europeani- 



230 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

zation of Chinese politics, following the Europeani- 
zation of trade and industry, has brought great men- 
tal and physical confusion for which adequate for- 
mulas cannot be speedily found. The excessive re- 
liance placed on legalistic argument and the views 
of professors is a sign of this; for when men are 
confused they naturally turn to what others have 
written into their code-books in the hope that analogy 
will establish the justice of their own case. The 
little originality shown year in and year out by 
leaders who have been educated abroad is a symptom 
attracting increasingly imfavourable attention; for 
while they are skilful and smooth the lack of initiative 
and the absence of any critical faculties are increas- 
ingly evident. It is indeed a remarkable fact that 
a race as intellectual as the Chinese should have failed 
to produce in the revolutionary period a single strong 
personality with strong views and executive capacity 
such as even Soviet Russia has done. Continually 
to fall back on principles; continually to invoke in- 
ternational law as an invincible palladium; continu- 
ally to request back something which it is the real 
aim and object of the Repubhc to abolish, is for all 
the world like attempting to plant down in a Western 
landscape the old Chinese walled city with its crum- 
bling ramparts which belongs to such a hoary and 
distant past. . . . 

Had the Chinese Delegation prepared themselves 

for the diplomatic duel and determined on a plan 

^ of battle in the way that Count Witte did seventeen 



FROM THE PACIFIC 231 

years before at Portsmouth in far more desperate 
circumstances the conference would have yielded very 
different results. Count Witte says in his Memoirs : 
"I resolved to base my tactics on the following prin- 
ciples: (1) Not to show that we were in the least 
anxious to make peace, and to convey the impression 
that if His Majesty had consented to the negotia- 
tions, it was merely because of the universal desire 
on the part of all countries to see the war terminated ; 
(2) to act as befitted the representatives of the great- 
est empire on earth, undismayed by the fact that that 
mighty empire had become involved temporarily in 
a slight difficulty; (3) in view of the tremendous in- 
fluence of the press in America, to show it every at- 
tention and to be accessible to all its representatives; 
(4) to behave with democratic simplicity and without 
a shadow of snobbishness, so as to win the sympathy 
of the Americans. ..." 

That China was still the greatest empire on earth, 
the only nation throughout the ages that has ever 
amassed a population of over four hundred millions, 
was a matter of such vast future economic signifi- 
cance that the implications should have been boldly 
dealt with. It was cowardice on the part of all 
concerned not to have assaulted all along the line 
the issue of the cash and credit system of the West: 
not to have shown in precise and illimiinating lan- 
guage the nature of the economic revolution which 
is forever gathering strength : not once to have drawn 
attention to the great enemy — ^the low standard of 



232 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

living and to insist on the taking of measures to 
deal with it. A new spirit should have heen shown 
in which reticence had no place. Had there been that 
from the beginning, the wise precedent of the Shan- 
tung conversations might have been applied to the 
remaining items of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan 
could have been persuaded to yield much, had her 
heroic sacrifice in the Russian war of twenty years 
ago been eloquently dealt with in such a forum as 
Washington — ^had it been admitted that her contri- 
bution to the growth of wealth in Manchuria has been 
considerable and her aid still required. I am thor- j 
oughly convinced that the blood-stained heights of 
Port Arthur will never be surrendered and the ter-- 
ritorial lease cancelled until the part they played 
in destroying Russian imperialism has been fully and; 
adequately recognized by China in messages to^ 
Japan. No impartial person making a reckoning 
can avoid saying that China has lost something of 
the world's sympathy by failing to understand that 
sacrifice confers moral rights, and that excessive con- 
centration on local issues excludes her from partici- 
pating in benefits which others enjoy because they 
possess the international mind. Too long has it been 
considered by the Chinese official class that foreign 
affairs are the questions which arise from the pres- 
ence of foreigners and foreign interests in Chinese 
territory — not the general question of China's place 
in the world and the status of her relations with all 



FROM THE PACIFIC 233 

nations, great and small. This, in a single sentence, 
is the great irony of the hour. 

Russia is a case in point — Russia that has a fron- 
tier that marches with the Chinese frontier for four 
thousand miles and that has vainly attempted to re- 
new some kind of relations for three or four years. 
China's failure to adopt a positive policy must ulti- 
mately bring a punishment. For Japan is at last 
reversing her Siberian policy and admitting estab- 
lished facts; and the prospect to-day seems to be 
that her crudities and roughnesses will be forgotten 
when China's indifference will still be rankling. At 
any time during the past two years it would have 
been easy and feasible for China to recognize the 
Far Eastern Repubhc and thereby win the eternal 
friendship of the Russian people. Russian action in 
Mongolia and elsewhere along the common frontier 
has been the inevitable result. China's loss will be 
Japan's gain — and there is every indication that that 
gain will not be small. 

IV 

And what of Japan? 

The disappearance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
has already exercised a beneficent influence. To-day 
she stands by her own unaided efforts, owing no one 
a qualified and dangerous allegiance. Yet precisely 
how the partial correction of the great series of 
errors made in the period of the world war will 
ultimately be accepted by the new generation it is 



234 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

too soon to see/ Most educated Japanese are to-day 
aware of the political folly of attempting to erect 
half a century too late an old-type continental em- 
pire: but the victory won at Washington would have 
a far greater repercussion were it not for the sus- 
picion that money-power will ultimately stultify the 
compacts entered into. That the Japanese, whose 
resources are far inferior to the resources of Western 
nations, should await on the real battle-ground — 

1 In this connection it is necessary to note that a prominent Japanese 
J newspaper in Tokyo has recently published military information which, 
though officially denied, is substantially correct. 

A capital contention in the pages of the present volume, that to the 
Japanese Army and Navy China is merely a base of supplies and that 
her neutrality, although now guaranteed, would be treated as of no 
consequence, is amply borne out by this curious revelation which runs 
as follows: — 

"Since the conclusion of the Washington Conference, the offices of 
the Army and Navy General Staffs have been busy in the readjustment 
of the plans for national defence. This programme was completed at the 
end of February, and the chiefs of staff. General Uyehara and Admiral 
Yamashita, have submitted it to the throne to secure the sanction of 
the Emperor. The Board of Field Marshals has already given its 
approval. 

"The position of Japan in international affairs is now quite different 
from what it was at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and this 
nation can not expect to receive any assistance from England or the 
United States. In the event of war, therefore, Japan must be prepared 
to sustain the brunt of war for at least four or five years unaided 
except by the hope of ultimate victory. The Japanese Army and Navy 
" must co-operate and exert supreme efforts to secure connections with 
our western neighbour. 

"In order to accomplish this end, the lines of defence will be in the 
following order: The first line of defence is to be at sea, extending 
from the Kurile Islands on the north through the Bonin and Loochoo 
Islands to Formosa. It is absolutely necessary to secure command of 
the adjacent Pacific, the Sea of China, the Yellow Sea and the Sea of 
Japan. 

"By land the first line of defence will be from Hankow through Shan- 
tung and Harbin to Saghalien, which must be in close touch with the 
main islands of Japan. The Straits of Tsushima would also be made 
a second line of defence in order to carry on warfare over a long period 
of time. 

"As a result of the reduction of the number of principal battleships, 
it has become disadvantageous for us to carry on an offensive battle 
. on distant waters. For this reason the first line of defence must be 
held at all costs. Night attacks will be the main tactical principle." 



FROM THE PACIFIC 235 

China — further concrete proofs of the proclaimed 
altruism of the West before they reverse in every 
particular the policy they developed since the Rus- 
sian war of two decades ago is natural. Quick to 
realize new tendencies, they will model their activi- 
ties on the actions of others. They are an imitative 
people, who have been taught to be distrustful by 
the evidence of the superior power which the white 
races possess from their control of the world's natural 
resources and the world's empty areas and from their 
superior scientific and mechanical ability; but they 
will never be a timid people. At the present mo- 
ment Japanese policy is plainly in a quandary be- 
cause it is beyond the resources of the country to 
deal simultaneously with China and Russia ; and also 
because the raw materials they need are so scattered 
in these two domains that it is impossible to concen- 
trate effort in a single direction. One thing of im- 
portance they discovered during the world-war — ^that 
the potential riches of China, which have been the 
theme of every writer for half a century, are above 
the earth and not below it. In other words that apart 
from agricultural wealth, which is in the hands of 
an industrious peasantry, China is inferior in min- 
eral resources. Asiatic Russia — and particularly the 
territory of the Republic of the Far East — ogives 
evidence of vast mineral wealth ; but the greatest ore 
reserves in the Far East are in the Philippine Islands, 
where there is one deposit of a thousand million tons ; 
whilst the oils they need lie even further south in 



236 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

Borneo and the Netherlands Indies, unless the bor- 
ings now being made in Saghalien prove unexpect- 
edly successful. 

There is thus already a certain conflict in Japan 
between "navalism" and "continentalism" which the 
decisions of the Washington Conference have tended 
to accentuate. The symbol of Japanese navalism are 
the German islands north of the equator, and the 
possibility of later including in the zone yet other 
groups. If the doctrine of the Mandates could be 
scrapped and Germany reinstated as in colonial 
power the waters of the Pacific would appear less 
enigmatic than they do to-day; for it is folly to im- 
agine that many issues have been more than post- 
poned. If the men of the Satsuma Clan four and 
five hundred years ago were able not only to raid 
the Chinese coasts but to establish themselves in 
North Luzon in their Malayo-Chinese junks, there 
is no reason to suppose that time has made them less 
daring with the submarine and the auxiliary ship. 
Navalism or continentalism — both have their advo- 
cates. An organized China will alone supply the 
corrective which is now lacking. 

But an organized China, looking upon foreign 
affairs and foreign policy not as the endless series 
of incidents arising in her territory from the activi- 
ties of foreigners, but as the working-out of her or- 
dered place in the world, is still far off. Even under 
the most favourable auspices a generation or two 
may elapse before that organization is reasonably 



FROM THE PACIFIC 237 

advanced ; and it is during this vital period that many 
developments may come. 

Is it possible for Japan to be really frank and 
friendly with China and to assist her rise as a mod- 
ern state if that is insisted upon by Anglo-American 
agreement? Her action in Shantung seems an an- 
svrer in the affirmative. But Japan went into Shan- 
tung as a result of a fatal error of British policy 
and Japan goes out to correct it. The Manchurian 
question and the doctrine of geographical propinquity 
are bound up with the Russian question. Japanese 
even of liberal tendencies are apprehensive of what 
that question may mean for them. The great fortress 
of Vladivostok, with the military possibilities it shel- 
ters, stands ever before their eyes as something re- 
quiring sleepless vigilance. No doubt Japan's Rus- 
sian pohcy will be dictated by the requirements of her 
China policy and vice versa ; there is every likelihood 
to be in the future, as there has been in the past, 
an elaborate triangular play in which in measure as 
pressure increases in one direction it will be dimin- 
ished in another, but yielding at all times to the in- 
fluences from the distant West. 

Other considerations will enter increasingly into 
the problem — notably economic considerations. Com- 
merce must soon become everything for Japan as it 
is everything for England. If she is to survive as 
a great Power and develop as others will develop 
(particularly China with her contemplated 30 million 
spindles) the burdens of militarism must be slowly 



238 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

dropped. There is an increasing tendency to be 
seen among her industrial leaders to utilize cheap la- 
bour and Japan's proximity to the source of raw 
materials, by putting up factories in China. How 
far this movement will go, and whether it will in 
the end dominate policy, it is too soon to say. 

Japan's trials are not over; they are just begin- 
ning. The next thirty years will prove what she is 
made of. For centuries the race has been trained 
to conceal and repress, and no man at the present 
moment — not even Japanese — can say what will be 
the state of the nation even five years from now. 

The experiment of adopting Western machinery 
without the Western spirit has yet to be proved a 
success. But clever men direct the destinies of Ja- 
pan : she has never lacked of men of character. They 
will pick out with intelligence the main issue in each 
succeeding crisis and bend all their energies to sur- 
mounting it. Cut off from British support by the 
collapse of the Alliance, the natural tendency of their 
^policy will be to incline towards the United States, 
where lies their major trading interest and their great- 
est market. The influence of America must tend to 
make them less precise in their objectives, and more 
inclined to hesitate. . . . 

VI 

British poHcy, if it would frankly accept this very 
changed situation, could exert untold influence 
through constructive action. Her practical measures 



FROM THE PACIFIC 239 

are still superior (at least in China) to those of other 
nations because they are based on sound commercial 
precedents. But the official survival of the mercan- 
tilist ideal which has lived for eighty years ought 
no longer to be countenanced even as a theory. A 
new gesture is required. I believe that just as Eng- 
land took the lead in the establishment of the treaty- 
port as the symbol of the open door so now should 
she take the lead in the establishment of the railway 
as the new symbol. A rejection of the policy of 
the internationalization and the taking of the neces- 
sary steps to assist the nationalization of railway- 
building agencies is the most pressing matter to-day. 

In simple language, the creation of an adequate 
iron and steel industry to build up the railway net- 
work at the lowest possible cost with the fullest pos- 
sible use of native resources. 

Admitting the restricted nature of Chinese iron 
ore resources, it would require no vast sums of money 
to modernize and reorganize the great Hanyehping 
concessions which formed Group III of the Japanese 
Twenty-one Demands, and equip them to serve as 
the driving-force in the general railway scheme. For 
the nations assembled at Washington to record their 
hope by formal resolution that "the future develop- 
ment of railways in China shall be so conducted as 
to enable the Chinese Government to effect the uni- 
fication of railways into a system under Chinese con- 
trol," and then not to take feasible steps would be 
a mockery. The conversion of the Hanyehping en- 



240 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

terprises into a National Railway enterprise, adding 
thereto the necessary subsidiaries, would at once elim- 
inate a source of friction between China and Japan 
and at the same time encourage the mining of ore 
on the scale that Japanese industry requires. Euro- 
peans and Americans in China are continually sigh- 
ing for the strong men who will evolve order out 
of chaos; but what are needed are not human giants 
whose day is over, but giant systematic enterprises 
which will stabilize the new forces and sound the 
doom of the system of loan-mongering and traffick- 
ing in important monopolies still going on. The na- 
tions of the world must reach out and strengthen the 
government underneath the government in China, 
i.e. the people: for the true secret of the order be- 
neath the surface chaos is the vast old-world strength 
of the Chinese commune and the fact that business 
is still very largely conducted on the old basis of hard 
cash. Whilst Europe is languishing under an ava- 
lanche of paper money, China, in spite of the bank- 
ruptcy of the government, runs on hard cash. The 
silver coinage of seven hundred million dollars and 
the three hundred million ounces of bullion in circu- 
lation by no means exhausts the metallic currency; 
there is in addition a copper coinage amounting to 
160 units per head of population (or 64,000,000,000 
coppers) which though debased and falling in value 
represents a very large sum. With a superabundance 
of cheap foodstuffs, making the cost of living infini- 
tesimal compared with elsewhere in the world, no 



FROM THE PACIFIC 241 

matter whether government totally disappears or not, 
the inherent conditions will remain superior to what 
they are elsewhere and give greater promise of good 
returns. 

Still Chinese society requires to be iron-boxmd if 
it is to remain permanently effective. By national- 
izing railways in the only effective way, i.e. by mak- 
ing them the product of Chinese mines and Chinese 
workshops, as far as is humanly possible, they will 
become identified with the people and solidify their 
power. No system of foreign controllers can ever 
be as effective as a system which makes the whole 
four hundred millions the Watch Committee of their 
Government. That the plan will have to be resorted 
to is certain from the way in which provincial mili- 
tarism has now openly settled on the existing railway 
network as the most powerful political instrumen- 
tality and is using it both as a weapon of offence 
and defence. 

The problem of the iron and steel industry of 
China should have been brought up at Washington 
and a formal scheme presented; for the Open-door 
Treaty requires the examination and elucidation of 
such language as is found in Group III of the 
Twenty-one Demands: namely, 

"Article 1. The two contracting Parties mutually agree 
that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping 
Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations 
and they further agree that without the previous consent 
of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the 



242 AN INDISCREET CHl^ONICLE 

rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Com- 
pany nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the 
same. 

"Article ^. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines 
in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping 
Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the 
said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the 
said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to 
carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may 
directly or indirectly affect the interest of the said Com- 
pany, the consent of the said Company shall first be ob- 
tained — " 

Although the clash of 1915 ended in the compro- 
mise contained in the Declaration below which is 
hmding on both governments, it has become mean- 
ingless and harmful in view of the changed condi- 
tions. 

"If in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese 
capitalists agree upon co-operation, the Chinese Govern- 
ment, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between 
the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forth- 
with give its permission. The Chinese Government further 
agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the 
consent of the Japanese capitalists, to convert it into a 
state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign 
capital other than Japanese." 

Here then is the first matter which should be 
brought before the Board of Reference; for the con- 
version of the Company owing to its enormous debt 
into a state enterprise, and its absorption of other 



FROM THE PACIFIC 243 

Chinese semi-government iron companies is a first 
step to consummate the railway programme. 

VII 

Indirectly due to the Washington decisions a new 
storm has burst over China and is spending itself 
in the Chinese way. The Parliament of 1913, de- 
stroyed twice, is back in the capital. The same men 
find that the same problems are no longer there. 
The popular conception of 1912 of a unified, cen- 
tralized Republic has been replaced by the ideal of 
local autonomy and federated provinces. Provin- 
cial militarism, canalized by the railways and des- 
tined to be still further restricted — and therefore 
quickly explosive — as more railways are built, has 
likewise changed its aspect: control of rolling-stock 
and railway revenues has become more important 
than control of provincial capitals. The relationship 
of the provinces to the Central Government has thus 
been vastly complicated by Western instrumentahties 
which are stronger than the men who attempt to con- 
trol them and which are tearing down things with- 
out number. ISTo matter what may be embodied in 
the Constitution — or what federal scheme adopted — 
there is this strange phenomenon which eludes treat- 
ment. Force could cure it if that force were wielded 
by competent hands. But in a country the size of 
China — a Europe in itself — military genius is only 
one necessity: courage is the second and third and 
fourth necessity and money makes up the rest — 



244 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

and of these there is just now lamentably little. . . . 
The abohtion of injurious trade taxation by the 
Constitution — which is another proposal — ^will do 
little to cure another real and increasing ill, which 
is that even moderate taxation in the treaty-ports, 
where most of the wealth of the country is now con- 
centrated, cannot be enforced owing to extraterri- 
toriality. The disorder which wealthy Chinese, as 
well as all foreigners in the country, denounce so 
bitterly is indeed largely due to the fact that nearly 
all wealth is tax-free and the revenue almost entirely 
taken from the poor. If elsewhere in the world a 
similar immunity prevailed there would be similar 
results. The collapse of England and the United 
States would be more marked than the collapse of 
China were London and New York and the fifty 
largest municipalities in each countiy exempt by 
Treaty from contributing to the national Treasury. 
Yet a Sales-tax of 1% would produce not less 
than $100 millions gross, mainly in these foreign 
settlements, and seems wholly feasible, as it has 
proved a complete and remarkable success in the 
Philippines.^ If the proceeds were entirely applied 

1 The Canadian Sales-Tax, which produces not far short of 100 
million dollars, is thus defined: 

"Placing of a tax at a rate of not more than 1 per cent on the 
gross sales of real property, the gross rents and royalties of all kinds, 
on gross receipts of all public utilities, such as railways, steamships, 
street-railways, water, power, and light companies ; on the gross receipts 
of places of amusement and clubs; on the gross receipts by banks and 
bankers of interest and commissions; on the gross commissions 
earned by brokers; on the gross receipts of insurance companies, hotels, 
restaurants, barber-shops, liverymen, architects, accountants, lawyers, 
physicians, advertising agents, etc. ; on the gross receipts from personal 
services, but not on salaries or wages." 



FROM THE PACIFIC 245 

to productive works such as national roads under 
local mixed committees, with sole and imdisputed 
powers to control collection and expenditure, they 
would so augment the earning-powers of the popu- 
lation as to revolutionize business. The real prob- 
lem cannot be attacked until the true opening of 
the country is carried out by such co-operative effort 
between foreigners and Chinese. That sentence is 
a complete summary of the crisis of the present gen- 
eration. China must be made willing to concede 
something in return for wealth-making concessions. 
A different class of negotiators is required, both on 
the foreign and the Chinese side, who will deal with 
things precisely as they are. Ileal life and real prob- 
lems must be attacked. China, who has most of her 
clever men proscribed or living in the retirement of 
the extraterritorialized areas, urgently needs the help 
of all her sons. A general amnesty is a necessary 
measure to-day — something which will re-establish 
confidence and bring men out of retirement. Fer- 
rero, in his monumental "Greatness and Decline of 
Rome," might have been writing of this other great- 
ness which has declined because jealousy and re- 
vengefulness have disintegrated the old order. The 
army in China is not the chief enemy : nor is disband- 
ment the principal problem. Immaturity of judg- 
ment and a refusal to face facts will bring the coun- 
try far lower than the acts of an undisciplined sol- 
diery, which in any case spring from immaturity of 
judgment and a refusal to face facts. The pseans of 



V 



246 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

praise regarding what was registered at Washington 
must cease ; for in the matter of the chief problem — 
China — the failure is greater than the success. 



VIII 

Is it right to conclude on a note of pessimism? 
Not if there is a full realization of the difficulty, tardy 
though that realization be, in the two countries which 
alone can bring adjustment. The United States and 
England must view matters differently from what 
they have done even during the past year. They 
must be prepared for a far-reaching effort and radi- 
cal changes. They must attack the essential things 
and on a basis of association push forward the build- 
ing-up of the new edifice. 

The organization of credit in China must be as- 
sisted, — the government and people need to be taught 
how to help themselves. National stock exchanges 
and co-operation between foreign and Chinese bank- 
ers are required at the chief centres in the country: 
local credit-creations are far more important than 
borrowing from abroad. A unique opportunity will 
be provided by the Special International Conference 
to secure a special national conference to sit at the 
same time and at the same place; to decide overlap- 
ping questions; and to enter into definite compacts 
binding on all the provinces alike. If it can be laid 
down by solemn compact, that the invasion of one 
province by the troops of another province is an overt 



FROM THE PACIFIC 247 

act of rebellion which will automatically start certain 
machinery working, it will be possible to break up the 
system of railway warfare which is the biggest po- 
tential menace of the hour, and is apt to burst forth 
at any moment. The disbandment of all forces in 
excess of legal establishment is not so urgent as the 
return of troops to their own provinces. The loss 
from desertions and sickness is in any case so high 
— between 50 and 60 men per division per month — 
that if recruiting were stopped, the army would vir- 
tually disappear in twelve years. But no command- 
ing officer will stop recruiting until he is sure that 
his reward will not merely be elimination by a more 
powerful rival. 

Chinese will not agree among themselves in any 
single issue for at least a generation unless there is 
a binding compact involving foreign nations as well 
as themselves, with admittedly just means of deal- 
ing with infractions. They are too numerous, their 
territory too vast, and their society too upset for 
anything else to be possible. It will be as interesting 
to watch the wriggling, the backing and filling of the 
nations to avoid this uncomfortable fact as it has been 
interesting to watch the wriggling, the backing and 
the filling in the case of communist Russia. China 
is not communist and never will be. But she is a vast 
series of agricultural communes, with endless cheap 
foodstuffs, where men can retire for a generation or 
two, and wait — wait until the English-speaking peo- 
ples, with their prime commercial needs on the seas 



248 AN INDISCREET CHRONICLE 

and in the cities of the coast, agree to apply common 
sense in a wholesale form and lead others to do the 
same; for economic laws with their inexorable logic 
are bomid in the long run to prove supreme and bring 
justice to the people. 



APPENDIX 

THE DECISIONS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFER- 
ENCE 

A: Arms Treaties: 

1. Four-Power Treaty and Annex. 

2. The Five-Power Naval Treaty. 

3. Submarines and Poison Gas Treaty. 

B : Treaties and Resolutions Affecting China : 

1. The Nine-Power Treaty. 

2. Chinese TarifF Treaty. 

3. The Shantung Treaty. 

4. Resolution regarding a Board of Reference to se- 
cure the principle of the Open Door in China. 

5. Resolutions regarding Chinese railways. 

6. Resolution regarding reduction of Chinese armies. 

7. Resolution regarding publication of aU international 
commitments affecting China. 

8. Resolutions banishing spheres of influence. 

9. Resolution regarding Radio Stations in China. 
The nine commissions, conferences, or boards established, 

were : — 

1. A five-power conference (created by the naval limi- 
tation treaty), to meet eight years hence to discuss the 
question of naval armament anew. 

Note: — In addition to the above resolutions, decisions were registered 
to abolish foreign post offices in China as from 1st January, 1923; to 
appoint a foreign judicial commission to visit China and investigate on 
the spot the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality; and to 
summon a conference of Chinese officials and foreign diplomats in 
Peking, to meet subject to China's request, in order to determine the 
procedure under which foreign military or police troops shall be with- 
drawn from China. 

249 



250 APPENDIX 

2. A five-power commission to revise the rules of warfare 

in the light of the World War. 
S.- A board of reference to consider economic and railway 

questions in China — what may be called the Open Door 

Commission. 

4. A nine-power commission on "extraterritoriality" 
rights in China. 

5. A special conference to prepare the way for Chinese 
tariff revision. 

6. A separate commission to revise the existing Chinese 
tariff. 

7. A conference of Chinese officials and foreign diplomats 
at Peking, to meet subject to China's request, in order 
to determine the procedure under which foreign mili- 
tary or police troops shall be withdrawn from China. 

8. A conference of the managers of foreign wireless sta- 
tions in China and the Chinese Communications Min- 
ister, to work out the details of radio regulation. 

9. A joint Sino- Japanese Shantung Commission to de- 
termine the procedure under which Japan shall restore 
Kiaochow and Shantung rights to China. 



1. THE FOUR-POWER TREATY AND ANNEX 

The United States of Ameeica, The British Empire, 
France and Japan, 

With a view to the preservation of the general peace and 
the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insidar 
possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, 

Have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect, and 
have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: 

The President of the United States of America. 

Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge, Oscar W. 
Underwood and Elihu Root, citizens of the United States. 



APPENDIX 251 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond 
the Seas, Emperor of India. 

The Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord 
President of his Privy Council. 

The Right Hon. Baron Lee of Fareham, G.E.E., K.C.B., 
First Lord of his Admiralty. 

The Right Hon. Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., 
his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the 
United States of America. 

And for the Dominion of Canada, the Right Hon. Robert 
Laird Borden, G.C.M.G., K.C. 

For the Commonwealth of Australia, the Hon. Georges 
Foster Pearce, Minister of Defence. 

For the Dominion of New Zealand, Sir John William Sal- 
mond, K.C, Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. 

For the Union of South Africa, the Right Hon. Arthur 
James Balfour, O.M., M.P. 

For India, the Right Hon. Valingman Sankaranarayana 
Srinivasa Sastri, member of the Indian Council of State. 

The President of the French Republic. 

Mr. Rene Viviani, Deputy, former President of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers. 

Mr. Albert Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies. 

Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, Grand 
Cross of the National Order of the Legion of Honor. 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. 

Baron Tomosahuro Kato, Minister for the Navy, Junti, 
a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of 
the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia 
Flowers. 

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, his Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary at Washington, Jusjii, a member of the 
first class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun. 



252 APPENDIX 

Prince Ivesato Tokugawa, Junii, a member of the first 
class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun. 

Mr. Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, Jushii, a member of the second class of the Imperial 
Order of the Rising Sun. 

Who having communicated their full powers, found in 
good and due form, have agreed as follows: 

I The high Contracting parties agree as between them- 
selves to respect their rights in relation to their in- 
sular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. 

If there should develop between any of the high con- 
tracting parties a controversy arising out of any Pa- 
cific question and involving their said rights which is 
not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely 
to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsist- 
ing between them, they shall invite the other high con- 
tracting parties to a joint conference to which the 
whole subject will be referred for consideration and 
adjustment. 
II If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive ac- 
tion of any other power, the high contracting parties 
shall communicate with one another fully and frankly 
in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most 
efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to 
meet the exigencies of the particular situation. 

Ill This treaty shall remain in force for ten years from 
the time it shall take eff^ect, and after the expiration 
of said period it shall continue to be in force, subject 
to the right of any of the high contracting parties to 
terminate it upon twelve months' notice. 

IV This treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in ac- 
cordance with the constitutional methods of the high 
contracting parties, and shall take effect on the de- 
posit of ratification, which shall take place at Wash- 



APPENDIX 253 

ington, and thereupon the agreement between Great 
Britain and Japan, which was concluded in London 
on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. 

The Government of the United States will transmit to all 
the signatory powers a certified copy of the proces verbal of 
the deposit of ratifications. 

The present treaty, in French and in English, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United 
States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted 
by that Government to each of the signatory powers. 

In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present treaty. 

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of 
December, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one. 

Following is the text of the reservation note, prepared 
by the American delegates and accepted by the other powers : 

In signing the treaty this day between the United States 
of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, it is 
declared to be the understanding and intent of the signatory 
powers : 

1. That the treaty shall apply to the mandated islands 
in the Pacific Ocean, provided, however, that the mak- 
ing of the treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent 
on the part of the United States of America to the 
mandates and shall not preclude agreements between 
the United States of America and the mandatory pow- 
ers, respectively, in relation to the mandated islands. 

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph 
of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace ques- 
tions which according to principles of international law 
lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
respective powers. 

Washington, D. C, Dec. 13, 1921. 



254 APPENDIX 

ANNEX TO PACIFIC TREATY 

ADOPTED ON 4tH FEBRUARY, 1922, AND SIGNED ON THE 6tH 

FEBRUARY 

The United States of America, the British Empire, France 
and Japan have, through their respective plenipotentiaries, 
agreed upon the following stipulations supplementary to the 
quadruple treaty signed at Washington on Dec. 13, 1921 : 

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" 
used in the aforesaid treaty shall, in its application to Japan, 
include only Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island 
of Saghalin), Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands 
under the mandate of Japan. 

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect 
as the said treaty, to which it is supplementary. 

The provision of Article IV of the aforesaid treaty of 
Dec. 13, 1921, relating to ratification, shall be applicable 
to the present agreement, which, in French and English, shall 
remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the 
United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be 
transmitted by that Government to each of the other con- 
tracting Powers. 

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Agreement. Done at the City of Wash- 
ington, 6th February, 1922. 

2. THE FIVE-POWER NAVAL TREATY 

The United States of America, the British Empire, 
France, Italy and Japan, 

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general 
peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament. 

Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these pur- 

NoTE: — For the text of the United States Senate reservation to the 
Four-Power Treaty, see footnote in Part VII. 



APPENDIX 255 

poses, to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval 
armament, and to that end have appointed as their plenipo- 
tentiaries: 

The President of the United States of America: 
Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

Citizens of the United States; 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions 
beyond the Seas, Emperor of India ; 
The Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., 

Lord President of his Privy Council; 
The Right Hon. Baron Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., 

First Lord of his Admiralty; 
The Right Hon. Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., 
his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
to the United States of America; 
and for the Dominion of Canada : 

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Laird Borden, G.C.M.G., 
K.C.; 
for the Commonwealth of Australia: 

Senator the Right Hon. George Foster Pearce, Minis- 
ter for Home and Territories ; 
for the Dominion of New Zealand : 

The Hon. Sir John William Salmond, K.C., Judge of 
the Supreme Court of New Zealand; 
for the Union of South Africa : 

The Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P. ; 
for India : 

The Right Hon. Valingman Sanlcaranarayana Srinivasa 
Sastri, member of the Indian Council of State ; 



256 APPENDIX 

The President of the French Republic: 

M. Albert Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies; 

M. Jules J. Jusserand, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, 
Grand Cross of the National Order of the Legion of 
Honour ; 

His Majesty the King of Italy: 

The Hon. Carlo Schanzer, Senator of the Kingdom; 

The Hon. Vittorio Rolandi Ricci, Senator of the King- 
dom, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten- 
tiary at Washington; 

The Hon. Luigi Albertini, Senator of the Kingdom ; 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: 

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister Jor the Navy, Junii, 
a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of 
the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paul- 
ownia Flower; 
Baron Kijuro Shidehara, his Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotentiary at Washington, Joshii, a 
member of the first class of the Imperial Order of 
the Rising Sun; 
Mr. Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, Jushii, a member of the second class of the 
Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, 
who, having communicated to each other their respective fidl 
powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows: 

Chapter I 

General Provisions Relating to the Limitation of Naval 

Armament 

Article 1. The contracting powers agree to limit their 
respective naval armament as provided in the present treaty. 



APPENDIX 257 

Article 2. The contracting powers may retain respectively 
the capital ships which are specified in Chapter II, Part 1. 
On the coming into force of the present treaty, but subject 
to the following provisions of this article, all other capital 
ships, built or building, of the United States, the British 
Empire and Japan shall be disposed of as prescribed in 
Chapter II, Part 2. 

In addition to the capital ships specified in Chapter II, 
Part 1, the United States may complete and retain two 
ships of the West Virginia class now under construction. 
On the completion of these two ships the North Dakota and 
Delaware shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, 
Part 2. 

The British Empire may, in accordance with the replace- 
ment table in Chapter II, Part S, construct two new capital 
ships not exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) stan- 
dard displacement each. On the completion of the said 
two ships, the Thunderer, King George V., Ajax and Cen- 
turion shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, 
Part 2. 

Article 3. Subject to the provisions of Article 2, the 
contracting powers shall abandon their respective capital 
ship building programmes, and no new capital ships shall be 
constructed or acquired by any of the contracting powers 
except replacement tonnage which may be constructed or 
acquired as specified in Capter II, Part 3. 

Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, 
Part 3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that 
chapter. 

Article 4.. The total capital ship replacement tonnage 
of each of the contracting powers shall not exceed in stan- 
dard displacement, for the United States 525,000 tons ( 533,- 
400 metric tons) ; for the British Empire 525,000 tons: 
(533,400 metric tons) ; for France 175,000 tons (177,800 



258 APPENDIX 

metric tons) ; for Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons) ; 
for Japan S15,000 tons (320,040 metric tons). 

Article 5. No capital. ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 
metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, 
or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of 
the contracting powers. 

Article 6. No capital ship of any of the contracting pow- 
ers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 16 inches 
(406 millimetres). 

Article 7. The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of 
each of the contracting powers shall not exceed in standard 
displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 
metric tons) ; for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 
metric tons) ; for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons) ; 
for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons) ; for Japan 81,- 
000 tons (82,296 metric tons). 

Article 8. The replacement of aircraft carriers shall 
be affected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, pro- 
vided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence 
or building on Nov. 12, 1921, shall be considered experimen- 
tal, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit pre- 
scribed in Article 7, without regard to its age. 

Article 9. No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,- 
432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired 
by or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, 
any of the contracting powers. 

However, any of the contracting powers may, provided 
that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not 
thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, 
each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 
metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect 
economy any of the contracting powers may use for this 
purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in 
course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped 
under the provisions of Article 2. The armament of any 



APPENDIX 259 

aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) 
standard displacement shall be in accordance with the re- 
quirements of Article 10, except that the total number of 
guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a calibre 
exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft 
guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (126.7 millimetres), 
shall not exceed eight. 

Article 10. No aircraft carrier of any of the contracting 
powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches 
(203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of 
Article 9, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 
6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, .the total number of 
guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not ex- 
ceeding 5 inches (126.7 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. 
If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding 
6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is 
not limited. In either case, the number of anti-aircraft 
guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (126.7 millimetres) 
is not limited. 

Article 11, No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,- 
160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a cap- 
ital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by or con- 
structed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any of the 
contracting powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting 
ships, nor taken in time of peace under Government control 
for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or 
as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose 
of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than 
as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this 
article. 

Article 12. No vessel of war of any of the contracting 
powers hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall 
carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 milli- 
metres). 

Article 13. Except as provided in Article 9, no ship desig- 



260 APPENDIX 

nated in the present treaty to be scrapped may be recon- 
verted into a vessel of war. 

Article IJf.. No preparations shall be made in merchant 
ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike arma- 
ments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of 
war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the 
mounting of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimetres) 
calibre. 

Article 15. No vessel of war constructed within the juris- 
diction of any of the contracting powers for a non-contract- 
ing power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement 
and armament prescribed by the present treaty for vessels 
of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any 
of the contracting powers ; provided, however, that the dis- 
placement for aircraft carriers constructed for a non-con- 
tracting power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 
metric tons) standard displacement. 

Article 16. If the construction of any vessel of war for a 
non-contracting power is undertaken within the jurisdiction 
of any of the contracting powers, such power shall promptly 
inform the other contracting powers of the date of the sign- 
ing the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship 
is laid ; and shall also communicate to them the particulars 
relating to the ship prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, Section 
1, (b) (4) and (5). 

Article 17. In the event of a contracting power being 
engaged in war, such power shall not use as a vessel of 
war any vessel of war which may be under construction within 
its jurisdiction for any other power, or which may have 
been constructed within its jurisdiction for another power 
and not delivered. 

Article 18. Each of the contracting powers undertakes 
not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any 
vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become 
a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign power. 



APPENDIX 261 

Article 19. The United States, the British Empire and 
Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing 
of the present treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval 
bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and 
possessions specified hereunder : 

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now 
holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except 
(a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska 
and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian 
Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands; 

(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the Brit- 
ish Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific 
Ocean, east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, 
except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the 
Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New 
Zealand ; 

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of 
Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the 
Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, For- 
mosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or pos- 
sesions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter ac- 
quire. 

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing 
provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases 
shall be established in the territories and possessions specified ; 
that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval 
facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and 
that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the 
territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, 
however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of 
worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval 
and military establishments in time of peace. 

Article 20. The rules for determining tonnage displace- 
ment prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply to the 
ships of each of the contracting powers. 



262 APPENDIX 

Chapteb II 

RULES EELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY DEFI- 
NITION OF TERMS 

PART I 

Capital Ships Which May Be Retained hy the Contracting 

Powers 

In accordance with Article 2, ships may be retained by 
each of the contracting powers as specified in this part. 

Ships which may be retained by the United States : 

Name Tonnage Name Tonnage 

Maryland 32,600 Nevada 27,500 

California 32,300 New York 27,000 

Tennessee 32,300 Texas 27,000 

Idaho 32,000 Arkansas 26,000 

New Mexico 32,000 Wyoming 26,000 

Mississippi 32,000 Florida 21,825 

Arizona 31,400 Utah 21,825 

Pennsylvania 31,400 North Dakota 20,000 

Oklahoma 27,500 Delaware 20,000 



Total tonnage 500,650 

On the completion of the two ships of the West Virginia 
class and the scrapping of the North Dakota and Delaware, 
as provided in Article 2, the total tonnage to be retained 
by the United States will be 525,850. 

Ships which may be retained by the British Empire: 

Name Tonnage Name Tonnage 

Eoyal Sovereign 25,750 Emperor of India 25,000 

Royal Oak 25,750 Iron Duke 25,000 

Revenge 25,750 Marlborough 25,000 

Resolution 25,750 Hood 41,200 

Ramillies 25,750 Renown 26,500 

Malaya 27,500 Repulse 26,500 

Valiant 27,500 Tiger 28,500 

Barham 27,500 Thunderer 22,500 

Queen Elizabeth 27,500 King George V 23,000 

Warspite 27,500 Ajax 23,000 

Benbow 25,000 Centurion 23,000 



Total tonnage 580,450 



APPENDIX 263 

On the completion of the two new ships to be constructed 
and the scrapping of the Thunderer, King George V., Ajax 
and Centurion, as provided in Article 2, the total tonnage to 
be retained by the British Empire will be 558,950 tons. 

Ships which may be retained by France: 

Tonnage Tonnage 

Name (Metric Tons) Name (Metric Tons) 

Bretagne 23,500 Jean Bart 23,500 

Lorraine 23,500 Courbet 23,500 

Provence 23,500 Condorcet 18,890 

Paria 23,500 Diderot 18,890 

France 23,500 Voltaire 18,890 



Total tonnage 221,170 

France may lay down new tonnage in the years 19S7, 1929 
and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section 2. 

Ships which may be retained by Italy: 

Tonnage Tonnage 

Name (Metric Tons) Name (Metric Tons) 

Andrea Doria 22,700 Dante Aligliieri 19,500 

Cai Duillio 22,700 Eoma 12,600 

Conte di Cavour 22,500 Napoli 12,600 

G.iulio Cesar e 22,500 Vittorio Emanuele 12,600 

Leonardo da Vinci 22,500 Kegina Elena 12,600 



Total tonnage 182,800 

Italy may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929 
and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section 2. 

Ships which may be retained by Japan: 

Name Tonnage Name Tonnage 

Mutsu 33,800 Fu-So 30,600 

Nagato 33,800 Kirishima 27,500 

Hiuga 31,260 Haruna 27,500 

Ise 31,260 Hiyei 27,500 

Yamashiro 30,600 Kongo 27,500 

Total tonnage 301,320 



264 APPENDIX 

PAET II 

Rules for Scrapping Vessels of War 

The following rules shall be observed for the scrapping 
of vessels of war which are to be disposed of in accordance 
with Articles 2 and 3: 

1. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such condi- 
tion that it cannot be put to combatant use. 

2. This result must be finally effected in any one of the 
following ways : 

(a) Permanent sinking of the vessel. 

(b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve 
the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and ar- 
mour, and all deck, side and bottom plating. 

(c) Converting the vessel to target use exclusively. In 
such case all the provisions of Paragraph S of this part, ex- 
cept Subparagraph 6, in so far as may be necessary to enable 
the ship to be used as a mobile target, and except Subpara- 
graph 7, must be previously complied with. Not more than 
one capital ship may be retained for this purpose at one 
time by any of the contracting powers. 

(d) Of the capital ships which would otherwise be scrapped 
under the present treaty in or after the year 1931, France 
and Italy may each retain two seagoing vessels for training 
purposes exclusively ; that is, as gunnery or torpedo schools. 
The two vessels retained by France shall be of the Jean Bart 
class, and of those retained by Italy one shall be the Dante 
Alighieri, the other of the Giulio Cesare class. On retaining 
these ships for the purpose above stated, France and Italy 
respectively undertake to remove and destroy their conning 
towers, and not to use the said ships as vessels of war. 

3. (a) Subject to the special exceptions contained in 
Article 9, when a vessel is due for scrapping, the first stage 
of scrapping, which consists in rendering a ship incapable 
of further warlike service, shall be immediately undertaken. 



APPENDIX 265 

(b) A vessel shall be considered incapable of further war- 
like service when there shall have been removed and landed, 
or else destroyed in the ship : 

(1) All guns and essential portions of guns, fire-control 
tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets; 

(2) All machinery for working hydraulic or electric 
mountings ; 

(3) AU fire-control Instruments and range-finders; 

(4) All ammunition, explosives and mines; 

(5) All torpedoes, warheads and torpedo tubes; 

(6) All wireless telegraphy Installations; 

(7) The conning tower and all side armour, or alterna- 
tively all main propelling machinery; and 

(8) All landing and flylng-ofF platforms and all other 
aviation accessories. 

4. The periods In which scrapping of vessels Is to be 
effected are as follows: 

(a) In the case of vessels to be scrapped under the first 
paragraph of Article 2, the work of rendering the vessels In- 
capable of further warlike service. In accordance with Para- 
graph 6 of this part, shall be completed within six months 
from the coming into force of the present treaty, and the 
scrapping shall be finally effected within eighteen months 
from such coming Into force. 

(b) In the case of the vessels to be scrapped under the 
second and third paragraphs of Article 2, or under Article 
3, the work of rendering the vessel Incapable of further war- 
like service In accordance with Paragraph 3 of this part shall 
be commenced at later than the date of completion of its 
successor, and shall be finished within six months from the 
date of such completion. The vessel shall be finally scrapped 
in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this part, within eighteen 
months from the date of completion of its successor. If, 
however, the completion of the new vessel be delayed, then 
the work of rendering the old vessel Incapable of further 



266 



APPENDIX 



Replacement and Sckapping of Capital Ships — 

UNITED STATES 

Ships Retained 
Summary 
Ships Pre- Post- 

Laid Ships Ships Scrapped Jut- Jut- 

Year Down Completed (AgeinPa/rentheses) land land 

Maine (20), Missouri (20), Vir- 
ginia (17), Nebraska (17), 
Georgia (17), New Jersey 
(17), Ehode Island (17), Con- 
necticut (17), Louisiana (17), 
Vermont (16), Kansas (16), 
Minnesota (16), New Hamp- 
shire (15), South Carolina 
(13), Michigan (13), Wash- 
ington (0), South Dakota (0), 
Indiana (0), Montana (0), 
North Carolina (0), Iowa (0), 
Massachusetts (0), Lexington 
(0), Constitution (0), Constel- 
lation (0), Saratoga (0), 
Eanger (0), United States 

(0)* 17 1 

Delaware (12), North Dakota 



1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 

1935 

1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 



.A, Bf.. 



(12) 



.C, D. 

.E, F 15 

.G .. 
.H, I 



15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 


15 


3 



C, D Florida (23), Utah (23), Wyo- 
ming (22) .» 12 5 

J .. E, F Arkansas (23), Texas (21), New 

York (21) 9 7 

K, L G Nevada (20), Oklahoma (20)... 7 8 

M H, I Arizona (21), Pennsylvania (21) 5 10 

N, O J Mississippi (21) 4 11 

P, Q K, L New Mexico (21), Idaho (20) .. 2 13 

M Tennessee (20) 1 14 

N, O California (20), Maryland (20) . 15 

P, Q 2 ships West Virginia class 15 



*The United States may retain the Oregon and Illinois for non-com- 
hatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III. (b). 

t Two West Virginia class. 

Note. — ^A, B, C, D, &c., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 
tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the years 
specified. 



APPENDIX 267 

warlike service in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this part 
shall be commenced within four years from the laying of the 
keel of the new vessel, and shall be finished within six months 
from the date on which such work was commenced, and the 
old vessel shall be finally scrapped in accordance with Para- 
graph 2 of this part within eighteen months from the date 
when the work of rendering it incapable of further warlike 
service was commenced. 

PART III 

Replacement 

The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers 
shall take place according to the rules in Section I and the 
tables in Section II of this part. 
SECTION I— Rules for Replacement 

(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after 
the date of their completion may, except as otherwise pro- 
vided in Article 8 and in the tables in Section II of this 
part, be replaced by new construction, but within the limits 
prescribed in Article 4 and Article 7. The keels of such 
'new construction may, except as otherwise provided in 
Article 8 and in the tables in Section II of this part, be laid 
down not earlier than seventeen years from the date of com- 
pletion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, 
that no capital ship tonnage, with the exception of the 
ships referred to in the third paragraph of Article 2, and 
the replacement tonnage specifically mentioned in Section 
II of this part, shall be laid down until ten years from Nov. 
12, 1921. 

(b) Each of the contracting powers shall communicate 
promptly to each of the other contracting powers the follow- 
ing information: 

(1) The names of the capital ships and aircraft carriers 
to be replaced by new construction; 



268 APPENDIX 

(2) The date of governmental authorization of replace- 
ment tonnage; 

(S) The date of laying the keels of replacement ton- 
nage; 

(4) The standard displacement in tons and metric tons 
of each new ship to be laid down, and the principal dimensions, 
namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at or below water- 
line, mean draught at standard displacement; 

(5) The date of completion of each new ship and its stand- 
ard displacement in tons and metric tons, and the principal 
dimensions, namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at or 
below waterline, mean draught at standard displacement, at 
time of completion. 

(c) In case of loss or accidental destruction of capital 
ships or aircraft carriers, they may immediately be replaced 
by new construction subject to the tonnage limits prescribed 
in Articles 4 and 7, and in conformity with the other pro- 
visions of the present treaty, the regular replacement pro- 
gramme being deemed to be advanced to that extent. 

(d) No retained capital ships or aircraft carriers shall 
be reconstructed except for the purpose of providing means 
of defence against air and submarine attack, and subject 
to the following rules: The contracting powers may, for 
that purpose, equip existing tonnage with bulge or blister 
or anti-air attack deck protection, providing the increase 
of displacement thus eflPected does not exceed 3,000 tons 
(S,048 metric tons) displacement for each ship. No alter- 
ations in side armour, in calibre, number or general type 
of mounting of main armament shall be permitted, except: 

(1) In the case of France and Italy, which countries with- 
in the limits allowed for bulge may increase their armour 
protection and the calibre of the guns now carried on their 
existing capital ships so as to exceed sixteen inches (406 
millimetres), and (2) the British Empire shall be permitted 
to complete, in the case of the Renown, the alterations to 



APPENDIX 



269 



Replacement and Sceapping of Capital Ships — 
GREAT BRITAIN 



Year 



Ships 

Lmd Ships 

Down Completed 



1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 



1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 



1935 



1936 

1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 



.A, Bt 



Ships Scrapped 
(Age in Parentheses) 
Commonwealth (16), Agamem- 
non (13), Dreadnought (15), 
Bellerophon ( 12 ) , St. Vincent 
(11), Inflexible (13), Superb 
(12), Neptune (10), Herculea 
(10), Indomitable (13), Tem- 
eraire (12), New Zealand (9), 
Lion (9), Princess Royal (9), 
Conqueror (9), Monarch (9), 
Orion ( 9 ) , Australia ( 8 ) , Agin- 
court (7), Erin (7), 4 build- 
ing or projected * 



Ships Retained 
Summary 
Pre- Post- 
Jut- Jut- 
land 



A,B King George V. (13),Ajax (12), 

Centurion (12), Thunderer 
(13) 



.C, D 

.E, F 

.G 

.H, I C,D. 



.E,F, 



.K, L 



.G. 



.M H,I. 

.N, J.... 

.P, Q K,L. 

M... 

N,0. 

P,Q. 



.Iron Duke (20), Marlborough 
(20), Emperor of India (20), 

Benbow (20) 13 

.Tiger (21), Queen Elizabeth 
(20), Warspite (20), Barham 

(20) 9 

..Malaya (20), Royal Sovereign 

(20) 7 

.Revenge (21), Resolution (21). 5 

..Royal Oak (22) 4 

.Valiant (23), Repulse (23) 2 

.Renown (24) 1 

.Ramillies (24), Hood (21) 

.A (17), B (17) 



lamd 



21 


1 


21 


1 


21 


1 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 


17 


3 



8 
10 
11 
13 
14 
15 
15 



* The British Empire may retain the Colossus and Collingwood for 
non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, 
III. (b). 

t Two 35,000-ton ships, standard displacement. 

Note. — A, B, C, D, &c., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 
tons standard displacement laid down and completed in the years 
specified. 



270 APPENDIX 

armour that have already been commenced but temporarily 
suspended. 

(Here follows Section II of Part III, giving the replace- 
ment and scrapping schedules of all five countries — the 
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. 
These tables are printed separately at the tops of pages 1021- 
1024.) 

PAET IV 

Definitions 

For the purposes of the present treaty the following ex- 
pressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this 
part : 

Capital Ship 

A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is de- 
fined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose dis- 
placement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,150 metric tons) stand- 
ard displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre 
exceeding 8 inches (203 millimetres). 

Aircraft Carrier 

An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war .t^ith a 
displacement in excess of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) 
standard displacement designed for the specific and exclusive 
purpose of carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed 
that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon, 
and not designed and constructed for carrying a more power- 
ful armament than that allowed to it under Article 9 ar 
Article 10, as the case may be. 

Standard Displacement 

The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement 
of the ship complete, fully manned, engined and equipped 



APPENDIX 



271 



ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equip- 
ment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellane- 
ous stores and implements of every description that are 
intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed 
water on board. 

The word "ton" in the present treaty, except in the ex- 
pression "metric tons," shall be understood to mean the ton 
of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilos). Vessels now completed shall 
retain their present ratings of displacement tonnage in ac- 
cordance with their national system of measurement. How- 
ever, a power expressing displacement in metric tons shall 



Replacement and Sceapping of Capital Ships — 

FRANCE 



Year 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 



Ships 
Laid Down 



Ships 
Completed 



Ships Scrapped 
(Age in Parentheses) 



Ships Retained 
Summary 
Pre- Post- 
Jut- 



land 

.. 7 
.. 7 
,. 7 
.. 7 
.. 7 



Jut- 
land 



















. 35,000 tons 7 

7 

.35,000 tons 7 

Jean Bart (17), Courbet 

1930 35,000 tons,, (17) 5 

1931 ..35,000 tons 5 

1932 ..35,000 tons.. 35,000 tons., France (18) 4 

1933 ..35,000 tons 4 

1934 35,000 tons. .Paris (20), Bretagne (20) 2 

1935 .35,000 tons.. Provence (20) 1 

1936 35,000 tons . .Tiorraine (20) 

1937 

1938 

1939 

1940 

1941 

1942 



* Within tonnage limitations ; number not fixed. 

Note. — France expressly reserves the right of employing the capital 
ship tonnage allotment as she may consider advisable, subject solely to 
the limitations that the displacement of individual ships should not 
surpass 35,000 tons, and that the total capital ship tonnage should 
keep within the limits imposed by the present treaty. 



2n APPENDIX 

be considered for the application of the present treaty as 
owning only the equivalent displacement in tons of 2,240 
pounds. A vessel completed hereafter shall be rated at its 
displacement tonnage when in the standard condition defined 
herein. 

Chapter III 

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 

Article 21. If, during the terra of the present treaty, the 
requirements of the national security of any contracting 
power in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that 
power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, 
the contracting powers will, at the request of such power, 
meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the 

Rbpiacement and Scrapping op Capital Ships — 

ITALY 

Ships Retained 
Summary 
Pre- Post- 
Ships Ships Ships Scrapped Jut- Jut- 
Year Laid Down Completed ( Age in Parentheses) land land 

1922 6 

1923 6 

1924 6 

1925 6 

1926 6 

1927 ..35,000tons 6 

1928 6 

1929 ..35,000 tons 6 

1930 6 

1931 ..25,000 tons.. 35,000 tons.. Dante Alighieri (19) 5 * 

1932 ..45,000 tons 5 

1933 . .25,000 tons. .35,000 tons.. Leonardo da Vinci (19).. 4 * 

1934 4 * 

1935 35,000 tons.. Giulio Cesare (21) 3 * 

Conte di Cavour (21), 

1936 45,000 tons. . Duilio (21 ) 1 * 

1937 25,000 tons.. Andrea Doria (21) * 

* Within tonnage limitations ; number not fixed. 

Note. — Italy expressly reserves the right of employing the capital 
ship tonnage allotment as she may consider advisable, gubject solely to 
the limitations that the displacement of individual ships should not 
surpass 35,000 tons, and the total capital ship tonnage should keep 
within the limits imposed by the present treaty. 



APPENDIX 



273 



Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships — 

JAPAN 



Ships 

Laid Ships Ships Scrapped 

Year Down Completed (Age in Parentheses) 

Hizen (20), Mikasa (20), Ka- 
shima (16), Katori (16), 
Satsuma (12), Aki (11), 
Settsu (10), Ikoma (14), 
Ibuki (12), Kurama (11), 
Amagi (0), Akagi (0), Kaga 
(0), Tosa (0), Takao (0), 
Atago (0), Projected pro- 
gramme 8 ships not laid down.* 

1922 

1923 

1924 

1925 

1926 

1927 

1928 

1929 

1930 

1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 



Ships Retained 
Swmmary 
Pre- Post- 
Jut- Jut- 
land land 



...A.. 
...B.. 
. ..C. 

..D.. 

..E.. 

..F.., 

..a. 

,..H. 
..I.. 



A. 
.B. 

.C. 
.D. 

.E. 
.F. 
..G. 



.Kongo (21) 7 

.Hiyei (21),Haruna (20) 5 

.KirisMma (21) 4 

.Fuso (22) 3 

.Yamasliiro (21 ) 2 

.Ise (22) 1 

.Hiuga (22) 

H. Nagato (21) 

I Mutsu (21) 



* Japan may retain the Shikishima and Asahi for non-combatant pur- 
poses, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III. (b). 

Note. — A, B, C, D, &c., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 
tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the years 
specified. 



Note Applicable to All the Tables in Section II 

The order above prescribed in which ships are to be scrapped is in 
accordance with their age. It is understood that when replacement 
begins according to the above tables the order of scrapping in the case 
of the ships of each of the contracting powers may be varied at its 
option; provided, however, that such power shall scrap in each year 
the number of ships above stated. 



274 APPENDIX 

provisions of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agree- 
ment. 

In view of possible technical and scientific developments, 
the United States, after consultation with the other con- 
tracting powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the 
contracting powers, which shall convene as soon as possible 
after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force 
of the present treaty to consider what changes, if any, in 
the treaty may be necessary to meet such developments. 

Article 22. Whenever any contracting power shall become 
engaged in a war which, in its opinion, affects the naval 
defence of its national security, such power may, after no- 
tice to the other contracting powers, suspend for the period 
of hostilities its obligations under the present treaty, other 
than those under Articles 13 and 17, provided that such 
power shall notify the other contracting powers that the 
emergency is of such a character as to require such suspen- 
sion. 

The remaining contracting powers shall, in such case, 
consult together with a view to agreement as to what tem- 
porary modifications, if any, should be made in the treaty 
as between themselves. Should such consultation not pro- 
duce agreement, duly made in accordance with the constitu- 
tional methods of the respective powers, any one of said 
contracting powers may by giving notice to the other con- 
tracting powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its 
obligations under the present treaty, other than those under 
Articles 13 and 17. 

On the cessation of hostilities, the contracting powers will 
meet in conference to consider what modifications, if any, 
should be made in the provisions of the present treaty. 

Article 23. The present treaty shall remain in force until 
Dec. 31, 1936, and in case none of the contracting powers 
shall have given notice two years before that date of its in- 
tention to terminate the treaty, it shall continue in force 



APPENDIX 275 

until the expiration of two years from the date on which 
notice of termination shall be given by one of the contracting 
powers, whereupon the treaty shall terminate as regards all 
the contracting powers. Such notice shall be communicated 
in writing to the Government of the United States, which 
shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notification 
to the other powers and inform them of the date on which 
it was received. The notice shall be deemed to have been 
given and shall take effect on that date. In the event of 
notice of termination being given by the Government of the 
United States, such notice shall be given to the diplomatic 
representatives at Washington of the other contracting 
powers, and the notice shall be deemed to have been given 
and shall take effect on the date of the communication made 
to the said diplomatic representatives. 

Within one year of the date on which a notice of termina- 
tion by any power has taken effect all the contracting powers 
shall meet in conference. 

Article ^^. The present treaty shall be ratified by the 
contracting powers in accordance with their respective con- 
stitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the 
deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at 
Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the 
United States will transmit to the other contracting powers 
a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of rati- 
fications. 

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts 
are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States, and duly certified 
copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to 
the other contracting powers. 

In Faith Whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present treaty. 

Done at the City of Washington the first day of Feb- 
ruary, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two. 



276 APPENDIX 

To the naval treaty was added a supplementary resolution, 
adopted at the plenary session of Feb. 4. This addition was 
an amplification of Article 18 of the treaty, which binds 
the signatory powers not to dispose of war craft — in such 
condition that the vessels might be utilized as warships — 
*'by gift, sale or transfer." The new resolution, which is to 
be taken as a part of the treaty, reads thus : 

It should, therefore, be recorded in the minutes of the sub- 
committee (on naval limitation) and before the full con- 
ference that the powers signatory to the treaty of naval 
limitation regard themselves in honour bound not to sell any 
ships between the present date and ratification of the treaty, 
when such a sale would be a breach of Article 18. 

3. SUBMARINES AND POISON GAS TREATY 

TEXT OF THE FIVE-POWER COMPACT UNDER WHICH THE UNITED 
STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN, FRANCE AND ITALY BIND 
THEMSELVES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF SUBMARINES AS 
COMMERCE DESTROYERS, AND OF POISON GAS IN WARFARE 

The treaty embodying the resolutions passed by the confer- 
ence against the use of submarines as comimerce destroyers, 
and also against the employment of poison gas in warfare, 
the text of which is given herewith, was presented by Mr. 
Root at the fifth plenary session of Feb. 1, and signed at 
the seventh and last plenary session on Feb. 6, 1922. Both 
subjects had been debated at length in previous sessions, 
and the decisions here translated into treaty terms were 
not reached without considerable discussion. ( See February 
Current History.) Mr. Root was sponsor for both of the 
original resolutions prohibiting these agencies of warfare. 
The text of this double treaty is as follows: 

The United States of America, the British Empire, 
France, Italy and Japan, 



APPENDIX 277 

Hereinafter referred to as the signatory powers, desiring 
to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations 
for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants 
at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of nox- 
ious gases and chemicals, have determined to conclude a 
treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipo- 
tentiaries (here follows the list of names), who, having com- 
municated their full powers found in good and due form, have 
agreed as follows : 

Article 1. The signatory powers declare that among the 
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the 
lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, 
the following are to be deemed an established part of inter- 
national law : ( 1 ) A merchant vessel must be ordered to sub- 
mit to visit and search to determine its character before it 
can be seized. A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless 
it refuse to submit to visit and search after warning or 
to proceed as directed after seizure. A merchant vessel must 
not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been 
first placed in safety. (2) Belligerent submarines are not 
under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules 
above stated ; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant 
vessel in conformity with these rules, the existing law of na- 
tions requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to 
permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 

Article 2. The signatory powers invite all other civilized 
powers to express their assent to the foregoing statement 
of established law, so that there may be a clear public under- 
standing throughout the world of the standards of conduct 
by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment 
upon future belligerents. 

Article 3. The signatory powers, desiring to insure the 
enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared 
by them with respect to attacks upon and seizure and de- 
struction of merchant ships, further declare that any per- 



278 APPENDIX 

son in the service of any power who shall violate any of 
those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a 
governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the 
laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if 
for an act of piracy, and may be brought to trial before the 
civil or military authorities of any power within the juris- 
diction of which he may be found. 

Article 4- The signatory powers recognize the practical 
impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers 
without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 
1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non- 
combatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use 
of submarines as comjnerce destroyers shall be universally 
accepted as a part of the law of nations they now accept that 
prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves, and 
they invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 

Article 6. The use In war of asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices 
having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the 
civilized world, and a prohibition of such use having been 
declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized 
powers are parties, the signatory powers, to the end that this 
prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of in- 
ternational law, binding alike the conscience and practice 
of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree 
to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other 
civilized nations to adhere thereto. 

Article 6. The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as 
possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of 
the signatory powers and shall take effect on the deposit of 
all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington. 
The Government of the United States of America will trans- 
mit to all the signatory powers a certified copy of the proces- 
verbal of the deposit of ratifications. The present treaty, 



4PPENDIX 279 

in French and English, shall remain deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States of America, and 
duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Gov- 
ernment to each of the signatory powers. 

Article 7. The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica will further transmit to each of the non-signatory powers 
a duly certified copy of the present treaty and invite its 
adherence thereto. Any non-signatory power may adhere 
to the present treaty by communicating an instrument of 
adherence to the Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica, which will thereupon transmit to each of the signatory 
and adhering powers a certified copy of each instrument of 
adherence. 

In Faith Whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present treaty. Done at the City of Wash- 
ington, the sixth day of January, One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Twenty-two. 

B 

4. TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING 

CHINA 

(1) THE "OPEN-DOOK," TEEATY 

Nine-Power Pact Declaring for Integrity of Chinese Sover- 
eignty and for Equal Opportunity in Trade Intercourse 

The Treaty on Chinese Integrity, as it was entitled in the 
official version, or the treaty on the "Open Door," the text 
of which is given below, was presented by Secretary Hughes 
at the sixth plenary session of the arms conference on Feb. 4. 
This nine-power agreement, signed by the American, British, 
Chinese, Japanese, French, Belgian, Italian, Dutch and 
Portuguese delegations for their respective Governments, 
was based on the original Root resolutions and embodies 



280 APPENDIX 

further a number of resolutions passed by the Far Eastern 
Committee at various sessions. It was formally approved 
by the conference after Secretary Hughes had read the "sub- 
stantive portions" and was signed, together with other 
treaties, at the seventh plenary session held on Feb. 6 — 
the last meeting of the conference. All the delegations also 
unanimously approved a supplementary resolution, which 
had been adopted by the Far Eastern Committee on Feb. 3, 
and which provided for the establishment in China of a board 
of reference charged with the maintenance of the "open-door'* 
principle, as well as a special declaration by China binding 
her not to alienate any of her territory. 

The main treaty pledges the nine signatory powers to 
help China to get on her feet, and not to seek for themselves 
any unfair or special advantages, and also to respect Chinese 
neutrality; it further authorizes all or any of them, includ- 
ing China herself, to call a conference of all the signatories 
in case a situation arises which involves the application of 
the terms of the treaty. The official text is as follows : 

The United States of America, Belgium, the British 
Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands 
AND Portugal, 

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions 
in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of 
China, and to promote intercourse between China and the 
other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity; 

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose, amd 
to that end have appointed as their respective plenipotenr- 
tiaries (here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries), who 
having conmmnicated to each other their fuU powers, found 
to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows: 

Article 1. The contracting powers, other than China, 
agree : 

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the 
territorial and administrative integrity of China. 



APPENDIX 281 

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed oppor- 
tunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an ef- 
fective and stable Government. 

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually 
establishing and maintaining the principle of equal oppor- 
tunity for the commerce and industry of all nations through- 
out the territory of China. 

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in 
China in order to seek special rights or privileges which 
would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly 
States, and from countenancing action inimical to the secur- 
ity of such States. 

Article 2. The contracting powers agree not to enter 
into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding, 
either with one another, or individual!}- or collectively with 
any power or powers, which would infringe or impair the 
principles stated in Article 1. 

Article 3. With a view to applying more effectually the 
principles of the open door, or equality of opportunity, in 
China for the trade and industry of all nations, the contract- 
ing powers, other than China, agree not to seek or to sup- 
port their respective nations in seeking: 

(A) Any arrangement which might purport to establish 
in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights 
with respect to commercial or economic development in any 
designated region in China; 

(B) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive 
the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking 
any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participat- 
ing with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, 
in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason 
of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated 
to frustrate the practical application of the principle of 
equal opportunity. 

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this 



282 APPENDIX. 

article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisi- 
tion of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the 
conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or financial 
undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and 
research. 

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in 
the foregoing stipulations of this article in dealing with 
applications for economic rights and privileges from Govern- 
ments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties 
to the present treaty or not. 

Article 4" The contracting powers agree not to support 
any agreements by their respective nationals with each other 
designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the 
enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated 
parts of Chinese territory. 

Article 5. China agrees that, throughout the whole of the 
railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair dis- 
criminations of any kind. In particular there shall be no 
discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of 
charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of 
passengers or the countries from, which or to which they are 
proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the coun- 
try from which or to which they are proceeding, or the 
nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of con- 
veying such passengers or goods before or after their trans- 
port on the Chinese railways. 

The contracting powers, other than China, assume a cor- 
responding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid rail- 
ways over which they or their nationals are in a position to 
exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agree- 
ment or otherwise. 

Article 6. The contracting parties, other than China, 
agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of 
war to which China is not a party ; and China declares that 



APPENDIX 283 

when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neu- 
trality. 

Article 7. The contracting powers agree that, whenever 
a situation arises which, in the opinion of any one of them, 
involves the application of the stipulations of the present 
treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, 
there shall be full and frank communication between the 
contracting powers concerned. 

Article 8. Powers not signatory to the present treaty 
which have governments recognized by the signatory powers 
and which have treaty relations with China shall be invited 
to adhere to the present treaty. To this end the Govern- 
mjent of the United States will make the necessary communi- 
cations to non-signatory powers and will inform the con- 
tracting powers of the replies received. Adherence by any 
power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by 
the Government of the United States. 

Article 9. The present treaty shall be ratified by the 
contracting powers in accordance with their respective con- 
stitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the 
deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at 
Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the 
United States will transmit to the other contracting powers 
a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifi- 
cations. 

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts 
are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States, and duly certified 
copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Governnient to 
the other contracting powers. 

In Faith Whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present treaty. Done at the City of Wash- 
ington the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hun- 
dred and twenty-two. 



284 APPENDIX 

THE SUPPLEMENTAEY RESOLUTION 

The supplementary resolution adopted by the conference 
at this same session read thus : 

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Em- 
pire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, 

Desiring to provide a procedure for dealing with ques- 
tions that may arise in connection with the execution of the 
provisions of Articles S and 5 of the treaty to be signed at 
Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, with reference to their general 
policy, designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to 
safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote 
intercourse between China and the other powers upon the 
basis of equality of opportunity. 

Resolve, That there shall be established in China a board 
of reference to which any questions arising in connection with 
the execution of the aforesaid articles miay be referred 
for investigation and report. 

The special conference, provided in Article 2 of the treaty 
to be signed at Washington Feb, 6, 1922, with reference 
to the Chinese customs tariff shall formulate for the appro- 
val of the powers concerned a detailed plan for the constitu- 
tion of the board. 

DECLARATION BY CHINA 

The Chinese declaration regarding alienation of territory, 
also added to the Far Eastern treaty, was stated thus : 

China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking 
not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or lit- 
toral to any power. 



APPENDIX 285 

(2) Treaty on the Chinese Tariff 

Text of the Nine-Power Agreement Raising China's Customs 
Revenue to 5 Per Cent., and Appointing a Revision Comh 
mission to Meet at Shanghai 

The nine-power treaty on the Chinese tariff, like the 
treaty on the "open door," was presented to the arms con- 
ference at the sixth plenary session of Feb. 4, and was un- 
animously approved at that session. The reporter for the 
compact was Senator Underwood, who traced the series of 
events that had created the existing situation — a situation 
under which China received a quota of customs revenue far 
below the nominal 5 per cent, to which she was entitled. Mr. 
Sze asked that China's various statements on this subject 
— ^made at the sessions of Jan. 5, Jan. 16 and Feb. 3' — 
be spread upon the record, and this was done. The treaty, 
which embodied the resolutions adopted Jan. 16, provides 
for the assembling at Shanghai as soon as possible of a 
special commission, whose duty it shall be to revive the 
Chinese tariff so as to make it equivalent to 5 per cent, ad 
valorem, instead of about 3.5 per cent., as at present. The 
treaty also provides for a special conference to take steps 
toward the abolition of the "likin" or internal customs in 
China, and authorizes the levying of a surtax, in most in- 
stances 2.5 per cent., on Chinese imports as soon as this 
is found advisable. A further revision is to be made in 
four years to adjust the specific duties fixed by the revising 
commission to the ad valorem rates, and thereafter revisions 
are to take place every seven years instead of every ten years, 
as heretofore. Senator Underwood, in reporting the treaty, 
said that it might be expected to double the maritime cus- 
toms revenue of China. A full account of the presenting 
address made by Senator Underwood, and the reply of the 
Chinese delegation, will be found in the records. The 



286 APPENDIX 

text of the treaty, which was signed at the last session of the 
conference on Feb. 6, reads as follows: 

The United States of America, Belgium, British Em- 
pire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, 

With a view to increasing the revenues of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, have resolved to conclude a treaty relating to the 
revision of the Chinese customs tariff and cognate matters, 
and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries 
(here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries ) , who, having 
communicated to each other their full powers, found to he in 
good and due form, have agreed as follows: 

Article 1. The representatives of the contracting powers 
having adopted, on the 4th day of February, 1922, in the 
City of Washington, a resolution, which is appended as an 
annex to this article, with respect to the revision of Chinese 
customs duties, for the purpose of making such duties equiv- 
alent to an effective 5 per centum ad valorem, in accordance 
with existing treaties, concluded by China with other nations, 
the contracting powers hereby confirm the said resolution 
and undertake to accept the tariff rates fixed as a result of 
such revision. The said tariff rates shall become effective 
as soon as possible, but not earlier than two months after 
publication thereof. 

Annex — ^With a view to providing additional revenue to 
meet the needs of the Chinese Government, the powers rep- 
resented at this conference, namely, the United States of 
America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, agree: 

That the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, 
adopted by the Tariff Revision Commission at Shanghai on 
Dec. 19, 1918, shall forthwith be revised so that rates of duty 
shall be equivalent to 5 per cent, effective, as provided for 
in the several commercial treaties to which China is a part. 



APPENDIX 287 

A revision commission shall meet at Shanghai, at the ear- 
liest practicable date, to effect this revision forthwith and on 
the general lines of the last revision. 

This commission shall be composed of representatives of 
the powers above named and of representatives of any addi- 
tional powers having governments at present recognized by 
the powers represented at this conference and who have 
treaties with China providing for a tariff on imports and 
exports not to exceed 5 per cent, ad valorem and who desire 
to participate therein. 

The revision shall proceed as rapidly as possible, with 
a view to its completion within four months fromi the date of 
the adoption of this resolution by the Conference on Limi- 
tation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. 

The revised tariff shall become effective as soon as possible, 
but not earlier than two months after its publication by the 
Revision Commission. 

The Government of the United States, as convener of the 
present conference, is requested forthwith to communicate the 
terms of this resolution to the Governments of powers not 
represented at this conference, but who participated in the 
revision of 1918 aforesaid. 

Article 2. Immediate steps shall be taken through a spe- 
cial conference to prepare the way for the speedy abolition 
of likin and for the fulfilment of the other conditions laid 
down in Article 8 of the treaty of Sept. 5, 1902, between 
Great Britain and China ; in Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty 
of Oct. 8, 1903, between the United States and China, and 
in Article 1 of the supplementary treaty of Oct. 8, 1903, 
between Japan and China, with a view to levying the surtaxes 
provided for in these articles. 

The special conference shall be com!posed of representa- 
tives of the signatory powers, and of such other powers as 
may desire to participate and may adhere to the present 
treaty, in accord with the provisions of Article 8 in suffi- 



288 APPENDIX 

cient time to allow their representatives to take part. It 
shall meet in China within three months after the coming 
into force of the present treaty on a day and at a place 
to be designated by the Chinese Government. 

Article 3. The special conference provided for in Article 
2 shall consider the interim provisions to be applied prior 
to the abolition of likin and the fulfilment of the other 
conditions laid down in the articles of the treaties mentioned 
in Article 2 ; and it shall authorize the levying of a surtax 
on dutiable imports as from such date, for such purposes 
and subject to such conditions as it may determine. 

The surtax shall be at a uniform rate of 2^ per centum 
ad valorem, provided that in case of certain articles of lux- 
ury which, in the opinion of the special conference, can 
bear a greater increase without unduly impeding trade, the 
total surtax may be increased, but may not exceed 5 per 
centum ad valorem. 

Article 4- Following the immediate revision of the cus- 
toms schedule of duties on imports into China, mentioned 
in Article 1, there shall be a further revision thereof, to take 
effect at the expiration of four years following the comple- 
tion of the aforesaid imjnediate revision, in order to insure 
that the customs duties shall correspond to the ad valorem 
rates fixed by the special conference provided in Article 2. 

Following this further revision there shall be, for the same 
purpose, periodical revisions of the customs schedule of 
duties on imports into China every seven years, in lieu of 
the decennial revision authorized by existing treaties with 
China. 

In order to prevent delay, any revision made in pur- 
suance of this article shall be effected in accord with rules 
to be prescribed by the special conference provided for in 
Article 3. 

Article 5. In all matters relating to customs duties there 



APPENDIX 289 

shall be effective equality of treatment and of opportunity 
for all the contracting powers. 

Article 6. The principle of uniformity in the rates of 
customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers 
of China is hereby recognized. The special conference pro- 
vided for in Article 2 shall make arrangements to give prac- 
tical effect to this principle, and it is authorized to make 
equitable adjustments in those cases in which a customs priv- 
ilege to be abolished was granted in return for some local 
economic advantage. 

In the meantime, any increase in the rate of customs duties 
resulting from tariff revision or any surtax hereafter im- 
posed in pursuance of the present treaty shall be levied at a 
uniform rate ad valorem at all land and maritime frontiers 
of China. 

Article 7. The charge for transit passes shall be at the 
rate of ^1/^ per centum ad valorem until the arrangements 
provided for by Article 2 come into force. 

Article 8. Powers not signatory to the present treaty, 
whose Governments are at present recognized by the signa- 
tory powers and whose present treaties with China provide 
for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per 
centum ad valorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present 
treaty. 

The Governmjent of the United States undertakes to make 
the necessary communications for this purpose and to in- 
form the Governments of the contracting powers of the re- 
plies received. Adherence by any power shall become effec- 
tive on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the 
United States. 

Article 9. The provisions of the present treaty shall over- 
ride all stipulations of treaties between China and the re- 
spective contracting powers which are inconsistent therewith, 
other than stipulations according most favoured nation 
treatment. 



290 APPENDIX 

Article 10. The present treaty shall be ratified by the 
contracting powers in accord with their respective consti- 
tutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the de- 
posit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Wash- 
ington as soon as possible. The Government of the United 
States will transmit to the other contracting powers a cer- 
tified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifica- 
tions. 

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts 
are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States and duly certified 
copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to 
the other contracting powers. 

In Faith Whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present treaty. Done at the City of Wash- 
ington the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred 
and twenty-two. 

In connection with the tariff treaty, the Chinese delegation 
presented and caused to be spread upon the record a resolu- 
tion which states that "the Chinese Government have no 
intention to effect any change which miay disturb the pres- 
ent administration of the Chinese maritime customs." 



(3) THE SHANTUNG TREATY 

Text of the Separate Treat?/ Between China and Japan 
Which Settled the Long and Bitter Dispute Over Shantung. 

The treaty between China and Japan embodying the terms 
of transfer to China of Kiao-Chau and the Shantung Rail- 
way, together with all rights to public property, maritime 
customs, mining, port and other rights formerly held by 
Germany, was presented to the conference at its fifth plenary 
session on Feb. 1. The history of this whole episode, and 
of the conditions under which a final settlement was reached 



APPENDIX 291 

after two months' discussion outside the conference proper, 
has been told in the main article on the conference. The 
two Asiatic delegations attributed the final success of these 
long negotiations to the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. 
Balfour. The text of the treaty, which was signed at the 
seventh and last plenary session, Feb. 6, follows herewith : 

China and Japan, being equally animated by a sincere 
desire to settle amicably and in accordance with their com- 
mon interest outstanding questions relative to Shantung, 
have resolved to conclude a treaty for the settlement of such, 
and have to that end named as their plenipotentiaries, that 
is to say: 

His Excellency the President of the Chinese Republic ; 

Soa Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary ; 

Vi Kvuin Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary; and 
Chung-Hui Wang, former Minister of Justice; 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; 
Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister of the Navy ; 

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary; and 

Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Aff^airs ; 
Who, having coimrnvnicated to each other their respective 
full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed 
upon the following articles: 

I, THE FORMER GERMAN-LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAQ-CHAU 

1. Japan shall restore to China the formjer German leased 
territory of Kiao-Chau. 

2. The Governments of Japan and China shall each ap- 
point a commission with powers to make and carry out de- 
tailed arrangements relating to the transfer of the adminis- 
tration and of public property in the said territory and to 



292 APPENDIX 

settle other matters equally requiring adjustment. For 
such purposes the Japanese and Chinese comjmissions shall 
meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present 
agreement. 

3. The said transfer and adjustment shall be completed 
as soon as possible, and in any case not later than six months 
from, the date of the coming into force of this agreement. 

4. The Japanese Government agrees to hand over to the 
Chinese Government, upon the transfer to China of the 
administration of the former German leased territory of 
Kiao-Chau, such archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and 
other documents, in the possession of Japan or certified 
copies thereof, as may be necessary for the said transfer, 
as well as those that may be useful for the administration 
by China, after such transfer, of that territory, and of the 
fifty-kilometre zone around Kiao-Chau Bay. 

n. PUBLIC PROPERTIES 

1. The Government of Japan undertakes to transfer to 
the Government of China all public properties, including 
land, buildings, works or establishments in the leased terri- 
tory of Kiao-Chau, whether formerly possessed by the Ger- 
man authorities or purchased or constructed by the Japanese 
authorities during the Japanese administration of the said 
territory, save those indicated in this article (Paragraph 3) 
of this treaty. 

2. In the transfer of such public properties no compensa- 
tion will be claimed from the Government of China except (1) 
for those purchased or constructed by the Japanese author- 
ities and also (2) for the improvement on or additions to 
those formerly possessed by the German authorities. With 
regard to cases under these two categories, the Government 
of China shall refund a fair and equitable proportion of 
the expenses actually incurred by the Government of Japan 



APPENDIX 293 

for such properties specified in (1) or such improvements or 
addition specified in (2), having regard tO' the principle of 
depreciation. 

S. It is agreed that such public properties in the leased 
territory of Kiao-Chau as are required for the Japanese 
Consulate to be established in Tsing-tao shall be retained by 
the Government of Japan, and that those required more 
especially for the benefit of the Japanese community, includ- 
ing public schools, shrines and cemeteries, shall be left in the 
hands of the said community. 

Details of such matters shall be arranged by the joint 
commission provided for in an article of this treaty. 

ni. JAPANESE TROOPS 

The Japanese troops, including gendarmes now stationed 
along the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, 
shall be withdrawn as soon as the Chinese police or military 
force shall have been sent to take over the protection of the 
railway. 

The disposition of the Chinese police or military force and 
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops under the foregoing 
provisions may be effected in sections. The date of the com- 
pletion of such process for each section shall be arranged in 
advance between the competent authorities of Japan and 
China. The entire withdrawal of such Japanese troops shall 
be effected if possible within three months, and, in any case, 
not later than six months from the date of the signature 
of the present agreement. 

The Japanese garrison at Tsing-tao shall be completely 
withdrawn, simultaneously, if possible, with the transfer of 
the administration of the leased territory of Kiao-Chau to 
China, and in any case not later than thirty days from the 
date of such transfer. 



294 APPENDIX 

IV. THE MARITIME CUSTOMS 

1. It is agreed that upon the coming into force of the 
present treaty the Custom House of Tsing-tao shall be 
made an integral part of the Chinese maritime customs. 

2. It is understood that the provisional agreement of 
Aug. 6, 1915, between Japan and China relative to the 
maritime customs office at Tsing-tao will cease to be effec- 
tive upon the coming into force of the present treaty. 

V. THE TSING-TAO-TSINANEIT RAILWAY 

1. Japan shall transfer to China the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu 
Railway and its branches, together with all the properties 
appurtenant thereto, including wharves, warehouses and other 
similar properties. 

2. China, on her part, undertates to reimburse to Japan 
the actual value of the railway properties mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph. The actual value to be so reimbursed 
shall consist of the sum of 53,406,141 gold marks (which 
is the assessed value of such portion of the said properties 
as was left behind by the Germans), or its equivalent, plus 
the amount which Japan, during her administration of the 
railway, has actually expended for permanent improvements 
on or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allow- 
ance for depreciation. It is understood that no charge 
will be made with respect to the wharves, warehouses and 
other simjilar properties mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this 
article, except for such permanent improvements on or addi- 
tions to them as may have been made by Japan during her 
administration of the railway, less a suitable allowance for 
depreciation. 

3. The Government of Japan and the Government of 
China shall each appoint three commissioners to form a 
joint railway commission, with powers to appraise the actual 



APPENDIX 295 

value of the railway properties on the basis defined in the 
preceding paragraph, and to arrange the transfer of the 
said properties. 

4. Such transfer shall be completed as soon as possible, 
and, in any case, not later than nine months from the date 
of the coming into force of the present agreement. 

5. To effect the reimbursement under Paragraph 2 of 
this article, China shall sim;ultaneously with the completion 
of the transfer of the railway properties, deliver to Japan 
Chinese Government Treasury notes, secured on the proper- 
ties and revenues of the railway, and running for a period 
of fifteen years, but redeemable at the option of China at 
the end of five years from the date of the delivery of the 
Treasury notes, or at any time thereafter upon six months' 
previous notice. 

6. Pending the redemption of the said Treasury notes, 
the Chinese Government will select and appoint, for so long 
a period as the said notes remain unredeemed, a Japanese 
subject to the post of traffic manager and another Japanese 
subject to be chief accountant jointly with the Chinese chief 
accountant with co-ordinate functions. These officials shall 
all be under the direction, control and supervision of the 
Chinese managing director, and removable for cause. 

7. Financial details of a technical character relating 
to the said Treasury notes, not provided for in this article, 
shall be determined in mutual accord between the Japanese 
and Chinese authorities as soon as possible, and, in any case, 
not later than six months from the date of the coming into 
force of the present agreement. 

VI. THE EXTENSIONS OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY 

It is agreed that the concessions relating to the two ex- 
tensions of the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway, namely, the 
Tsinanfu-Shunteh and the Kaomi-Hsuchowfu lines, will be 



296 APPENDIX 

thrown open for the common activity of an international 
financial group, on terms to be arranged between the Chinese 
Government and the said group. 



Vn. AMINES 

The mines of Tsechuan, Fangtse and Chinlingchen, for 
which the mining rights were formerly granted by China to 
Germany, shall be handed to a company to be formed by a 
special charter of the Chinese Government, in which the 
Japanese capital may not exceed the amount of the Chinese 
capital. The mode and terms of such arrangement shall 
be determined by the Chinese and Japanese commissions 
which are to be appointed for that purpose and which shall 
meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present 
agreement. 

VIII. OPENING OF THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY 

The Japanese Government declares that it has no intention 
of seeking the establishment of an exclusive Japanese set- 
tlement or of an international settlemient in Tsing-tao. 

The Chinese Government, on its part, declares that the 
entire area of the former German leased territory of Kiao- 
Chau will be opened to foreign trade, and that foreigners 
will be permitted freely to reside and carry on commerce, 
industry, and other lawful pursuits within such area. 

The vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by for- 
eign nationals in said area, whether under the German regime 
or during the Japanese military occupation, will be re- 
spected. 

All questions relating to the status or validity of such 
vested rights acquired by Japanese nationals shall be ar- 
ranged by the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission. 



APPENDIX 297 

IX. SALT INDUSTRY 

Whereas, the salt industry is a Government monopoly in 
China, it is agreed that the interests of Japanese companies 
of Japanese nationals actually engaged in the said industry 
along the coast of Kiao-Chau Bay are to be purchased by 
the Chinese Government on paymjent of fair compensation, 
and that exportation to Japan of a quantity of salt pro- 
duced'by the said industry along the said coast is to be per- 
mitted on reasonable terms. Arrangements for the above 
purposes, including the transfer of said interests to the 
Chinese Government, shall be completed by the Chinese 
and Japanese commissions as soon as possible, and in 
any case not later than six months from date of the com- 
ing into force of the present agreement. 

X. SUBMARINE CABLES 

Japan declares that all the rights, titles and privileges 
concerning former German submarine cables between Tsing- 
tao and Chefoo, and between Tsing-tao and Shanghai, are 
vested in China, with the exception of those portions of the 
said two cables which have been utilized by the Japanese 
Government for the laying of a cable between Tsing-tao and 
Sasebo — it being understood that the question relating to 
the landing and operation at Tsing-tao and the said Tsing- 
tao-Sasebo cable shall be arranged by the Chinese and Japa- 
nese commissions as subject to the terms of the existing con- 
tracts to which China is a party. 

XI. ^WIRELESS STATIONS 

The Japanese wireless stations at Tsing-tao anid Tsinanfu 
shall be transferred to China upon the withdrawal of the 
Japanese troops at those two places, respectively, with fair 



298 APPENDIX 

compensation for the value of these stations. The details 
of such transfer and compensation shall be arranged bj 
the Chinese and Japanese commissions. 



ANNEXES 

7. Preferential Rights — Japan declares that she re- 
nounces all preferential rights with regard to foreign assist- 
ance in persons, capital and material, stipulated in the Sino- 
German Treaty of March 6, 1898. 

//. Public Enterprises — Enterprises relating to electric 
light, telephone, stock yards, &c., shall be handed over to 
the Chinese Government, with the understanding that the 
stock yard, electric light and laundry enterprises are, in turn, 
to be handed over to the municipal government of Tsing-tao, 
which will form Chinese corporations in conformity with the 
Chinese Company law to manage them, under municipal super- 
vision and regulations. 

///. Telephones — 1. The Japanese Government agrees to 
turn over to the Chinese Government the telephone enter- 
prise in the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau. 

2. As regards such telephone entei'prise, the Chinese Gov- 
ernment will give due consideration to requests from the for- 
eign community at Tsing-tao for such extensions and im- 
provements as may be reasonably required by the general 
interests of the public. 

IV. Public Works — The Chinese Government declares 
that in the management and maintenance of the public works 
in Tsing-tao, such as roads, waterworks, parks, drainage, 
sanitary equipment, &c., handed over to the Chinese Govern- 
ment by the Japanese Government, the foreign community 
in Tsing-tao shall have fair representation. 

V. Maritime Customs — The Chinese Government declares 
that it will move the Inspector General of the Chinese mari- 
time customs to permit the Japanese traders at Tsing-tao to 



APPENDIX 299 

comimunicate with the said customs in the Japanese language, 
and, in the selection of a suitable staff for the Tsing-tao 
customs, to give consideration within the limits of its estab- 
lished service regulations to the diverse needs of the trade 
of Tsing-tao. 

VI. The Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway — Should the Joint 
Railway Commission fail to reach an agreement on any of 
the matter entrusted to its charge, the points at issue shall 
be taken up by the two Governments for discussion and ad- 
justment by means of diplomacy. In the determination of 
such points the two Governments shall, if necessary, obtain 
recommendations of an expert or experts of a third power or 
powers who shall be designated in mutual agreement with 
each other. 

VII. Extension of tlie Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway. — ^The 
Japanese Government has no intention of claiming that the 
option for the construction of the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway 
should be thrown open for the comjnon activity of the inter- 
national financial consortium if that railway is to be con- 
structed with Chinese capital. 

VIII. Opening of the Former Leased Territory — The Chi- 
nese Government declares that, pending the enactment and 
general application of laws regulating the system of local 
self-government in China, the Chinese local authorities will 
ascertain the views of the foreign residents in the former 
German leased territory of Kiao-Chau in such municipal 
matters as may directly afpect their welfare and interests. 

SPECIAL UNDERSTANDINGS 

The four following special understandings, as recorded in 
the minutes of the conversations, and as explained by Secre- 
tary Hughes at the plenary session of Feb. 1, form a part 
of the conclusions reached: 

1. It is understood that on taking over the railway, the 



j 



300 APPENDIX 

Chinese authorities shall have full power and discretion to 
continue to remove the present employes of Japanese nation- 
ality in the service of the railway and that reasonable notice 
may be given before the date of the transfer of the railway. 
Detailed arrangements regarding the replacement to take 
effect immediately on the transfer of the railway to China are 
to be nxade by the Chinese and Japanese authorities. 

2. It is understood (1) that the entire subordinate staff 
of the Japanese traffic manager and of the Japanese chief 
accountant is to be appointed by the Chinese Managing 
Director; and (2) that after two years and a half from the 
date of the transfer of the railway, the Chinese Government 
may appoint an assistant traffic manager of Chinese nation- 
ality, for the period of two years and a half, and that such 
assistant Chinese traffic manager may also be appointed at 
any time after six months' notice for the redempion of the 
Treasury notes is given. 

3. The Japanese delegation declares that Japan has no 
intention to claim that China is under any obligation to 
appoint Japanese nationals as members of the said subordi- 
nate staff. 

4. It is understood that the redemption of the said Treas- 
ury notes will not be effected with funds raised from any 
source other than Chinese. 



(4) Resolution 

Regarding a Board of Reference to Serve the Principle of 
the Open Door in China. 

I. With a view to applying more effectually the prin- 
ciples of the open door or equality of opportunity in China 
for the trade and industry of all nations, the powers other 
than China represented at this conference agree: 

(a) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking 



APPENDIX 301 

any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour 
of their interests any general superiority of right with re- 
spect to commercial or economic development in any desig- 
nated region of China ; 

(b) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking 
any such monopoly or preferences as would deprive other 
nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade 
or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese 
Government or with any local authority in any category or 
public enterprise which by reason of its scope, duration or 
geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the principle 
of equal opportunity. 

It is understood that this agreement is not to be so con- 
strued as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or 
rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular 
commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the en- 
couragement of invention and research. 

II. The Chinese Government takes note of the above 
agreement and declares its intention of being guided by the 
same principles in dealing with applications for economic 
right and privileges from Governments and nationals of all 
foreign countries whether parties to that agreement or not. 

III. The powers, including China, represented at this 
conference agree in principle to the establishment in China 
of a Board of Reference to which any question arising on the 
above agreement and declaration may be referred for inves-y 
tigation and report. (A detailed scheme for the constitu- 
tion of the board shall be formed by the special conference 
referred to in Article I of the convention on Chinese customs 
duties.) 

(5) Railway Resolutions op 19th January 

(a) The Chinese Government declares that throughout 
the whole of the railways in China it will not exercise or 



302 APPENDIX 

permit any unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular 
there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or in- 
direct, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground 
of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which 
or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership 
of goods or the country from which or to which they are 
consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or 
other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or 
after their transport on the Chinese railways. 

The other powers represented at this conference take 
note of the above declaration and make a corresponding dec- 
laration in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over 
which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise 
any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement 
or otherwise. 

Any question arising under this declaration may be re- 
ferred by any of the powers concerned to the Board of 
Reference, when established, for consideration and report. 

(b) The resolution for railway unification, as finally 
adopted, read thus: 

The powers represented in this conference record their 
hope that, to the utmost degree consistent with legitimate 
existing rights, the future development of railways in China 
shall be so conducted as to enable the Chinese Government 
to effect the unification of the railways into a railway sys- 
tem under Chinese control, with such foreign financial and 
technical assistance as may prove necessary in the interests 
of that system. 

(6) REsoiiUTioN Regarding Reduction of China's Armies 

Whereas the powers attending this conference have been 
deeply impressed with the severe drain on the public revenue 
of China through the maintenance in various parts of the 
country of military forces, excessive in number and con- 



APPENDIX 303 

trolled by the military chiefs of the provinces without co- 
ordination ; and 

Whereas the continued maintenance of these forces appears 
to be mainly responsible for China's present unsettled politi- 
cal conditions ; and 

Whereas it is felt that large and prompt reductions of 
these forces will not only advance the cause of China's 
political unity and economic development, but will hasten her 
financial rehabilitation ; 

Therefore, without any intention to interfere in the inter- 
nal problems of China, but animated by the sincere desire to 
see China develop and maintain for herself an effective and 
stable Government, alike in her own interest and in the 
general interest of trade ; and being inspired by the spirit of 
this conference, whose aim is to reduce, through the limi- 
tation of armaments, the enormous disbursements wliich man- 
ifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon 
enterprise and national prosperity; it is 

Resolved, That this conference express to China the ear- 
nest hope that immediate and effective steps may be taken 
by the Chinese Government to reduce the aforesaid military 
forces and expenditures. 

(7) Resoltition Regakding Publication op Ali. Intee- 
NATiONAii Agreements 

The powers represented in this conference, considering it 
desirable that there should hereafter be full publicity with 
respect to all matters affecting the political and other inter- 
national obligations of China and of the several powers in 
relation to China, are agreed as follows : 



The seven powers other than China will, at their earliest 
convenience, file with the Secretariat General of the confer- 



304 APPENDIX 

ence for transmission to the participating powers a list of all 
treaties, conventions, exchange of notes or other inter- 
national agreements which they may have with China, or with 
any other power or powers in relation to China, which they 
deem to be still in force and upon which they may desire 
to rely. In each case citations will be given to any official or 
other publication in which an authoritative text of the docu- 
ments may be found. In any case in which the document 
may not have been published, a copy of the text (in its orig- 
inal language or languages) will be filed with the Secre- 
tariat General of the conference. 

Every treaty or other international agreement of the char- 
acter described which may be concluded hereafter shall be 
notified by the Governments concerned within sixty days of 
its conclusion to the powers who are signatories of or adher- 
ents to this agreement. 



The several powers other than China will file with the Sec- 
retariat General of the conference at their earliest conveni- 
ence for transmission to the participating powers a list, 
as nearly complete as may be possible, of all those contracts 
between their nationals, of the one part, and the Chinese 
Government or any of its administrative subdivisions or local 
authorities, of the other part, which involve any conces- 
sion, franchise, option or preference with regard to rail- 
way construction, mining, forestry, navigation, river con- 
servancy, harbour works, reclamation, electrical communica- 
tions, or other public works or public services, or for the 
sale of arms or ammunition, or which involve a lien upon 
any of the purviews or properties of the Chinese Government 
or of any of its administrative subdivisions. There shall be, 
in the case of each document so listed, either a citation to a 
published text or copy of the text itself. 

Every contract of the public character described which 



APPENDIX 305 

may be concluded hereafter shall be notified by the Govern- 
ments concerned within sixty days after the receipt of in- 
formation of its conclusion to the powers who are signa- 
tories of or adherents to this agreement. 

ni 

The Chinese Government agrees to notify, in the condi- 
tion laid down in this agreement, every treaty, agreement 
or contract of the character indicated herein which has been 
or may hereafter be concluded by that Government or by 
any local authority in China with any foreign power or 
the nationals of any foreign power, whether party to this 
agreement or not, so far as the information is in its posses- 
sion. 

IV 

The Governments of powers having treaty relations with 
China, which are not represented at the present conference, 
shall be invited to adhere to this agreement. The United 
States Government, as convener of the conference, under- 
takes to communicate this agreement to the Governments of 
the said powers, with a view to obtaining their adherence 
thereto as soon as possible. 

(8) REsoiiUTioN Banishing Spheres of Influence 

Resolved, That the signatory powers will not support any 
agreement by their respective nationals with each other de- 
signed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the 
enjoyment of exclusive opportunity in designated, parts of 
Chinese territory. 

(9) Resolution Regarding Radio Stations in China 

The representatives of the powers hereinafter named par- 
ticipating in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern ques- 



>/ 



306 APPENDIX 

tions in the conference on the limitation of armament, to 
wit, the United States of America, Belgium, the British 
Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, have resolved: 

1. That all radio stations in China, whether maintained 
under the provisions of the International Protocol of Sept. 
7, 1901, or in fact maintained in the grounds of any of 
the foreign legations in China, shall be limited in their use 
to sending and receiving Government messages and shall not 
receive or send commercial or personal or unofficial messages, 
including press matters ; provided, however, that in case all 
other telegraphic communication is interrupted, then, upon 
official notification accompanied by proof of such interrup- 
tion to the Chinese Ministry of Communications, such sta- 
tions may afford temporary facilities for commercial, per- 
sonal or unofficial messages, including press matter, until 
the Chinese Government has given notice of the termination 
of the interruption. 

2. All radio stations operated within the territory of 
China by a foreign Government or the citizens or subjects 
thereof, under treaties or concessions of the Government 
of China, shall limit the messages sent and received by 
the terms of the treaties or concessions under which the re- 
spective stations are maintained. 

3. In case there be any radio station maintained in the 
territory of China by a foreign Government or citizens or 
subjects thereof without the authority of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment such station and all the plant, apparatus and 
material thereof shall be transferred to and taken over by 
the Government of China, to be operated under the direction 
of the Chinese Ministry of Communications upon fair and 
full compensation to the owners for the value of the installa- 
tion, as soon as the Chinese Ministry of Communications is 
prepared to operate the same effectively for the general pub- 
lic benefit. 



APPENDIX 307 

4. If any question shall arise as to the radio stations 
in leased territories, in the South Manchurian Railway zone 
or in the French concession at Shanghai, they shall be 
regarded as matters for discussion between the Chinese Gov- 
ernment and the Government concerned. 

5. The owners or managers of all radio stations main- 
tained in the territory of China by foreign powers or citi- 
zens or subjects thereof shall confer with the Chinese Min- 
istry of Communications for the purpose of seeking a com- 
mon arrangement to avoid interference in the use of wave 
lengths by wireless stations in China, subject to such gen- 
eral arrangements as may be made by an international con- 
ference convened for the revision of the rules established by 
the International Radio Telegraph Convention signed at 
London, July 5, 1912. 

The reservations, as approved by the Committee and 
spread upon the record, read thus : 

*'The powers other than China declare that nothing in 
paragraphs 3 or 4 of the resolution of Dec. 7, 1921, is to 
be deemed to be an expression of opinion by the conference 
as to whether the stations referred to therein are or are 
not authorized by China. 

"They further give notice that the result of any discus- 
sion arising under Paragraph 4 must, if it is not to be sub- 
ject to objection by them, conform with the principles of 
the open door, or equality of opportunity, approved by 
the conference." 

In addition, Mr. Alfred Sze for China similarly spread 
upon the record the following declaration by China : 

"The Chinese delegation takes this occasion formally to 
declare that the Chinese Government does not recognize 
or concede the right of any foreign power or of the nationals 
thereof to instal or operate, without its express consent, radio 
stations In legation grounds, settlements, concessions, leased 
territories, railway areas or other similar areas." 



APPENDIX TO PART VI 

It may be held pertinent at this hour to disclose the fol- 
lowing from official notebooks. After Japan had attacked 
and captured Kiaochow (Nov., 1914), the Chinese Minister 
in Tokyo, through the secret service, obtained information 
that a series of drastic demands were being formulated. He 
therefore secretly visited the Elder Statesman, Marquis 
Matsukata, who was friendly to China, to intercede with 
him. Marquis Matsukata disclaimed all knowledge saying 
that Marquis Okuma, the Premier, was not on good terms 
with any of the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and did not 
consult them, but he advised a warning to be conveyed to 
President Yuan Shih-kai to exercise extreme care. Unfor- 
tunately the agitation over the continued presence of Japa- 
nese troops in Shantung had already reached boiling-point, 
and in spite of the warning President Yuan Shih-kai was 
forced by the Shantung people to issue a strong protest to 
Japan on the 4th January. This was precisely what Mar- 
quis Okuma and Baron Kato (Foreign Minister) were wait- 
ing for. On the 19th January the Twenty-one Demands 
were secretly filed on President Yuan Shih-kai personally. 
It was Count Inouye, Japanese Ambassador in London, and 
adopted heir of Marquis Inouye, the Elder Statesman, who 
later forced action by the Genro. Count Inouye had per- 
sistently denied the existence of Group V to Viscount Grey, 
then British Foreign Secretary. When it transpired that 
there was really such a group of which he had been kept in 
ignorance, he telegraphed confidentially over the heads of 
the Cabinet asking that the Emperor recall him as his 
honour had been compromised by Baron Kato, forcing him 

to prevaricate in his dealings with Viscount Grey. 

308 



APPENDIX 309 

When the Peking negotiations approached their inevitable 
crisis at the end of April, there was a mounting storm of 
indignation among the Elder Statesmen. China in her last 
reply having rebutted the final Japanese proposals, on the 
4th May the Cabinet and the Genro held a joint meeting 
which lasted four hours without coming to any definite con- 
clusion. Owing, however, to the open opposition of the 
Elder Statesmen there was an increasing tendency to with- 
draw the two articles of Group V., dealing with the employ- 
ment of Japanese advisers and the proposed monopoly in 
the supply of Japanese arms and ammunition. In order to 
come to a definite decision the Cabinet called a second meet- 
ing next day. This was also inconclusive : hence an arrange- 
ment was made for an Imperial audience on the 6th May. 

At this meeting before the Throne it was declared that 
the fundamental causes of disagreement between the Genro 
and the Cabinet were: 

(1) That the Japanese Government in drawing up the 
Twenty-one Demands did not consult the Elder Statesmen 
whose opinion is usually solicited in matters of importance. 

(2) That without the approval of the Genro the Govern- 
ment had declared martial Law in Manchuria and the Port 
Arthur Leased Territory and mobilized troops in these 
areas. 

At the beginning of the Audience the Genro Marquis 
Matsukata inquired about Japan's financial standing in the 
event of war. The Finance Minister answered that four 
months* expenditure had been prepared. Marquis Matsu- 
kata (who was the principal financial authority in Japan 
having established the gold standard) replied that to bring 
down a big country like China, four months was an entirely 
inadequate preparation. Prince Yamagata then asked 
whether it would be necessary to consult England and 
America prior to the taking of final steps ; if an ultimatum 
were issued leading to the intervention of other Powers how 



310 APPENDIX 

would Japan meet the contingency? Baron Kato, Foreign 
Minister, answered that the filing of an ultimatum would 
cause China to accept all the Demands. If not, war would 
be declared which would automatically overthrow the gov- 
ernment of Yuan Shih-kai. Prince Yamagata answered 
that even if Yuan Shih-kai were so easily overthrown it 
would be much harder to restore the status quo ante helium, 
and that unless Japan were prepared for a ten years' strug- 
gle he feared the desired results would not be accomplished. 
Marquis Matsukata urged once more that the clauses deal- 
ing with Japanese advisers and Japanese arms and the like 
should be left for mutual consideration and no force threat- 
ened in their regard. To this Baron Kato objected strenu- 
ously. In consequence of his brusque manner in the Impe- 
rial presence he was ordered to leave the meeting, which 
proceeded without him and ended by the general acceptance 
of the contentions of the Genro. 

It was in consequence of these developments that in the 
/ultimatum delivered to China the next day, 7th May, Japan 
agreed to detach Group V from immediate consideration, 
reserving it for a later date. The Japanese Legation in 
Peking, only apprised of these events at a much later date, 
was telegraphing all that day (7th May) and the next, 
after filing the ultimatum that better terms were obtainable. 
These are the true facts which have hitherto been closely 
guarded. 



c^ 



,v> A. 



5-' \^^ 









<y 



.0- 



.>i' -^^ 



A^ 'V 



?/-/' 



:^ ''^'^'V ^^':'■^ 






,0 o 



,5^*4^*^, ^ 



A^ 






■<^^^. 



...*^.-_.,v. 



•^//'^ 



•^ -V. 



,0 0, 



'tf-. 



''^^. .l'^' 



■%c>' -^;n 



-^^ ^. 



.V -^c^ 



•,\' 









%..<^' 



...^A 



-^^ 



%.^' 



• 0' . ^' 



'7^;''-^ .0^,^^'^«V 



N -/;.,. 



\^.. 



■.■^' 






•^-' 



'"^^"^^^ ^^f' "-^ 



°^._ *. 



iV ./^. 






A^ 



''' iT^'^u^ 



^. -.% 



'-^^. .^x^" 



'.■^f-%^' 



•^, ^^^^ 



